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Preface
At the beginning of his career, Alfred Einstein worked several years at the then
newly established Swiss patent office. He first started as a junior clerk but soon
became a senior patent examiner. It would be overstated to say that his job at the
patent office was deterministic to Einstein's later scientific theories, but the type
of work - he said himself - certainly influenced his thinking and his clear way of
presenting new theories. After he had left the Swiss patent office, Einstein
continued to be interested in patent matters. Not only did he frequently act as an
adviser for firms, he also obtained a few patents himself. Besides scientists like
Einstein, with a strong interest in inventions and technological applications,
patents have also attracted a lot of attention of lawyers. A number of famous
patent wars have been fought out before court. To name some, the long-running
conflict between Akzo and Du Pont on the superstrong aramid fibre, which will
be described more extensively in chapter 1, or the famous conflict between the
Holland Sweetener Company and NutraSweet about patents on the artificial
sweetener aspartame.
This book is not concerned with the technical aspects of patents that Einstein
was particularly interested in, nor with the legal aspects lawyers may argue
about. Instead, this book deals with the economic aspects of patents. Much profit
can be at stake when patents are involved. Imagine, for example, what the firm
that possessed the patent on the game of monopoly must have gained from it.
Unfortunately for the Parker Brothers - and this holds true for many patent-
holders - they had no absolute monopoly; they faced competition from other
players in the market for games.
Research is a process where, in the ideal case, positive externalities are im-
portant. Although only my name is on the cover, I have received many positive
externalities from several persons for which I am most grateful. First of all, I
would like to thank Luc Soete for his trust, his enthusiastic encouragement and
his smooth, stimulating supervision, and particularly Patrick Van Cayseele for his
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critical assessments, for showing me the rich field of Industrial Organization, and
finally for his truly excellent guidance in the process of writing this thesis.
Furthermore, I would like to thank Paul David, who, spread over several visits,
has read each and every draft chapter and who has provided me with valuable
fresh and insightful comments which were useful indeed. My special thanks go
to Curtis Eaton; chapter 4 (a joint work of Patrick Van Cayseele and myself) has
much profited from the comments he made when he acted as our discussant at
the MERIT Conference, December 1992, and, more importantly, he delivered the
essential parts for chapter 7, which became a joint work of Curtis Eaton, Patrick
Van Cayseele and myself. On top of his tangible contribution, Curtis Eaton -
probably without knowing it - gave me much inspiration and energy for this
book. Next, I would like to thank Reinoud Joosten, Bart Verspagen and Thomas
Ziesemer for the regular open-door discussions and the help they provided any
time I needed them and from which I learned a lot. Finally, I would like to thank
the following persons whose contributions can be traced back to the chapter
level: Claude Crampes, Daniel Deneffe and Eric de Laat, for their critical remarks
on chapter 3; Geert Duysters and John Hagedoorn, for providing most of the data
of chapter 6; Erik Brouwer and Marga Peters, for their help in processing these
data; and Ed Steinmueller, for his practical comments. By definition, positive
externalities are not paid for, but I hope that in the future I can provide these
persons with some externalities coming from my side.
One cannot live from intellectual externalities alone. Therefore I would like to
thank some financial contributors. My major sponsor for four years has been the
Foundation for the Promotion of Research in Economic Sciences (grant 450-227-
014), which is part of the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research
(NWO). This organization also provided me with a grant that enabled me to visit
the 3rd Summer School in Economic Theory at the Institute for Advanced Stud-
ies, June 1992, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. This grant has had a high
personal rate of return. Finally, the Shell travel donation for the Crete Conference
of the EARIE, September 1994, is also greatly acknowledged.
I would also like to thank all persons who make of MERIT an excellent, effi-
cient and pleasant environment to work in; special thanks go to Wilma Coene-
grachts, Mieke Donders, Corien Gijsbers (who also did a fine job of checking the
English), and Silvana de Sanctis. My final thanks go to some people outside my
direct working environment; my family for the solid foundation they have been
providing through the years, my friends for the necessary distraction, and José
for her daily support.
Maastricht, June 1994
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
It is quite remarkable that economists have devoted so much research effort to
justify the patent system. After all, patents existed long before economics origi-
nated as a science. It is even more remarkable that modem economists bring
forward the same arguments that were also used some five centuries ago when
the first patent systems were established. During the last ten years, economists
have exposed a renewed interest in the economics of ideas. A recent attempt to
appraise the results of incorporating the intentional search for ideas, strongly
emphasizes the characteristic of non-rivalry of ideas as being crucial to most
results.' Non-rivalry is present if a good can be used more than once without
diminishing the usefulness to others. A computer programme, for example, can
be used by millions of people, but is still able to perform the same tasks for all
users. The revived attention has raised the consciousness that, although ideas can
cause economies to grow, a pure laissez-faire system may not perform well in
providing these non-rival ideas. Institutional mechanisms can be designed to
improve the invisible hand outcome. The patent system is currently mentioned as
a good example of how an institutional innovation can improve welfare through
collective action on non-rival goods production. Surprisingly, this same notion of
non-rivalry can be found in the earliest, medieval patent systems. In latin 'patent'
stands for 'open'; a patent right, an open right, is 'usable more than once', and as
such a most appropriate property right to non-rival goods.
Of course, economists are able to analyze historical institutions even long
after they started to exist and the newer version of this old argument is theoret-
1. See Romer (1993). Perhaps most significantly, the revived attention has influenced the
field of growth theory. One of the main results of new growth theory is that the non-
rival character of ideas is the driving force behind the growth of modern economies -
through industries-wide increasing returns.
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ically much better founded. The numerous economic analyses over time have
provided us with a much better understanding of the various costs and benefits
of patents. Major contributors include Machlup, Penrose, Plant, Schmookler,
Arrow, and many other economists in the Industrial Organization field. Despite
the considerable attention given to patents so far, some aspects still seem to be
neglected in economics. The many patent cases in the juridical literature, one of
which is described below, have made clear that there are limits to the monopoly
power that patents provide. These limits of patent protection have hardly been
analyzed by economists.
DM Pout vs. Aifczo*
The conflict between Du Pont and Akzo was concerned with the production pro-
cess of aramide, a synthetic fibre. Du Pont introduced its aramide fibre first in
1972 under the trademark of 'Kevlar'. Later, Akzo entered the market with a
chemically identical fibre with the tradename of 'Twaron'. Since the base of this
patent war is formed by the historical research and patent positions of both firms,
some backgrounds on these positions might be useful. Du Pont has a long-
standing tradition in polyamid fibre research. In the 1930s Du Pont's researchers
developed a new polyamid, well known under the name of 'Nylon'. In the 1950s
they developed a method for polymerising a new class of polyamids, called
aromatic polyamids. This method was patented in 1958. Because the new
polyamids had excellent heat-resisting properties, Du Pont's research aimed at
spinning a fibre from them. In 1967 such a fibre was introduced and served as a
textile fibre for fire-protective clothing. In the late 1960s research showed that a
special subgroup of the new aromatic polyamids resulted not only in the most
heat-resisting but also the strongest fibre known thus far. At that time, however,
there was a problem in spinning the new fibre directly from the polymerisation
solution. Du Pont's research was therefore mainly directed towards solving this
problem. Several solutions were found and patented, but none of these solutions
proved to be commercially attractive. It was not before December 1969 that Du
Pont's researcher Blades improved the fibre such that it was suitable for
commercial production (he developed the so-called 'air gap spinning method').
Du Pont applied for two patents for this process in 1971. The patents were
granted in 1973 after several respecifications and negotiations with the US Patent
Office. The patent office refused to accept the applications three times because in
1964 another firm, Monsanto Company, had applied for a related air gap
spinning method. But the Blades patents were eventually granted and can be
2. For a more extensive description of the conflict see Mulder and Vergragt (1991).
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considered as key patents in the protection of the fibre Kevlar, which was mar-
keted in 1972.
Contrary to Du Pont, Akzo does not have a long tradition in polyamids.
Akzo started its research on strong fibres in 1970. In the early 1970s the major
goal of Akzo research was to catch up with Du Pont. By 1973 Akzo had nearly
caught up and was not far from spinning its own strong fibre. There were, how-
ever, still some problems with the spinning process. Blades' patents, published in
1973, showed the solution of leading the spinning through an air gap. Because
another air gap spinning process had already been described in the Monsanto
patent prior to the Blades patents, the Akzo patent department advised to use
parts of the process described in the Blades patents. Thus, by 1973 Akzo was also
able to produce the new aromatic polyamid, which was named 'aramid' from
then on.
After catching up with Du Pont, Akzo's research focused on improving the
production process. As a result of this Akzo researcher Vollbracht found a new
solvent for the polymerisation process in 1975. A patent application for this new
solvent was filed in February 1975. The value of this alternative solvent increased
enormously when it became clear that the original solvent Du Pont used was
carcinogenic, while the alternative was not. Du Pont wanted a license for the new
solvent, but Akzo was only prepared to grant it if a worldwide agreement was
reached which enabled it to produce an aramid fibre as well. Du Pont refused to
cooperate and instead tried to block the patent applications of Akzo, which
caused considerable waiting lags in most countries. Probably, the reason behind
Du Pont's refusal to reach an agreement was the fact that in 1975 the European
synthetic fibre market collapsed. Because of financial restrictions of Akzo, Du
Pont expected that Akzo had to stop the aramid project. But a loan of the Dutch
Ministry of Economic Affairs prevented that. After estimating the patent positions
of Akzo and Du Pont and concluding that Akzo had a sufficiently strong posi-
tion, the Ministry was prepared to grant the loan. In 1978 Akzo started prepara-
tions for the building of aramid and spinning plants. As soon as it became clear
that Akzo received a helping hand from the Dutch government, Du Pont started
filing complaints to several courts in Europe in 1979. In reaction, Akzo contested
Du Pont's patents in a US court.
In the meantime, the Akzo research department came up with another im-
provement in the aramid production. As a result of an improved mixing of the
spinning solution, a fibre was produced which proved to be even better heat-
resistant. Akzo applied for a patent (in order to obtain a stronger position in the
conflict) and Du Pont opposed after its publication in 1981. The conflict escalated:
Du Pont and Akzo fought each other's patents (primarily the Blades and Voll-
bracht patents and the latest patents on the improved mixing) in almost every
industrialized country. There were victories for both (for example, Du Pont won
in the US and Akzo in the Netherlands and (former) West-Germany). The conflict
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was eventually ended somewhat surprisingly by a UK court. In June 1987 Akzo's
aramid fibre was forbidden in the UK. Du Pont built a Kevlar spinning plant in
Northern Ireland, an investment of about $60 million, in order to strengthen its
market position in Europe. In April 1988, however, the ban on Akzo's aramid in
the UK was lifted and there was a possibility that Du Pont's Kevlar was going to
be banned instead. To save the large investment in Northern Ireland, Du Pont
finally agreed to allow Akzo to enter the international aramid fibre market in
1989.
The patent conflict between Du Pont and Akzo perfectly illustrates that the
field of economics, when patents are involved, broadly intersects with the fields
of technology and law. The worldwide synthetic fibre market was at stake, a new
rapidly growing market offering enormous profit potential. Through intentional
research, Du Pont generated polyamid innovations and developed the synthetic
fibre market. The long-standing in-house research tradition in polyamids resulted
in a strong patent portfolio for Du Pont. Initially, Du Pont was able to control the
global aramid market and to deter entry because of its key Blades patents. How-
ever, motivated by the large profit opportunities, Akzo increased its research
effort and, finally, also obtained a key patent (the Vollbracht patent). The legal
war on each other's patents eventually broke the monopoly position of Du Pont
and made the market a duopoly.
Have economists realized and incorporated the close connections between
economics and technology and law? It took some time, but today most econo-
mists are convinced that the link between technology and economics is impor-
tant. However, the relation between law and economics is largely neglected, at
least in the economic patent literature. This lack of attention constitutes the basic
motivation for this thesis.
Endogenous Tedino/ogica/ C/iange m Economics
It took a long time for the economic literature to make the link between tech-
nology and economics. At first even Schumpeter, the forerunner among econ-
omists who pointed at the link, considered technical change as being exogenous
to the economic system (see Freeman 1982, p. 212 describing the young Schumpe-
ter's model). Later on, in his Capita/ism, Socialism and Democracy (1942), Schumpe-
ter adjusted his view and explained the vision of endogenous technological
change, taking place in research departments of large and monopolistic firms.
Only since the famous publication of Solow (1957), did most of the mainstream
economists become aware of the importance of technological change for the
economic system. Solow found that the productivity growth in the US over the
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period 1909-1949 could be explained to a large extent by improved technologies.'
Although Solow emphasized the importance of technical change, he did not
really endogenise it in his model. Kaldor (1957) was probably the first who made
a theoretical economic (growth) model with endogenised technical change. In
modern economic theory, the interest of growth theorists in endogenous technical
change has revived and resulted in a series of 'new growth models' (Romer 1994,
Grossman and Helpman 1994). But not only growth theorists have taken up the
issue. At a more micro level technological change was endogenised as well. It
was Arrow (1962) who first developed a theoretical model with endogenous
research and development (R&D) decisions of individual firms.
The relation to patents was first made by Nordhaus (1969). Nordhaus applied
Arrow's model to the study of optimal patent duration. Endogenous technical
change is at the heart of his analysis; Nordhaus (p. 74) states very explicitly that
the most basic justification for the institution of patents is endogenous R&D. If
most inventions also occured without intentional R&D, the basic economic argu-
ment for patents would disappear (the next chapter will discuss Nordhaus' study
in more detail).
: a NegZecfed Ffe/d in Patent Economics
The link between technology and economics was hard to implement in economic
science. The same seems to hold for the link between law and economics, at least
in the case of patents. Economists such as Coase (1960) (and Institutional Econ-
omics in general) have explored the basic relation between law and economics,
and parts of Industrial Organisation do so as well (see, for example, Scherer and
Ross 1990 for the economics of antitrust legislation). But in the case of patents,
the design, practice and impact of law has not received much attention in the
economic science, even though patent laws and practices heavily affect economic
variables. We have seen in the Du Pont-Akzo case what economic implications
patents and courts can have on market structure, behaviour and performance. A
large number of such cases have been discussed in the legal literature (see Cor-
nish 1989). But despite the economic importance, the patent literature has mainly
been dominated by legal experts and jurists. One could object to this view and
point at, for example, the vast economic literature on patent races in Industrial
3. As a parenthesis, it is worthwhile to observe that the point made and the method
used in Solow (1957) were in fact not completely new (Arrow 1994). In his article "Zur
Théorie der Langfristigen Wirtschaftsentwicklung", in Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv in
1942, Tinbergen performed similar calculations for the period 1870-1914 for Germany,
the UK, France and the US. Thus far, no or little credit has been given to Tinbergen for
this (I thank Bart Verspagen for pointing this out).
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Organisation. As a defense, however, one could then say that this literature is
concerned with the link between economics and technology, rather than the link
between economics and law. Patent race models study the economic effects of
patents as incentives on the stage of R&D competition. Law is important in later
stages, especially when decisions have to be made as to when to grant a patent
and how to judge in cases of supposed infringement and dispute. Although some
economic articles on patents have recently appeared which incorporate some
ideas from law (for example, Klemperer 1990, Scotchmer and Green 1990), much
remains to be done. This lack of attention constitutes the main motivation for this
book.
The field of law is heavily affected by the complexity of the technical con-
tents of patents. The implementation of patent laws becomes particularly compli-
cated in two phases of a patent procedure. First, in the examination phase. Patent
examiners must check whether applications fulfil the requirements as determined
by law. Most applications filed have been carefully prepared by their applicants.
The definition of the claims in applications is often the result of a delicate
interplay between the inventor, a patent attorney and an economic adviser, who
carefully consider all technical, legal and economic aspects of the various options
when writing the claims. These claims and all kinds of technical subtleties - not
of known products, but of inventions at the borders of current knowledge - must
be understood and critically judged by examiners. It is thus clear that the patent
office needs highly qualified persons, both technically and legally, to perform the
examination phase. The technical contents of patents can heavily affect the legal
practice in a later phase as well. After a patent is granted, disputes can occur
because other patentholders are of the opinion that their rights are infringed or
because the patentholder himself believes that his rights are violated by others. A
large number of these disputes are settled outside court. The patentholder can,
for example, offer the supposed infringer a license contract, or threat to file a suit
against him, which may be sufficient to deter him as well. The prospect of a
time-consuming and expensive court case often scares off both parties and makes
a mutual settlement a more attractive alternative. Yet, there are still numerous
cases where courts have to decide. The Du Pont vs. Akzo case is a good example.
To summarize, the general theme of this book is the economics of patent
protection. I will not study the impact of patents on innovation incentives, where
the economic analysis is strongly related to the field of technology. Such analysis
could be labelled as the economics of patent design. Instead, the role of patents in
the intersection area between law and economics is central to this book. It studies
the protection that a patent provides against competitors, once the patent is
granted. This field could be labelled as the economics of patent protection.
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1.2 Facts about Patent Protection
Patent laws generally define a patent as a temporary and exclusive right on an
invention. Such a legal definition must be considered as a framework which
leaves much interpretation open to judges, lawyers and practical economists in
firms and government service. Of course, no interpretation is involved in the
legal lifetime of a patent which is fixed by law. But how far, for example, does
the exclusivity of a patent reach? When exactly is a patent infringed? In theoreti-
cal economics, patents are often thought to provide perfect protection and thus
absolute monopoly power. Sometimes this assumption serves the tractability of
the theoretical model, but often it is believed to be realistic. If one takes a closer
look at the practice of patent disputes in courts, at innovations and innovation
strategies of firms and at diverse national patent systems, some facts about patent
protection, which seem obvious once perceived, become clear. The list of per-
ceived facts, which will be presented below, is not meant to be exhaustive. Only
the facts which relate to the issue of patent protection are presented. These facts
form the basis for the complete book: they have inspired the questions posed and
the basic assumptions made in the further analyses. Some facts are strongly relat-
ed to others.
(a) Most patentable inventions are patented
For a random sample of 100 US manufacturing firms, Mansfield (1986) found
that about 75% of all patentable inventions are actually patented in the period
1981-1983. This percentage differs over industries. In some industries, trade
secrets are more appropriate to protect inventions (for example, if technology
progresses rapidly and patent procedures take too much time), or reverse engi-
neering is so costly that patent protection is not worthwhile. Mansfield distin-
guished two groups of industries: one containing pharmaceuticals, chemicals,
petroleum, machinery and fabricated metal products, where over 80% of the
patentable inventions are patented and where patents are thus relatively
important. Another, containing primary metals, electrical equipment, office
equipment, instruments, motor vehicles, rubber and textiles, where patents are
less important (about 60% of all inventions are patented in this group). Mansfield
also observed that the proportion of patentable inventions really patented is, in
most industries, independent of the impact of patents as incentives to carry out
R&D. Thus, despite the fact (which he also finds for his sample) that patents do
not provide strong innovation incentives (except for the pharmaceutical and
chemical industry), many inventions are in fact patented. The proportion of
inventions patented is in most industries positively related to firm size. Large
firms make more use of patent protection than small firms. Taylor and Silberston
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(1973) have obtained similar results for samples encompassing fewer industries.
(b) Inventing around a patent occurs
There is a widespread belief in economics that patents are sufficiently strong to
provide perfect protection and thus absolute monopoly power. In the legal pro-
fession, however, lawyers are often confronted with the limits of patent protec-
tion. Competitors can invent around a patent with products or processes that are
similar to the patented one but that are nevertheless allowed for by court. We
already saw an illustration in the previous section where was described how
important parts of the Blades patents of Du Pont were used by Akzo. As another
illustration from real case law, consider the patent dispute about a new crane
discussed in Hoyng (1990). The crane is protected by European patent #0033060.
The new aspect of this crane is the flexible counterweight for the crane jib, which
makes that the crane is in equilibrium in any position (see figure l.l.a). This is
obtained by a mechanical construction. Later on, a second firm entered the mar-
ket with a crane that used the same idea of a flexible counterweight (see figure
l.l.b). This time the counterweight was obtained by changing the position of the
counterweight by using of hydraulic pumps. The patentholder charged the other
firm for infringing the patent, but the court decided that the patent was not
infringed. According to the court, the functionally equivalent use of hydraulic
pumps instead of bars was not obvious for an average expert in the field.
Because a major part of the crane was sufficiently inventive, although the basic
idea of the complete crane was similar, the second crane was not held to be too
similar.
The benefits for firms that invent around existing patents are obvious. Due to
spill-overs, these firms obtain information from the patentholder without paying
for it. Whereas the original inventor has spent time and money to carry out R&D,
imitators do not have to do this (or to a smaller degree) and still acquire the
necessary information. Firms that invent around thus face a cost and time advan-
tage relative to the original inventor. In a study of 48 new. products, Mansfield,
Schwartz and Wagner (1981) found that, on average, the ratio of the imitation
cost to the (original) innovation cost was about 65%. On average, the ratio of the
imitation time to the innovation time was about 70%. These relative R&D cost
and time advantages indeed spurs inventing around: 60% of all patented and
successful innovations were imitated within 4 years after introduction. The
results of Mansfield, Schwartz and Wagner are confirmed in a more recent study
of Levin, Klevorick, Nelson and Winter (1987). The latter make a distinction
between typical and major innovations and find that the latter take more time
and cost to imitate (but exact percentages as in Mansfield et al. cannot be derived
from their tables).
Introduction
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Figure 1.1 A crane patent dispute (source: Hoyng 1990)
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(c) Most innovations contain elements from existing products
As Schumpeter (1942) observed, a basic invention rarely occurs isolated but is
often followed by a cluster of improvements in the process of diffusion. Accor-
ding to Schumpeter, long cycles (Kondratieff cycles) in the economy can be
explained this way. Technical change is thus a cumulative process (see also Dosi
1988). New innovations are in some way or another always related to current
products (Scotchmer 1991). The new crane discussed above, for example, uses
known elements of old cranes, such as the material and the shape of design, but
adds new elements such as the flexible counterweight.'' This notion of sub-
sequent innovations is backed up at a micro level. A large part of the total R&D
expenditures of firms is allocated to product improvements (Freeman 1982).
Aiming at improvements can be attractive for firms because applied research and
experimental development are less uncertain than basic research, both from a
technical and marketable point of view. In his classification of innovation
strategies, Freeman (1982, p. 176) says the following about the 'defensive' innova-
tion strategy:
"The 'defensive' innovators do not wish to be the first in the world, but
neither do they wish to be left behind by the tide of technical change. ...,
most industrial R&D is 'defensive' or 'imitative' in character and concerned
mainly with minor 'improvements', modifications of existing products and
processes, technical services and other work with short time horizons."
The group of firms pursuing defensive innovation strategies is large and domi-
nant in most industries.
(d) The effective lifetime of a patent is often shorter than the legal lifetime
The effective lifetime can be defined in an indirect way as the duration which the
patentholder chooses protection to last. Legally, most modern patents last for
about 20 years. But in most patent systems, the patentholder has to pay renewal
fees each year in order to keep his patent valid. If the patentholder chooses not
to pay his renewal fees before the 20 years have passed, the patent expires. The
effective patent life is then shorter than the legal life. The obvious reason for not
paying the annual renewal fee is that the costs of extending protection outweigh
the returns from it. The annual renewal fees are fixed and known beforehand,
but the returns from patent protection are uncertain for several reasons. First,
competitors may invent around the patent after some years and make the returns
for the patentholder dissipate. Another reason for decreasing returns may be that
4. For more examples of related innovations, see Baker (1976).
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the innovations underlying the patents are commercially not successful (any-
more). It is well known that the importance of patents and innovations varies
considerably (Clark, Freeman and Soete 1983, Trajtenberg 1990). The patentholder
may not extend the protection of an unsuccessful innovation until the legal
expiration date. Schankerman and Pakes (1986) have studied the value of holding
patents in Europe, more precisely in the UK, Germany and France. Their goal
was to determine the economic value of a patent. They estimated the patent
value indirectly through the patentholders' decisions about renewals. Their study
showed that indeed the majority of patents are not renewed until the official
legal expiration date. For example, in the UK and France, more than half of the
patents are cancelled by year eight, and only a quarter passes year thirteen. The
legal lifetime in the UK and France is 20 years.
(e) Patents impede imitation
Although patent protection is not perfect and inventing around is still possible,
patents certainly can hinder competitors who invent around in similar technical
fields. Related innovations that build further on a patented invention typically
occur during the process of diffusion. Since related innovations can be hold to
infringe the patent, competitors have to invest R&D in order to be sufficiently
different. This R&D can be directed towards the generation of more new ele-
ments (higher improvement level) or towards less old elements (lower imitation
level) which subsequent innovations are made of (see chapter 3 for more on
types of innovation). Mansfield, Schwartz and Wagner (1981) provide evidence
on the extra R&D costs that competitors must spend due to the patent protection
on the innovations they want to imitate. They find that the extra imitation costs
due to the presence of patents are industry-specific: for example, about 30% in
ethical drugs, about 10% in chemicals and about 7% in electronics and machi-
nery. Again, like in fact (b), the results are confirmed by Levin et al. (1987), who
also find higher imitation costs in the presence of patents. Notice the difference
between fact (b) and (e): whereas fact (b) is about the ease of imitating innova-
tions in general, fact (e) deals with the imitation of patented innovations and, as
such, provides an estimation of the effectiveness of patent protection.
(f) Patent systems differ between countries
The difference between patent systems in most Northern and Southern countries
has been a major topic of discussion in the (past) Uruguay Round of GATT nego-
tiations (and long before, see Cooper 1973). Northern countries blamed Southern
countries not to provide (effective) patent protection and wanted them to adopt
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Table 1.1
Duration of patents
(a) Duration, counted from the filing date of the application:
20 years: Algeria; Belgium; Burundi; Chad; Denmark; Finland; France;
Hungary; Israel; Italy; Monaco; Morocco; Netherlands; Nigeria;
Norway; Rwanda; South Africa; Spain; Sudan; Sweden; Switzerland;
United Kingdom; Zimbabwe; European Patent Convention;
16 years: Bahamas; Jordan;
15 years: Brazil; Barbados; Bulgaria; China; Czechoslovakia; Democratic
People's Republic of Korea; Egypt; Iraq; Lebanon; Libya; Mongolia;
Poland; Romania; Soviet Union; Syria; Thailand; Viet Nam;
14 years: Malta; Mauritius;
10 years: OAPI (African Organization); Cuba;
5, 10, 15 or 20 years*: Iran; Tunisia;
5, 10 or 15 years**: Turkey.
(b) Duration, counted from the date following the filing date of the application:
20 years: former Federal Republic of Germany (and current Germany); Luxem-
bourg;
18 years: former German Democratic Republic;
15 years: Greece.
(c) Duration, counted from the publication date of the examined application:
18 years: Austria, but not beyond 20 years from the filing date of the applica-
tion;
15 years: Japan, but not beyond 20 years from the filing date of the applica-
tion;
12 years: Republic of Korea, but not beyond 15 years from the filing date of
the application.
(d) Duration, counted from the date the complete specification is lodged:
16 years: Australia; Ireland; Malawi; New Zealand; Zambia;
14 years: India.
(e) Duration, counted from the date of grant of the patent:
17 years: Canada; Philippines; United States of America;
16 years: Bangladesh; Pakistan;
15 years: Bolivia; Iceland; Malaysia; Portugal; Sri Lanka; Uruguay;
14 years: Mexico; Trinidad and Tobago;
5, 10, or 20 years**: Haiti;
5, 10 or 15 years*: Argentina; Dominican Republic;
5 or 10 years*: Venezuela;
5 years: Colombia; Ecuador; Peru.
Source: Annex VI, p. 309-311 in Beier and Schricker (1989)
(*: depending on the applicant's request; **: the law does not appear to indicate on what the
actual duration depends)
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their standards of protection. But beside the obvious difference between North
and South, i.e., between patent protection and no protection, more subtle differ-
ences exist within the Northern region. I will give some illustrations. First, the
legal lifetime differs among Northern countries. Table 1.1 presents the patent
duration of some countries. Although the legal duration is often not relevant (fact
d) because the patent will not last until the end, it can matter when exactly the
protection starts. The start varies considerably among countries, as does the legal
lifetime. Second, the annual renewal fees differ among countries. In Germany, for
example, the fee increases progressively in years, while in the UK and France the
fee increases linearly and starts at a lower level (Pakes 1986). Third, the novelty
requirements for patentability differ between countries. An indicator for the strin-
gency of examination is the granting ratio of the national patent office, i.e., the
proportion of applications that are granted a patent. The granting ratio in Ger-
many was around 35% (for the period 1955-1981), in the UK 83% (for the period
1955-1981) and in France 93% (for the period 1970-1981) (see Schankerman and
Pakes 1986). The final difference I will mention here is the rule in case of dispute.
In Canada and the US, the first-to-invent principle is practised, which means that,
if two inventors claim the same invention, the one who invented it first possibly
gets it. Most other countries, on the other hand, apply the first-to-file principle.
The first who files a patent application is the one who possibly obtains patent
protection. This is not necessarily the first who invented.
1.3 Research Questions
The theme throughout this book is patent protection. Although each chapter will
deal with one particular research question, some questions are underlying more
of them. Somehow these basic questions are all inspired by the above perceived
facts about patents.
The first question is on the shape of protection that a patentholder enjoys.
Fact (b) says that inventing around a patent occurs. But since patents always
provide some protection, inventing around cannot be unrestricted. When does a
patent provide protection and when does this protection stop?
The next question is on the practice of inventing around. How do competi-
tors technically invent around a patent? There are many possibilities. For exam-
ple, given fact (c) that most innovations contain known elements and are still
patentable, one manner to invent around would be by generating an improve-
ment of a patented product. Another example is imitation. If an imitation is
sufficiently dissimilar, it does not infringe the patent and is thus allowed for by
court.
The third basic question is on profits. Given the shape of patent protection
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and the various opportunities for inventing around, what are the profits of the
patentholder? But the shape also affects the profit opportunities of the com-
petitors who want to invent around. Fact (e) says that imitation is more costly
when patents are involved.
The fourth question is on how a country designs its patent system. The prof-
its of the patentholder and potential competitors depend on the design of patent
protection. This not only holds for profits, but for the national welfare in general
as well. Purely because of different isolated choices within countries, patent
systems might differ between countries (fact f).
In an international context, however, the design of a domestic patent system
might also depend on the foreign systems. Because of international spill-overs,
countries affect each other. This might lead to national strategic behaviour in
designing the patent system. The fifth and last question is then how countries
interdependently design their patent systems.
Some important aspects of patenting are excluded in this book. The practice
of licensing, for example, is not studied and kept outside the analysis. I refer to
Kamien (1992) for a survey of theoretical models on licensing. Another aspect
that is not studied here is the stage of technological competition which often
precedes the stage of patenting. For an excellent review of the literature on
patent races, see Reinganum (1989).
1.4 Methodology
A basic condition for the functioning of modern economies which rely to some
extent on the price mechanism, is a system of well-defined property rights.
Debreu's (1959) study on the general equilibrium of exchange economies uses the
assumption that agents have well-defined private endowments. This assumption
is necessary for the existence of a general equilibrium and its optimality in
resource allocation. At first sight, the assumption of well-defined property rights
seems not so stringent. Other assumptions, such as a system of markets for all
goods at all places at all times for all possible states of nature, seem much more
stringent. Debreu's model has proven its importance as the core of the neoclassi-
cal paradigm from which an enormous number of new theories have emerged.
The economics of invention is an example of theory originally emerging from the
general equilibrium framework. Arrow (1962) and Nelson (1959)' have pointed
out that even the assumption of well-defined property rights causes problems in
5. Arrow (1962) explains his arguments in the general equilibrium language of Debreu
(1959), whereas Nelson (1959) uses similar arguments resulting from more intuitive
reasoning.
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the context of inventions which are the intended purpose of research and devel-
opment. Due to characteristics of inventions, competitive systems do not achieve
optimal resource allocation. Besides indivisibilities and uncertainty, one of the
reasons that Arrow brings forth is the inappropriability of invention (which he
interprets to be a broader term for knowledge). The market for inventions has
some serious difficulties. In the absence of special legal protection, the inventor
cannot just sell his invention on the market. A property right on knowledge can
hardly be well-defined. A buyer must have a clue of what he is buying before-
hand. Thus, much knowledge has to be revealed before a possible choice of
purchase is made. Once bought, both the seller and the buyer have the knowl-
edge. Nothing prevents the buyer from selling it to others. Because of this in-
appropriability of invention, or any product of the human mind, the market does
not perform well. The institution of special property rights, such as patents, is
one of the instruments to correct the market failures caused by inappropriability.
Most studies on patents leave the general equilibrium framework and take a
partial equilibrium as object of study. Although some relations which are visible
in general equilibrium analysis disappear, the advantage of more detailed anal-
ysis possible in an industry is often thought to be stronger. This holds for Indus-
trial Organisation in general: generality is offered for the sake of detail. Some of
the necessary, often implicit, assumptions to justify a partial equilibrium frame-
work are: (i) that prices at other markets are fixed; and (ii) that income effects are
very small (the market considered is small and price changes do not affect the
consumers' budgets too much). In this book I will also pursue partial equilibrium
analysis and therefore always make the above assumptions.
The principal tools used to examine the basic research questions posed in the
previous section are adopted from the product differentiation literature (for an
excellent short survey, see Eaton and Lipsey 1989, for a more extensive treatment,
see Beath and Katsoulacos 1991 or Anderson, de Palma and Thisse 1992). There
are two branches of models in the product differentiation literature. In the first,
the non-address branch, consumers' preferences for differentiated goods are
defined over a finite or countably infinite set of goods. The main stream within
this branch uses a representative consumer approach. The seminal papers are
Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). One utility function where goods
enter symmetrically is representative of all consumers. The advantage of the
representative consumer approach is its tractability in calculus. This explains its
popularity in, for example, the new growth theory (see Grossman and Helpman
1991). There are, however, some important drawbacks in the non-address branch.
For example, the fact that consumers are held to be symmetric. There is no diver-
sity in consumers' tastes. Another example is the substitutability of goods. Since
all goods are treated symmetrically, they are all equal substitutes. In real life,
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however, some goods are closer substitutes than others. The address branch of
product differentiation meets these criticisms.* In the address branch consumers'
preferences are distributed over some continuous space of parameters describing
the nature of products. Consumers as well as products are characterized by
addresses on this continuum. So consumers' diversity and degrees of substitu-
tability of goods are incorporated. The price paid is a loss of calculating tracta-
bility which makes that, where the non-address branch is often used in a general
equilibrium framework, the address branch is almost exclusively used in partial
equilibrium analyses.
In this book I will adopt the address branch of product differentiation. Apart
from the advantages mentioned above, especially in the partial equilibrium
context chosen here, address models are far more appropriate to model patent
dimensions. The basic notion underlying this complete book is that a patent
defines a protected region on the continuum of a product (the product spectrum)
which is left exclusively for the patentholder/ Thus, where in basic address mod-
els firms are symmetric and have identical strategy sets, here, in the presence of
a patent system, asymmetries occur between a patentholder and competitors.
Given the use of product differentiation models, the analysis in this book is
naturally focused on product innovations. This is in contrast with other models
of patents, and microeconomic models of technical change in general, which
focus primarily on process innovations (following the seminal work of Arrow
1962).
6. Archibald, Eaton and Lipsey (1986) point at some further merits of the address ap-
proach.
7. This observation, be it in a much rawer form, was already made by Nicholas Kaldor
in his "Market Imperfection and Excess Capacity" (1935, p. 75, n.l): "The difference
between these two types of institutional monopolies (the one which affects merely the
relative costs of different producers, and the other which affects the elasticities of the
demand curves for products as well) can best be elucidated by examples. A legal patent
for a certain cheap process of producing ordinary window glass will not lead the
consumers to differentiate between glass produced by one process or another. It will
merely have the effect of imposing higher costs upon anybody who does not possess the
patent. A trade-mark protecting a certain soap or medicine, however, may lead the
consumers to differentiate between different soaps or medicines; and thus reduce the
elasticity of demand for the products of each producer." This book extends Kaldor's
interpretation of trade marks to patents.
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1.5 Plan of the Book
Each chapter in this book has also been written as a separate essay,* so that the
reader can pick up wherever he likes. Overall though, there is a clear logic be-
hind the chapters. First, I will present a survey of the existing theories in the
economic patent literature. Next, I will present my own analyses and work from
industry level to global level. I start at the micro level where dimensions of
patent protection are studied, first separately and later combined. Next, models
involving two and more countries are constructed. More precisely, each chapter
contains the following:
Chapter 2 presents a survey of the existing literature on intellectual property.
The emphasis in this survey is on theoretical models of patent protection,
running from the seminal paper of Nordhaus (1969) on patent lifetime to the
important article of Klemperer (1990) on patent breadth in the special patent
issue of the Rand Journal of Economics.
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 all deal with dimensions of patent protection. Chapter 3
studies patent height, where height is defined as the strength of protection
against improvements of competitors. The novelty requirements used by exam-
iners in the patent office mainly determine the height of protection. In a model of
vertical differentiation, I study the competition in product improvements between
a patentholder and one competitor. Chapter 4 deals with a related but basically
different dimension of protection, patent breadth. Breadth is defined as the
degree of protection against imitation. The broader protection is, the less similar
imitations are allowed to be. I use a model of horizontal differentiation to study
the dimension of breadth. The model of patent breadth is applied to the impor-
tant issue of price discrimination in competition policy. Competition policy and
patent policy are always felt to conflict. Patents provide market power while
competition policy often combats firms with market power. Chapter 5 combines
the dimensions of height and breadth into one model. The basis of this model is
a utility function which includes both vertical and horizontal differentiation. Such
a model makes it possible to examine optimal strategies for inventing around
patents.
Chapter 6 presents an empirical study which tests some aspects of the theo-
8. Each essay has also appeared as a MERIT Research Memorandum. A version of chap-
ter 3 has been published in the Tinbergen 7nsf;fMte Research B«//efin. One paper (with
Patrick Van Cayseele) based on chapter 4 will be published in Tec/imca/ C/wnge and f«e
WorW Economy, edited by John Hagedoorn. Another paper based on this chapter will be
published in Economics I^»ers. Chapter 7 is a joint work with Curtis Eaton and Patrick
Van Cayseele.
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ries developed in the previous chapters. It analyzes the patenting performance of
one specific industry, the data-processing industry, in the European Patent Office.
How do different innovation strategies cope with the novelty requirements of
examiners in the European Patent Office?
The international setting comes in in chapters 7 and 8. First, chapter 7
presents a model of patent breadth with two countries. These countries interde-
pendently set their patent breadths. The interdependence is caused by spill-overs
which run from larger protection in one country to larger incentives in the other
country. This model can deal with subtle differences in patent design between
countries. Next, a model specially developed to study the point of discussion in
the Uruguay Round is presented in chapter 8. Via the GATT negotiations, North-
ern countries want to extend their standards of protection to the South. In a
simple world model, the optimal extent of patent protection worldwide is exam-
ined under various regimes.
Finally, chapter 9 summarizes the results, gives some overall concluding re-
marks and points at directions for further research.
The Economic Theory
of Patents: A Survey
2.1 Introduction and Some History
The word patent originally stems from the latin 'litterae patentes', which can be
translated as 'open letters'. Open here really means 'usable more than once'.
Ordinary letters containing special rights were sealed on the outside. Once used,
the seal was broken and the letter had no value afterwards. An open letter has
the seal on the inside and the special right can thus be used more than once (see
David 1993 and the references therein).
Most economic historians refer to fifteenth century Venice and seventeenth
century England as the states having the oldest patent systems. Some jurists go
back in time even further and mention ancient Greece as the origin of intellectual
property. In the third century B.C. in Sybaris, a town in the southernmost part of
current Italy, a monopoly right was granted for one year to cooks who had
invented new and extraordinary recipes. The intention of this special law was
that the cookery artist could exploit his invention on the one hand, and that
others would be stimulated to improve the recipe of the rewarded cook on the
other (Brinkhof 1988). Other historical dissertations on the origin of the patent
system come up with the practice of mining in Austria in the thirteenth and
fourteenth century as one of the roots of current patent law (see Kaufer 1989).
The Alps were an ore-mining area with a tradition of common law concerning
the granting of property rights on mining, timber and water use to those who
first detected the mine. When mining became technically more complicated
because the easily accessible mines were exhausted, special privileges, based on
the existing mining law, were granted to those who designed devices that
extended mining possibilities (such as new mechanical means to draw the water
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from the lower mines).'
Although these primitive systems all have aspects similar to modern patent
systems, the first well-developed patent system existed in fifteenth century
Venice. On March 19, 1474, the first general patent law was passed by the
Venetian Senate (David 1993).* Another patent system, on which most modern
patent systems are based, emerged in England. During the period of Elizabeth
and James I, the policy of granting privileges of monopoly resulted in the Statute
of Monopolies in 1623. This Statute of Monopolies is often called the Magna
Charta of the right of inventors, because it was the first patent law to lay down
the principle that only the first inventor should be granted a patent (Machlup
and Penrose 1950).
Many countries followed the example of England and instituted patent
systems.' From the start, however, the patent system has been criticized by
opponents. The criticism was strongest in the 1860s and 1870s. At that time a
strong antipatent movement existed in England, Germany, and, especially,
Switzerland and the Netherlands. A major explanation for the antipatent move-
ment was the presence of a strong free-trade movement. Patent protection was
intuitively associated with tariff protection. The antipatent movement was
politically rather successful in weakening the patent laws. In the Netherlands the
patent system was even completely abolished in July 1869, and in Switzerland
the introduction was further prevented.'' However, from the 1870s onwards the
tide changed and the victory was eventually for the advocates of the patent
system. One reason for their victory was the economic crisis of 1873, which
suppressed the free-trade movement and made protectionism popular. Another
1. Kitch (1977) makes a similar observation and points at the analogy between patents
and mineral claims in the American West in the late nineteenth century.
2. The argument for the institution of a patent system is found in a correspondence cited
in David (1993): "We have among us men of great genius, apt to invent and discover
ingenious devices... Now, if provisions were made for the works and devices discovered
by such persons, so that others who may see them could not build them and take the
inventor's honour [sic] away, more men would then apply their genius, would discover,
and would build devices of great utility to our commonwealth."
3. By the end of the eighteenth century France (1791) and the US (1793) had their patent
systems. During the first half of the nineteenth century the institution of patent systems
spread out. For example, Austria instituted a patent system in 1810, Russia in 1812,
Prussia in 1815, Belgium and the Netherlands in 1817, Spain in 1820, Sweden in 1834,
and Portugal in 1837 (Machlup and Penrose 1950).
4. See Schiff (1971) on the economic consequences of the abolishment in the Netherlands,
and the absence of a patent system in Switzerland.
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reason was the Paris Industrial Property Convention of 1883, where an important
rule of international patenting was formulated. This rule says that nationals of
each member state must be given the same treatment in other states as that given
to its own nationals. If a country had no patent system, its nationals could not
get protection abroad. The basic idea behind this rule was to induce countries
without patent systems to institute them. Countries where the antipatent move-
ment was strongest were thus brought to institute patent systems: Switzerland
instituted a patent system in 1887 and the Netherlands re-instituted it in 1912
(Cornish 1989).
Machlup and Penrose (1950) surveyed the arguments pro and contra which
were used in the patent controversy in the nineteenth century. They reported
four types of arguments to justify the creation of patent rights, stressing a patent
to be: (i) the natural property right in ideas; (ii) the just reward for the inventor;
(iii) the best incentive to invent; and (iv) the best incentive to disclose secret
information. The first argument, which was especially popular in France, says
that intellectual property is not different from material property. An inventor has
a natural right to his invention. The counter argument is that a natural right to
an invention does not prevent others from using it (which, in fact, patents do).
The second line of arguments stresses that an inventor should be compensated
and rewarded for his efforts. The argument against it is that an inventor indeed
needs to be rewarded, but that a patent is not necessary because rewards would
also follow without. The third argument is more familiar in modern economics.
Invention needs to be stimulated because of the net social gain it generates.
Patents are the least expensive means to provide innovation incentives. Oppo-
nents argue that the patent system is not efficient. The costs of bureaucracy, court
personnel and lawyers make the patent system too costly and unattractive.
Moreover, the welfare loss due to monopoly is, of course, a major cost of the
patent system as well. The final type of argument points at the disclosure of
inventions, which without the patent system would have been secret to the
public. Arguments brought forward against this point are, first, that inventions
are often developed simultaneously by more persons. Since collective secrecy is
hard to establish, disclosure would also take place without the patent system.
Second, an individual inventor can hardly exploit his invention without revealing
it anyway.
Nowadays these old arguments are still brought forward. They show up in
the modern economic literature which this chapter will review. Other review
articles on the economics of intellectual property are Penrose (1951), Vernon
(1957), Machlup (1958), Kaufer (1989) and David (1993), all with major sections
on historical backgrounds; Besen and Raskind (1991) and Merges and Nelson
(1992), emphasizing the legal and business practices; La Manna (1992) and
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Crampes and Moreaux (1993), focusing on dimensions of patent protection; and
Griliches (1990), dealing with the empirical aspects of patents. The reader is
referred to White et al. (1978) and Cornish (1989) for the detailed legal aspects of
intellectual property.
This chapter will differentiate from these existing surveys and focus mainly
on the theoretical models of patents developed in the Industrial Organization
literature. After explaining the basic legal and economic aspects of intellectual
property in section 2.2, the rest of the chapter is organized as follows. First, in
section 2.3, I will sketch the legal and procedural aspects of patent granting in
steps. The procedure as described in the European Patent Convention is typical
of most modern patent systems and will be used as a guideline. The next sections
will review the literature along three themes. These themes are inspired by the
major stages of patentable technical change as shown in figure 2.1. The first is the
stage of prepatent technological competition, where firms compete with weapons
like research and development (R&D). The second stage concerns the patenting
decision and the patent procedure. The final, postpatent stage is where a firm has
obtained protection. The opportunities for exploitation of this protection are
central to this stage.
Stage I Sfage 2 Stage 3
Research and Development Patent Procedure Exploitation
Figure 2.1 Stages in patentable technical change
I will work backwards in time, starting with the last stage. Section 2.4 will
discuss models that deal with the stage of patent exploitation. How can a patent-
holder make his patent profitable? From the point of view of competition policy,
monopoly positions are always suspicious. Patent monopolies are therefore sub-
ject to all kinds of restrictions dictated by competition policy. In addition to these
legal restrictions, what are the opportunities for competitors to invent around the
patent? In brief, what are the rights and restrictions of the patentholder? Next,
section 2.5 will review the second stage of the granting procedure as determined
by patent laws. Studies on the private and social economic choices and trade-offs
relevant to this procedure are discussed. The information disclosure decision, as
required by patent law, plays a major role in the literature. In addition, the
requirements for patentability are studied, such as the stringency of the novelty
requirements. Once the possible gains, risks and costs of patent protection are
known, the first stage of research and development can be studied. The effects of
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patents on the innovation incentive are central to section 2.6. Alternative ways to
provide incentives are also described there. Finally, section 2.7 presents a schemat-
ic overview of the various models discussed (see table 2.2, p. 47), which may also
be convenient as a guide when reading sections 2.4 through 2.6.
2.2 The Legal and Economic Basics
fa,) Infe/fecfMflZ Property
Intellectual property can be loosely defined as the rights which can be enforced
on products of the human mind. Besides patents, other important forms of intel-
lectual property are copyright and trade marks. These three forms of intellectual
property imply different rights. Patents, for example, provide an exclusive control
over a technical invention for a limited time period, in general about 20 years.
The exclusivity of a patent is rather strong: a patentholder can keep others from
exploiting the protected product, even if they have generated it independently
from the patentholder. A less strong exclusivity - applied to, for example, top-
ographies of semiconductor chips and new plant and seed variations - allows for
reverse engineering. The rightholder cannot prevent others from stripping down
the invention and using it as the base for their own creation. A second form of
intellectual property, copyright, provides temporary protection on literary, artistic
and musical creations. Copyright can be enforced up to 50 years after the dead of
the creator. A copyrightholder can prevent others from exactly copy or exploiting
his creation. However, he cannot prevent others from exploiting their similar,
independently produced creations. A third form of intellectual property, which
attracts a lot of attention in the juridical literature but less in the economic litera-
ture, is the trade mark. Trade marks, such as firm names, brand names and logo-
types, can be protected by filing them in a trade mark register. If registered,
other firms are not allowed to use the same trademark. In this way, the reputa-
tion of a firm built up over time, for example through advertising, can be pro-
tected. Registered trade marks are usually protected for 7 years with the possibil-
ity of prolongation.
The patent is the intellectual property right that provides the strongest pro-
tection. The price, however, to be paid for this strong protection is the consider-
able effort necessary to obtain a patent. An application must be filed officially in
a patent office. After time-consuming examination procedures, the patent is
granted, or not. Copyright, on the other hand, is obtained almost automatically
when an artistic work is finished. It suffices for authors to sign with the © mark,
their name and the place of first publication. The same holds for trade marks,
which only have to be registered without any examination at all.
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(W Economic
Before discussing the economics of intellectual property, it is useful to give a
more detailed definition of the object that patents protect. In most juridical litera-
ture and patent laws, patents are said to protect 'inventions'. In my opinion, the
term 'new technical information' would be better because it is more general and
better represents the important issues. The latter term indicates that the good
in/ormahon is involved, which, as we will see below, has some special economic
characteristics. This information is not about market conditions or behaviour of
competitors - it is tec/mica/ information about a product or process. In the context
of patents and technological progress, particularly the «ra> technical information
is relevant.
The fundamental economic argument for patents is well known: because of
externalities in the production of new technical information on the one hand, and
because of the collective good character of information in general on the other,
the social value of new technical information is often higher than the private
value. The result is underprovision, even in a market with perfect competition
(Arrow 1962). Patents are instruments designed to correct this market failure.
They increase the private value of new technical information so that the differ-
ence between the social and private value decreases or even disappears. Less or
no underprovision of new technical information in the market is the intended
result.
The first element of the argument refers to the collective good character.
Indeed, technical information can be considered as a collective good. A pure
collective good has two characteristics (Cornes and Sandier 1986): nonrivalry and
nonexcludability. Nonrivalry is present here because the consumption of informa-
tion by one person does not affect the use by others. It is furthermore impossible
or very costly to exclude others from consumption of information. Due to these
features it is socially optimal to make the new technical information freely avail-
able (at zero price) once it is generated. The second element of the basic argu-
ment concerns the externalities in R&D. In the process of generating new techni-
cal information, externalities occur; information spills over to other firms without
them paying for it. A firm can thus hardly appropriate its new technical informa-
tion and the associated returns. Therefore, little or no incentive is present in
private firms to generate new technical information.
The patent system is instituted to provide an incentive to carry out R&D and
to exploit the collective good character as much as possible. A patentholder has
the exclusive but temporary right to a piece of new technical information. The
exclusivity of a patent provides monopoly power, resulting in supranormal
profits, necessary to recapture the R&D costs. Only then, a firm is prepared to
carry out R&D in the first place. In return for a patent, a firm does not only have
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to carry out R&D, but it also has to disclose the new technical information pub-
licly, in a way comprehensible to an expert in the field. The social benefit of
information disclosure is that it prevents duplicate R&D and makes it possible
for other firms to build further on it.
It is often suggested that patents are creations of property rights. In my opin-
ion, it would be more precise to consider patents as adyusfmen/s of 'ordinary'
property rights. Economic theories on the origin of the institution of ordinary
property rights can also be applied to technical information. Basically, these
theories (for example, Buchanan 1975) state that, without the institution of prop-
erty rights, the (physical) protection of property goes along with defense and
enforcement costs. If property rights are guaranteed by the state, these costs of
protecting a good are no longer necessary. For this reason, the institution and
enforcement of property rights by the state is beneficial to society. Property rights
to inventions can be explained in the same way. An inventor could protect his
invention physically and prevent others from imitating it. So why should the
property right to invention be explicitly created while there exist natural rights to
other property? I argue here that in order to correct the market the property right
for new technical information is adjusted in such a way that market failures
become less harmful. These adjustments are as follows: a patent is (i) a temporary
and (ii) a strongly exc/wsiue property right.
First, consider the exclusivity of the right. The most important aspect of a
patent is not the possibility to exploit the right, but to prevent others from doing
so. As mentioned above, patents also protect against firms which have independ-
ently generated a similar invention. Ordinary property rights do not have this
power. The question then is: Why is this strong version of excludability needed?
Two arguments can be brought forward. First, the enforcement costs that occur
when proving whether or not an invention is generated independently would be
very high without strong exclusivity. The enforcement costs of property rights on
tangible goods may already be high and have considerable impact (see Barzel
1989, De Meza and Gould 1992), so the rights on intangible technical information
are certainly hard to enforce. If the property right is made strongly exclusive,
these transaction costs do not occur. An identical invention is never tolerated,
independently generated or not. No proof of the patentholder is needed.
The second argument is related to the increased market and negotiation
power of a patentholder who has a strongly exclusive right. I will give a simple
example which highlights the point. Suppose for the moment that the lifetime of
the patent is infinite and the enforcement costs are zero. An R&D lab has gener-
ated new technical information and wants to sell this. A reason for selling the
information may be the inability of the lab to exploit it itself. The cost of generat-
ing the new product (the physical form of the new technical information) is c.
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Other firms can also generate the new product, but they have a cost disadvan-
tage relative to the lab; they face a cost of c + d. The R&D lab has thus a com-
parative advantage of d. The private return of the new product is u and is equal
to the social return. Suppose that the R&D lab is the only supplier in the market
and that there is also one demander, for example the only firm that has the right
facilities to exploit the new product. In the case of ordinary property rights, the
R&D lab cannot prohibit the demanding firm from generating and exploiting it
itself. The maximum price that the R&D lab can therefore charge is p = c + d.
This is the reservation price for the buyer; if the price were higher, he would be
better off inventing the product himself rather than buying it. Suppose that this
maximum price is indeed agreed upon. The profit for the R&D lab then is 7t = d,
which is equal to its relative R&D cost advantage. The profit of the buyer who
exploits the new product is it = P - c - d. Note that the incentive for R&D, given
by the profit for the lab, is independent of the social value of the invention
generated. It is completely determined by the comparative advantage in perform-
ing R&D.
If, however, the property right is as exclusive as in the case of patents, the
distribution of profits changes. The reservation price of the buyer is not p = c + d
anymore, because the buyer is no longer permitted to generate the new product
himself. The reservation price of the buyer is now p = n. This is what can be
gained with the new product. Suppose that this reservation price becomes effec-
tive. The profit for the R&D lab then is n = p - c and that of the buyer is 71 = 0. In
this case, the incentive is better designed. It is the social value of the invention u
that drives its generation by the R&D lab.
Summarizing, what can be learned from this simple example? The main
conclusion is that in case of ordinary property rights, the incentive to innovate is
solely determined by the cost advantage of the R&D lab, whereas in case of
strongly exclusive rights the R&D lab is guided by the social value of the inven-
tion. The allocation of R&D means from a social point of view is thus better in
the case of strongly exclusive property rights.
Besides stronger exclusivity, the second adjustment of the ordinary property
right concerns the lifetime. Ordinary property rights are not temporary. Why are
patents temporary? The economic reasoning goes as follows. Being a collective
good, new technical information should be provided at zero price. This is, how-
ever, not possible if an incentive has to be provided. But by making the patent
temporary, the new technical information will eventually be available at zero
price once the patent has expired (for the question of how temporary patents
should be, see Nordhaus (1969) in section 2.4).
These are the important basic economics of intellectual property and patents
in particular. A vast amount of literature has emerged on the fine-tuning of these
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basic arguments. Subtle parts of the patent system are more deeply analyzed. As
mentioned in the Introduction, I will present this literature in a reverse chrono-
logical order. I will start by discussing the rights and restrictions once a patent is
granted. Next, I will deal with economic choices in the patent-granting process.
Finally, the models dealing with the impact of patents on innovation incentives
will be reviewed. But first, I will describe the patent procedure of the European
Patent Office, which is typical of most modern patent systems.
2.3 A Typical Granting Procedure
I will use the patent-granting procedure of the European Patent Office as a guide
of exposition.' Where important differences between procedures can occur, this
will be mentioned. The successive steps of the procedure are as follows:
Step 1. j4pp/icafion awd Forma/
A European patent application must be submitted to the European Patent Office
(EPO) in Munich or its branch in The Hague. Within one month after the filing of
the application, a filing fee must be paid. There are very precise prescriptions
with respect to the form of application files. For example, the marges on the
application files are determined by law. More importantly, the application must
contain a specification of the invention, made up of two parts. First, a full
description of the invention, possibly with technical drawings and schemes.
Second, claims that indicate the invention where protection is looked for. An
applicant and his patent attorney have to make choices when formulating these
claims; broad claims are more likely to be disapproved, because claims of current
patents might be infringed. If approved, however, these broad claims provide
more protection.
The application remains secret up to 18 months after filing. Priority is ob-
tained directly after filing, or, in case the same application was submitted to
another patent office first, priority starts at that filing date (at least if the country
of filing joined the Paris Convention). The priority date determines the point at
which the application becomes state of the art.
The European patent system applies the 'first-to-file' principle; only the
inventor that applies for a patent first may be granted a patent. This first-to-file
system is used in most patent systems. There is another principle, used in, for
example, the US and Canada, according to which not the first who files but the
5. Apart from the granting procedure, the European Patent System is not typical in some
other aspects. But for the purpose of describing a patent procedure, these aspects are not
important.
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first who invents may obtain patent protection. The choice of the first-to-file
principle or the first-to-invent principle, is particularly important in conflict
situations when two firms claim the same invention.
In some countries, for example Belgium, the granting procedure stops after
the first step of application. A patent is granted unconditionally and immediately.
In that case the patent system is a 'registration system' comparable with trade
mark systems. In countries with an 'examination system', several steps must be
taken before a patent is possibly granted.
Step 2. Searc/i
On the basis of the specification, an initial inventory of the state of the art sur-
rounding the invention is carried out by the EPO. A fee has to be paid for this
search. The state of the art is primarily estimated from past patent specifications
and scientific publications. Priority rights of current applications are checked as
well. The explorative search report can be used by firms to obtain insight into the
state of the art in which they are active or to test whether the invention is suffi-
ciently novel after a first inventory.
Step 3.
Only after 18 months the application becomes public. These 18 months give a
firm the time and opportunity to perfect the invention or to start a production
process. After publication, the previously secret technical information becomes
part of the state of the art. Competitors of the inventing firm then can also obtain
the information. During the 18 months period of secrecy, the applicant can still
decide to withdraw his application without public disclosure.
Step 4. Substawfiue
Amendment of the application is possible between the search report and the
request for examination. Requests for examination can be filed up to 6 months
after the search report. The substantive examination of the patent application is
guided by various requirements. A patent is only granted for an invention that (i)
is new; (ii) involves an inventive step; and (iii) is industrially applicable. If these
requirements are not met, a patent is not granted. Not all intellectual products
can be considered inventions. For example, computer programmes and discover-
ies or scientific theories cannot be patented; plant and animal variations have
recently been patented in the EPO, although according to the official EPO
statutes this is still prohibited (Van Wijk, Cohen and Komen 1993). The novelty
requirement (i) must be read as new for the public. New means: not being part
of the state of technique as it is publicly known. The state of the art the moment
that priority is obtained is relevant. An invention that was previously used in
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secret can thus be patented. In contrast, an invention that was ever described in
a scientific journal cannot.
The second requirement, the inventive step, means that an invention is not
obvious for a person who is expert in the relevant technical field. Trivial
developments and improvements of a new product or process are thus not
patentable. If the invention is judged not to be novel enough, the possibility
exists sometimes, for example in Germany, to get a utility model (or 'petty
patent'). Such a utility model is similar to a regular patent but has a shorter legal
lifetime (of about 6 years).
Step 5. Granf
If the application meets the requirements for patentability and validity, it passes
the examination phase and a European patent is granted. To a large extent, the
national patent laws of the countries that were designated in the application are
relevant to the European patent. The lifetime, for example, of the European
patent is determined by the national lifetimes. In order to keep the patent valid,
a renewal fee has to be paid to the EPO every year. In most patent systems
increase these annual renewal fees in years after granting.
Sfep 6. Oppos/fj'on and
Up to 9 months after the grant, third parties can oppose against the granting
decision of the patent office. Third parties may believe that the requirements for
patentability are not fulfilled and that the patent infringes their patents. The
opposition department of the EPO is charged with judging the opposition. If the
opposition is held to be valid, the applicant is given the opportunity to change
the specification in order to satisfy the opposition. The EPO, however, can also
decide to withdraw its grant. After the opposition decision of the patent office,
the initial applicant can appeal against this decision as the last possible act.
To give an impression of the decisions of the EPO and the applicants, table
2.1 gives some key figures of applications filed in the period 1978-1985. About
69% of the applications were eventually granted a patent. Of the applications that
were not granted a patent, 4% was refused after formal examination, 6% was
withdrawn by the applicant and 21% was deemed withdrawn (disapproved by
the patent office). No opposition was filed in 82% of all grants. The opposition in
the remaining 18%, was either respected, rejected or is still in process.
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Table 2.1
Key figures on the EPO patent procedure (1978-1985 applications)
Procedural Status
Application
Refused
Withdrawn
Examination Required
Deemed Withdrawn
Granted
No Opposition
#
197,337
7,689
12,244
177,169
40,430
135,372
110,917
Source: Espace-Bulletin EPO
Note: Some applications are still in process. This explains the ac-
counting differences occurring.
2.4 Exploitation of the Granted Patent: Rights and Restrictions
The restrictions on the exploitation of the patent rights and the associated mo-
nopoly position can be divided into two groups: those caused by the market and
those caused by the government. The first group of restrictions stem from com-
petitors in the market who invent around the patent. Contrary to what is com-
monly thought or assumed in models of, for example, patent races, patents do
not provide perfect protection. The very fact that patent do not last forever but
are temporary already illustrates this point. But to some extent, even during the
patent lifetime, competitors can imitate and build further on the patented prod-
uct. The second group of restrictions, which stem from the government, have to
do with the monopoly position of the patentholder. Patent policy and compe-
tition policy are in natural conflict: while patent policy provides a legal monop-
oly position, competition policy often aims at suppressing it.
fa) /minting /\round by Competitors: Lewgf/i, Breadt/i and Heig/if o/ Profecfion
A patentholder is not perfectly protected. The protection is limited and can be
described by using three dimensions: (i) the length of protection: how long does
the right last?; (ii) the breadth of protection: to what extent does the patent
protect against imitations? (how similar are imitations allowed to be?); and (iii)
the height of protection: how novel are improvements required to be? One could
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say that length indicates the possibilities for competitors to invent T>ehind' the
patent, breadth to invent 'aside' the patent, and height to invent 'above' the
patent.
Pofenf
The historic reason in early England to set patent life to 14 years, with a possible
extension of 7 years, was to protect foreign masters, who came to teach English
appentrices, from competition of their apprentices once they mastered an art or
skills (see David 1993 and its references). Without this protection, foreign masters
would never come to England to disclose their technology and skills. Since the
average time to teach apprentices was 7 years, the protection lasted for two gen-
erations of apprentices.
More formal models have been developed to study the impact of patent
duration and to determine optimal lifetimes. Nordhaus (1969), the seminal work
in the patent literature, describes the trade-off which a benevolent social planner
faces when he chooses the lifetime of a patent. Nordhaus assumes perfect protec-
tion during the patent. The trade-off occurring is between the strength of the
innovation incentive and the size of the deadweight loss. Longer patent protec-
tion induces more R&D efforts, because the expected returns are higher, and
consequently improves the induced innovation, which is a larger cost reduction
in Nordhaus' analysis. The welfare cost of inducing larger innovations is a
longer-lasting and larger deadweight loss caused by the patent monopoly. The
socially optimal length is where these two opposing forces are in balance at the
margin. Nordhaus uses a framework originally developed by Arrow (1962). A
major assumption underlying both studies is a monopoly in the invention mar-
ket. Kamien and Schwartz (1974) and De Brock (1985) analyze the optimal patent
life given a competitive invention market. Another extension is advanced by
Goyal and De Laat (1991) which take more innovations into consideration.
David and Olsen (1992) point at another aspect of patent length. The longer
patents last, the better learning externalities can be internalized. A monopoly
with larger cumulative output, compared to more isolated firms, therefore better
exploits learning effects. These positive effects of learning might offset the dead-
weight losses caused by the monopoly.
Although, especially in the early analyses, much emphasis is placed on the
length of patent protection, there is some evidence that this dimension might be
less relevant than is often thought (see also fact d in chapter 1). Empirical work
by Schankerman and Pakes (1986) reveals the limited importance of de/wre patent
lifetime. Using renewal fees data, Schankerman and Pakes are able to determine
the value of holding patents. As long as the expected returns from holding a
patent are larger than the costs of holding the patent (determined by the annual
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renewal fees), it is worthwhile to extend protection. Their data show that the
effective lifetime of patents is often shorter than the legal lifetime. One possible
reason may be that competitors invent around a patent during the lifetime, which
makes the patent decreasingly valuable in time.
The claims in the patent specification determine the scope of patent protection. A
broad protection can be obtained in two ways. First, the claims can be formulated
broadly, but this might cause a number of problems. A claim can be broad to the
extent that it is in the scope of protection of another patent. Moreover, if a broad
protection is sought through broad claims, the applicant must have a pretty clear
picture of all possible applications of the invention. Only then can the applicant
protect as many potential future developments as possible. A second way to
obtain broad patent protection is through the jurisdiction in patent disputes. A
judge may interpret the claims broadly so that broad protection is obtained.
Broad here means that the words in the claims are not taken literally, but are
interpreted broadly. In the legal literature, the distinction between the 'fencepost'
principle and the 'guidepost' principle' is made in this context. The fencepost
principle says that claims literally define the exact patent protection. According to
the guidepost principle, claims only provide an indication of the protection.
Equivalences, for example, of what is written down in the patent specification are
also left to the exclusive use of the patentholder.
The scope of patent protection is important in infringement cases. A patent-
holder can suspect infringement if other firms enter the market with similar
products and processes. Here and in the rest of the book, I distinguish two types
of infringement. First, possible infringement from imitations which are very
similar to the patented product with the exception of some minor differences.
The protection against such imitations could be defined as breadf/i of protection.
The second type of possible infringement stems from improvements of a pat-
ented product or process. This type will be described in the next section on
patent Jieig/tf.
Within the patent breadth literature a further distinction can be made
between models that define breadth for one market on the one hand, and for
more markets on the other. Klemperer (1990), Waterson (1990) and Gallini (1992)
belong to the first category, while Kitch (1977), Merges and Nelson (1992) and
Matutes, Regibeau and Rockett (1993) belong to the other category. I will start
6. There exist some synonyms of what is labelled here as the guidepost principle. The
'signpost' system, for example, is used by Waterson (1989), or the 'equivalence' doctrine,
for example, is used by Merges and Nelson (1992).
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with the first category.
Since it is a seminal article and other essays in this book use similar models,
I will discuss Klemperer (1990) more extensively. In a model of horizontal prod-
uct differentiation, Klemperer defines patent breadth (or width as he labels it) as
the distance on the product spectrum away from the patentholder's product
where competing firms are allowed. All consumers are assumed to prefer, at
equal prices, the patentholder's product/ Consumers can differ in two aspects:
first, the travel cost per unit of distance and, second, the reservation price of
buying the product. A simple version of the model is illustrated in figure 2.2.
consumer cost
m •
t g b '
p*
tgb .
/3 1
/ ^ ^ ^ " ^ _^^ -^ 2 |
^ ^ ^ ^ j
product spectrum
Figure 2.2 A simple illustration of the Klemperer (1990) model
The horizontal axis represents the product spectrum, with the patentholder
and all consumers located at 0 and competitors located at b (given by breadth).
The vertical axis represents the consumer cost per unit purchased for a consumer
with reservation price m. Three consumers with identical reservation prices but
7. In the horizontal differentiation literature, it is more common to assume a (uniform)
distribution of consumers over the product spectrum rather than a mass point at 0 as is
done here (see Eaton and Lipsey 1989). However, if consumers have different transport
costs, the analysis is very similar to one where consumers are evenly distributed over
the product spectrum.
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different unit travel costs t are depicted in the figure. Consumer 1 is indifferent
between buying the patentholder's product at 0 with price p* and buying the
competitively provided alternative at b and incur the total travel cost of t,b.
Consumer 2 buys from the competitor because the consumer costs are lower
there (p* > tjb). Consumer 3 buys from the patentholder because paying price p*
costs less than travelling to the border b (p* < tjb).
Compared to the maximum welfare which results from a competitive provi-
sion of all varieties on the spectrum, the institution of positive patent breadth
induces two types of welfare losses. The first welfare loss results from consumers
who shift to less preferred varieties offered at a lower price. These consumers
face travel costs. Consumer 2, who incurs travel costs t2b, is such a consumer.
The second type of welfare loss occurs as consumers drop out of the market. If
the reservation price of consumer 3 is below the price charged by the patenthol-
der (p* > m), he would not buy. This type can also occur for the consumers who
buy the competitively provided variety at the border b. If the reservation price m
for consumer 2 is smaller than the total travel cost (tjb > m), he will not buy.
Starting point in Klemperer's analysis is a minimum profit level that has to
be provided to the patentholder in order to make him invest in R&D and gener-
ate the new product. Patent policy makers have two instruments at their dis-
posal: patent breadth and patent length. A long but narrow patent can provide as
much profit as a short but broad patent. The problem is to determine the mixture
of breadth and length that is optimal from a social welfare point of view. The
distributions of travel costs and reservation prices among consumers turn out to
be decisive for the optimal mix. I will give two examples. First, if all consumers
face identical travel costs, the patentholder will set the price such that all con-
sumers buy from him. In figure 2.2, suppose that all consumers have the same
travel cost t, as consumer 1. The optimal price p* will then be just above t,b. No
consumer will buy from the competitors. The first type of welfare loss, incurred
by travelling, will thus not occur here. The second type of welfare loss, incurred
by high prices, is minimized if the breadth is set very narrow and the lifetime is
large enough as to provide the minimum profit required. Thus, if consumers face
identical travel costs, very narrow patents are optimal. An opposite conclusion
emerges if the reservation prices of all consumers are identical. Infinitely broad
patent protection precludes all competition. The patentholder can then, without
the need to take into account competitors, charge a price equal to the reservation
price of all consumers.* Neither travel costs nor deadweight losses occur. Thus,
given identical reservation prices, very broad protection is optimal, mixed with a
8. This price strategy is comparable with perfect price discrimination, which is com-
monly known to cause no welfare loss, compared to perfect competition.
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lifetime that marginally provides the minimum profit level required.
Where Klemperer assumes a fencepost patent system with an exact border of
protection (b in figure 2.2), Waterson (1990) assumes a guidepost patent system
with inexact coverage. Given the presence of a patent, a competitor has to decide
whether or not, and where to enter the product spectrum. The potential entrant
takes into account the expected cost if the patentholder takes him to court over
violation of patent rights. If a court case does occur, the outcome is uncertain."
The expected court costs for the imitator increase if he locates closer to the pat-
entholder. Among the various conclusions resulting from this model, the most
important is that not all inventions will be patented.
The extension of the Klemperer model by Gallini (1992) involves the cost of
imitation. One could interpret Nordhaus' (1969) assumption of perfect patent
protection as an assumption of prohibitively costly imitation. Klemperer, on the
contrary, assumes costless imitation. Intermediate imitation cost levels are exam-
ined by Gallini. In her model, an imitator can either choose to wait until the
patent has expired and then duplicate costlessly, or choose to imitate, at some
cost, during the lifetime of the patent. Major point of the paper is that the first
possible strategy of waiting becomes less attractive if patent length increases.
Because imitation causes the profit of the patentholder to decrease, extension of
patent length may not improve the incentive to innovate. This is in contrast with,
of course, Nordhaus (1969), where extending lifetime always increases the incent-
ive, but also with Klemperer where very narrow patents can be optimal (when
consumers have identical travel costs). If the strategy of costly imitation is open,
broad patents which do not induce imitation, mixed with a lifetime that is
enough to provide the desired reward, are optimal in Gallini's model.
The models of Klemperer, Waterson and Gallini all consider the breadth of
patent protection in one market. A second category of theories define patent
breadth for more markets. In a mainly descriptive article Kitch (1977) exposes his
prospect theory of the patent system. By prospect he means "a particular oppor-
tunity to develop a known technological possibility" (Kitch 1977, p. 266). Pros-
pects can cover different (perhaps related) markets. Kitch argues that the process
of developing prospects can efficiently be undertaken in the patent system by
giving the inventor and holder of a pioneering patent sufficient control over the
prospects. Most patents are granted early in the innovation process before
commercialization. By providing prospects, the inventor is given more incentive
to invest in developments of his invention since he does not need to be afraid of
early imitation. A second advantage is that the inventor can coordinate the devel-
9. Meurer (1989) develops a model which studies the choices and possibilities for both
parties when patent litigation occurs.
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opment of prospects by imitators. Wasteful duplication of research can thus be
avoided. Furthermore, by auctioning prospects, a prospect tends to be developed
by the most efficient imitator. Kitch (1977) suggests that the US patent system has
been performing the prospect function quite well by providing broad protection.
Merges and Nelson (1992), in a study of patent scope decisions of US Courts,
doubt as to whether the US patent scope has been broad. Moreover, contrary to
Kitch, they doubt that the scope should be broad. They emphasize that if many
inventors aim for the same goal, a broad patent for the lucky first one can only
hinder subsequent innovations.
Although no reference is made to Kitch's prospect theory, the model of
Marutes, Regibeau and Rockett (1993) could be considered as its formalization.
Their starting point is a basic innovation which has various applications to be
developed in the future. These possible applications, which are all known to the
inventor and the potential imitators, are comparable with Kitch's prospects. In
brief, the authors compare two protection regimes. The first is a regime of
'length' protection, where the patentholder has the exclusive right to introduce
applications during the patent lifetime. If the patent expires, imitators can intro-
duce applications as well. The other is a regime of 'scope' protection, where
certain applications are reserved for the patentholder. Imitators can then, during
the patent lifetime, introduce nonreserved applications without infringement. The
regime of 'scope' protection is shown to generate higher welfare levels than the
'length' protection. The length of the period which the basic inventor chooses to
wait before patenting (in which applications can be developed) and the pattern of
development of subsequent innovations are taken into account when deriving
this conclusion on welfare. This formal analysis tends to support the view of
Kitch that inventors should be granted broad patents with control over many
prospects.
Pafenf
Besides imitation, another source of possible patent infringement stems from
improvement. If improvements of a patented product are introduced in the
market, the incumbent patentholder is likely to loose profits. The strength of this
threat for a patentholder depends primarily on the novelty requirements used by
examiners in the patent office. If these requirements are more stringent and, thus,
fewer improvements are approved, the current patentholder is better protected.
The extent of protection against improvements is defined here as patent
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height.'" So far, only few theoretical analyses have appeared on the issue of
patent height. This lack of attention seems curious for two reasons. First, most
industrial R&D is allocated to product improvements (see fact c in chapter 1 and
Freeman 1982). Second, patenting history has shown that many patents are
improvement patents (see Baker 1976).
Chapter 3 of this book presents a model where the height of protection is
central. The major point there is that the competition stemming from improve-
ments is basically different from the competition from imitations. Whereas the
breadth of patent protection can be described in a model of /jor/zowta/ differ-
entiation, the height of protection can be described in a model of uerfico/ product
differentiation. The reason is that all consumers in a market are expected to
prefer, at equal prices, an improvement to an older product. By definition, impro-
vements are then vertical differentiations. They are comparable with different
qualities of a product: high quality is preferred to low quality. Just like breadth
can be defined on the horizontal product spectrum, height can be thought of as
defining a protected region on the vertical spectrum. In a duopoly model with a
patentholder and an improver, chapter 3 examines how height affects the compe-
tition in product improvements. Major conclusions are that low patents do not
affect free competition (because some distance is naturally chosen), intermediate
patent can benefit both the patentholder and his competitor, and high patents, by
blockading entry, solely benefit the patentholder and provide him with absolute
monopoly power.
A paper related to the dimension of height is Van Cayseele (1989), which
discusses safety regulation in the pharmaceutical industry. From an analytical
point of view, the requirements for safety imposed by health policy very much
resemble the requirements for novelty imposed by patent policy. Another related
paper is Scotchmer and Green (1990). Although Scotchmer and Green also deal
with the stringency of the novelty requirements, their focus is not on the scope of
protection but on the disclosure of information. Their paper is discussed in the
next section.
(W CoM/Zi'cfs iw'f/i Competition Po/icy
The major social cost of patents, once granted, is the deadweight loss caused by
the market power positions they protect. Competition policy is designed to limit
or, in any case, control economic power positions. One can thus conclude that
patent policy and competition policy are in natural conflict. If, as is the goal of
10. In an economic context, the term patent height was first used by Klemperer (1990, p.
127). From conversations with an EPO official, I understood that the term height is
actually used within the EPO in discussions on standards of patentability.
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patent policy, some reward must be given to inventors, it is clear that competi-
tion policy has to act loosely against patent monopolies. For example, if the
patentholder was not allowed to set a price above marginal cost, the value of the
patent would be zero. What, from a welfare point of view, would be the optimal
price allowed to be set by the patentholder? Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) examine
this question. Although their paper is entitled "Optimal patent length and
breadth", it deals in fact more with competition policy than with patent breadth
policy. Patent breadth in their model directly determines the price that a patent-
holder can charge. As in Klemperer (1990), a minimum profit level has to be
given to a potential inventor. Two instruments are available to the government to
achieve this: (i) the lifetime of protection; and (ii) the price that the patentholder
is allowed to charge during the lifetime, which is directly determined by breadth.
Permitting higher prices raises the patentholder's profit on the one hand, but
causes the monopoly-associated deadweight losses to increase on the other.
Gilbert and Shapiro find that if higher prices are increasingly costly in terms of
deadweight loss, infinitely lived patents are optimal. In other words, it is better
then to set lower maximum prices than shorter patent lives.
Hausman and MacKie-Mason (1988) analyze the practice of third-degree
price discrimination by a patentholder. Price discrimination is often not allowed
for by competition policy, not even in the case of patentholders where the rules
are usually softened. The authors show that, under conditions that will be ex-
plained below, price discrimination as compared to uniform pricing raises static
welfare. This result holds for price-discriminating monopolists in general, but is
especially relevant for patentholders because the conditions under which it holds
are particularly relevant to new products. One condition is that new markets are
served under price discrimination, which are not served with uniform prices. But
even without opening new markets, a Pareto improvement occurs if scale econo-
mies are present, which is typically the case for new, patented products.
Finally, Gilbert and Newberry (1982) discuss the role of patents in pre-
emption practices. A patent creates opportunities for a firm with monopoly pow-
er to maintain this power. Indeed, a monopolist has an incentive to patent new
technologies before potential competitors and thus to stay monopolist. Their
point is that the extra cost of accelerated R&D can be smaller than the profit lost
when a competitor enters the market. Such preemptive activity can even lead to
'sleeping' patents, i.e., patents which are neither used nor licensed. The patenting
time as determined by technological competition is then earlier than the optimal
introduction time, determined, among other things, by the existing capital stock
of the firm. The disadvantage of the practice of preemptive patenting for social
welfare is obvious. A monopoly position is sustained and, in the case of sleeping
patents, new technologies, for which R&D was carried out, are not used. Yet,
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preemptive patenting may be less distortive than other forms of preemption.
(c,) Licenses
Another source of profits for a patentholder, besides marketing innovations
himself, stems from the right to grant licenses to others. There exists a vast
amount of literature on licensing, which addresses questions as: What is the
optimal number of licensees? and; What is the optimal payment structure, i.e.,
the optimal proportion of royalties vs. fixed fees? As said above, I will not
summarize the models on these issues here. For a complete survey of the liter-
ature on licensing, the reader is referred to Kamien (1992). As opposed to
voluntary licensing, the requirement of compulsory licensing can be considered a
restriction on the rights of a patentholder. Tandon (1982) develops a model,
based on Nordhaus (1969) and Arrow (1962), where the welfare effects of com-
pulsory licensing are studied. His results suggest that the use of compulsory
licensing can be socially efficient. Additionally, he finds that, given compulsory
licensing, infinitely lived patents are optimal. Tandon's model can be considered
as being basic to the models on patent breadth discussed above, in the sense that
it is the first to allow for competitors aside the patentholder.
2.5 Economic Choices in the Granting Procedure
This section will discuss the economic choices, both private and social, which are
relevant during the granting procedure. It will not discuss what happens prior to
the application. The R&D stage will be discussed in the next section since it is
heavily affected by later stages. The amount of investment in R&D depends on
the revenues which can be expected from it, which in turn depend on the oppor-
tunities provided by the patent system. There are two groups of factors that
determine the expected returns from patent protection. First, the exploitation
possibilities once a patent is granted. This group was dealt with in the above
section. Second, the economic choices during the application procedure, which
will be described in this section.
(a) Information Disclosure
The first choice of an inventing firm is whether or not to apply for patent protec-
tion. The obligation of information disclosure plays an important role in this
choice. In the specification of the invention, the technical information must be
outlined in a comprehensible manner. This specification becomes public 18
months after filing the application. The disclosure obligation causes a trade-off
for the inventing firm. As the secret technical information is revealed to competi-
tors, these competitors can absorb the new information, perhaps at some adop-
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tion cost, and use it while inventing around the patent. Does the advantage of
protection, even imperfect, outweigh the disadvantage of giving up secret infor-
mation?
A patent race with two patentable inventions, an intermediate and a final
one, is an appropriate model to study this information issue (see Grossman and
Shapiro 1987, and Harris and Vickers 1987 for these races). Scotchmer and Green
(1990) use such a multistage patent race to examine the relation between disclo-
sure decisions and the novelty requirements of the patent office. First they
observe a social trade-off in setting the stringency of examination. The social goal
of providing an innovation incentive is best served under strong novelty require-
ments, which is expected to result in higher profits for the patentholder. The
social goal of early information disclosure, on the other hand, is served under
weak novelty requirements. Innovations become public earlier. Strategic private
considerations regarding information disclosure make this trade-off rather com-
plex. Suppose two firms race for a final patent with the possibility of intermedi-
ate patenting. The possibility of an intermediate patent is provided by weak
novelty requirements and would be absent with stringent requirements. The firm
that arrives at the intermediate patent first may not want to give up this advan-
tage in the race and thus not patent, at the risk of being leapfrogged by the other
and ending up with nothing at all. Another advantage of not patenting is that the
other firm might drop out the race when it is signalled that there is too large a
gap. Taking this type of strategic behaviour into account, Scotchmer and Green
conclude that in general weak novelty requirements are socially preferred.
Another theme in their article is the rule that is applied in the case of dis-
putes. When two firms simultaneously claim very similar inventions, which firm
is to be granted the patent? There are two rules to determine the patentability.
The first-to-invent rule says that only the first invention, from a historical per-
spective, is patentable. The first-to-file rule says that only the invention that was
first reported through an application file is patentable. Scotchmer and Green find
that, relative to the first-to-file rule, the first-to-invent rule discourages infor-
mation disclosure. The reason being that, with first-to-invent, a first innovator
tends to wait with claiming rights until other inventors show up. This way he
prevents early spill-overs from disclosure while the patent can still be obtained.
In addition to the disclosure of technical information, the disclosure of pri-
vate market information, only present with the inventor, on the possible profits
of a competitor can play a role. Horstmann, MacDonald and Slivinski (1985)
examine the signalling effects of a patent application. Their assumption is that a
patent does protect against exact duplication but not against inventing around in
the form of imitations. The profitability of duplication (in the absence of a patent)
and imitation by a competitor is exactly known by the inventor. The competitor
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only knows the distribution of possible profits. But the competitor can extract
information from the inventor's patenting behaviour. Several conclusions on
patenting and imitating behaviour can be drawn from their signalling model. For
instance, if an imitation is not profitable, the inventor will always patent. Further-
more, if the inventor patents, the competitor will not enter the new market.
Finally, if the inventor does not patent, the competitor will imitate.
It should be stressed here that patents are just one instrument to protect
inventions and their associated profits. Alternative instruments are, for example,
secrecy, exploiting the lead time and descending the learning curve. Secrecy
implies no information disclosure. This alternative is more relevant to process
innovations than to product innovations which enter the market physically. Lead
time exploits the temporary information advantage. Competitors need time to
study the invention and to be able to invent around.
CW Permissive Patents
I have already pointed out that a patent is strongly exclusive and enables the
holder to prohibit others to exploit similar inventions, even when generated
independently. This right starts at the moment priority is obtained, which is
usually on the application date. Thus, if two firms are involved in a patent race
for an invention, only the firm that finishes first and applies for a patent will
possibly obtain one. It may happen that two firms compete in R&D for several
years with the race ending in a minor advantage for the eventual winner. The
R&D expenditures of the loser cannot be recouped. A great deal of literature
exists on the social costs and benefits of patent races (see Reinganum 1989 for an
excellent overview). Aside from the advantage of increased chance that the
invention will be generated more rapidly, duplicative R&D is always wasteful be-
cause identical information is generated twice. The dominant conclusion in these
models is that an industry spends too much R&D from a social welfare point of
view. The major reason is that if one firm increases its R&D, this diminishes the
chance that the other firm wins the race. The first firm, however, does not take
this effect on the second into account. Therefore, the common result is that the
R&D expenditures at industry level (of the two firms together) are too high from
a social welfare point of view (for a good example of a patent race model see
Loury 1979).
La Manna, MacLeod and de Meza (1989) investigate whether a less strong
form of patent exclusivity is socially beneficial. A patent system is studied where
not only the winner of a race obtains a patent but also later finishers. A time
limit, starting from the winner's application date onwards, could be set within
which later finishers can still apply. The major trade-off occurring is that a losers-
take-some reward structure diminishes the expected return from R&D because
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competition in the post R&D stage will drive profits down. At the same time,
however, this competition will benefit consumers. A strict regime where the win-
ner of the race takes all thus encourages R&D but impedes diffusion, while a per-
missive regime with multiple prizes discourages R&D expenditures but promotes
diffusion. La Manna et al. find that, under certain conditions, the permissive
regime", which allows for genuine but late finishers, is preferred to the strict
regime, which prevents late finishers.
fo) T/K Strategic /îo/e 0/ the Patent
All models discussed so far describe a scenario where the patent office first sets
the length and/or scope of protection and where the potential innovators react to
this design later. In a broader framework, the patent office and an innovator
could be considered as players in a patent regulation game. The game most
commonly described in the patent literature is one where the patent office is the
Stackelberg leader, who first chooses his strategy, and the innovator is the Stac-
kelberg follower, who reacts to the leader's choice. For example, in Klemperer
(1990) the patent office first chooses a mix of patent breadth and length and an
innovator is supposed to react optimally to this mix. La Manna (1992) examines
the possible strategic roles of the patent office in this regulation game. Instead of
Stackelberg leader, the patent office in his model can choose to be the follower.
In a game where the patent office has the role of follower, it provides a set of
mixtures which are welfare maximizing and the innovator chooses from this set
the profit-maximizing mixture. The patent office has two instruments at its dis-
posal: patent height and lifetime. Height is given by a minimum cost reduction
or a minimum outward shift of the demand function. A traditional patent game
would be organized the other way around: the innovator has several mixes of
patent height and length and the patent office chooses the socially optimal mix.
One of the conclusions of La Manna (1992) is that for certain cost and demand
parameters, the traditional role of the patent office as leader yields lower welfare
levels than its role as follower.
2.6 Feedback to the Innovation Incentive
The basic economic intention of patents is that they reduce or, preferably, close
the gap between the social and private value of an invention. An exclusive right
provides the patentholder with market power and thus more revenues than
would be possible without a patent. This extra profit, labelled as V here, is the
11. The permissive regime could be interpreted as weak novelty requirements, or as a
utility patent.
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carrot which induces a potential inventor to invest in R&D. Two questions are
important for the design of optimal innovation incentives: (i) how large a V must
be provided for the potential inventor?; and (ii) how can V be provided most
efficiently?
(a) 77JC Size 0/ f/ie Jncewfiue
There is the natural problem in R&D incentive design that the extra profit V dif-
fers per invention. Nordhaus (1969) already pointed at the disadvantage of uni-
form patent lives. He has shown that the theoretically optimal life of a patent
depends, among other things, on the price elasticity of demand for the product.
Products with lower elasticity of demand should have higher optimal lifetimes.
On the cost side, technological opportunities affect the optimal duration. Indus-
tries where many technological opportunities are present and inventions are thus
easier, should have smaller optimal patent lives. As Nordhaus (1969) also
remarks, invention-specific patent protection can hardly be realized.'* Two
reasons can be given for this. First, the information needed to estimate the social
and private value of an invention is costly to process. Second, even if this infor-
mation could be processed, it would be hard to obtain because inventing firms
probably would have a tendency to overestimate the social value of their inven-
tions in order to get more protection and profits. Although in practice optimal
patent lives are very hard to determine for individual inventions, one could say
that the scope of patent protection naturally adjusts for the importance of inven-
tions. A basic invention can reasonably be expected to yield more social value
than a minor improvement. Since more claims can be formulated for the basic
invention, a wider protection is obtained, resulting in higher profits for the basic
inventor. The basic invention then not only has higher social value but also more
protection and higher private value than the improvement.
A deviant argument with respect to incentive size is advanced in Hirshleifer
(1971). His article explains the pecuniary economics of invention. Contrary to
technological effects of invention, by which are meant improvements in prod-
uction functions, pecuniary effects are "the wealth shifts due to the price revalua-
tions that take place upon release and/or utilization of the information"
(Hirshleifer, p. 571). The original inventor is in the unique position to forecast the
pecuniary effects of his invention. A major source of profit for an inventor lies in
capturing these pecuniary effects. Inventions can thus be made profitable, even
tw't/zowf patent protection. By providing patent protection and the associated extra
profits, on top of the pecuniary effects, an inventor could well be overcompen-
12. The institution of utility models ('petty patents') with about 6 years of protection for
smaller inventions, however, is a - primitive - form of invention-specific lifetime.
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sated. To illustrate this, the future introduction of a certain product innovation
can make the profits of firms producing current substitutes decrease. The product
innovator could profit from this information by buying put options on the stock
of his future competitors. R&D expenditures could thus be recaptured and a
patent would not be necessary."
CW 77ie /ncewtoe Sfrucfwre
Question (i) in the introduction of this section on the optimal size of V can be
avoided by reformulating question (ii) as: how can the welfare loss of providing
one unit of V be minimized? Kaplow (1984) introduces, in a mainly legal article,
a ratio test as an instrument to judge monopolistic practices of patentholders. He
proposes the ratio of the patentee's reward divided by the monopoly loss as a
guideline for patent and competition policy. In general, he says, the higher this
ratio, the more desirable, from a social point of view, the monopoly practice is.
After formalization of the problem for the patent office to set an optimal mixture
of breadth and length, Klemperer (1990) comes up with an identical (inverse)
ratio of welfare loss divided by patentholder's profit as the objective function to
be minimized. Thinking in terms of this ratio proves to be very useful in patent
questions. The difficult question of incentive size is avoided and the focus can be
placed on the structure of the incentive. As explained in section 2.4, both Klem-
perer (1990) and Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) assume an exogenous incentive size
and search for the conditions under which the ratio of welfare loss to profit is
minimized.
The same procedure is followed in chapter 4 of this book in order to examine
the practice of price discrimination by a patentholder. There it is shown in a
model of patent breadth that, given linear demand functions, the innovation
incentive in the form of a fixed profit can be provided more efficiently by allow-
ing for price discrimination by the patentholder. In the price discrimination
literature (see Varian 1989 for an overview), it is a well-known result that price
discrimination, as compared to uniform pricing, lowers static welfare for linear
demand functions (given that no new markets are served under price discrimi-
nation). Because profits always increase under price discrimination, it is not clear
beforehand whether the ratio of welfare to profit is larger under price discrimina-
13. An example of this kind was the news that Xerox developed a new colour film, in
which silver is no longer used (Vo/fcsfcranf, November 24, 1993). The photography indus-
try is the largest buyer of silver and represents about 30% of total demand. As a result
of this news, the price for silver on the international market dropped by 5% within two
days. Xerox could have foreseen the impact of its new film on the silver price. If Xerox
had managed to buy put options on silver before the news became public or other par-
ties noticed this signal, it could have realized some rents.
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tion or under uniform pricing. The analysis in chapter 4 shows that the ratio
under discrimination is equal to the ratio under uniform pricing if there is no
explicit model of patent protection underlying the demand functions of the
patentholder. From the perspective of providing an innovation incentive, the
practice of price discrimination is thus neutral to uniform pricing. If an explicit
model underlies the extent of patent protection and the resulting demand in each
market, then the practice of price discrimination is shown to be a socially more
efficient manner to provide an innovation incentive.
fc) T7ie Patenf as Incentive
As already pointed out above, the literature on the topic of patent races is exten-
sive." A patent race describes the technological competition between two or
more firms aiming for the same innovation. The patent race is often modelled as
a winner-takes-all game (Reinganum 1989). The winner of the race obtains a
patent and the associated monopoly profit while the loser gets nothing at all. The
solution of such games is often characterized by an overinvestment, from a social
point of view, in R&D at industry level. As explained in section 2.5, the major
reason for this result is the fact that one firm in the race does not take into
account the negative effect on other firms if it increases R&D compared to the
others. This is labelled in the literature as the 'common pool problem'. Mortensen
(1982) shows that the common pool problem in patent races can be corrected. If
the winner of a race were required to compensate each of the losers for the lost
values of prospect, then the equilibrium in the patent race is socially efficient.
The strong exclusivity of patents can be said to cause the industrial overinvest-
ment. Modification of the exclusive character corrects this tendency.
Wright (1983) compares the performance of three instruments that provide
innovation incentives: patents, prizes and research contracts. A patent is awarded
to one successful inventor, a prize to all successful inventors. A research contract
purchases units of research activity beforehand at a fixed price. As shown above,
patents provide the inventor rewards at the cost of temporary deadweight losses.
Instead of indirectly via patents, an equivalent monetary compensation could also
be offered directly to researchers. This compensation could be funded by less
distortionary means, compared to deadweight loss causing patent monopolies.
Put this way, there is no reason to assume that patents are superior to prizes or
research contracts (the monetary compensations) in order to induce invention.
Wright points out that this conclusion on the disadvantage of patents may
14. This patent race literature has developed simultaneously with the auction literature
in game theory. Patent races are generally considered to be fine applications of auction
theory. This may explain the extensive literature on patent races.
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depend on an assumption of symmetric information, both present with an ad-
ministrator and researchers, concerning the costs and benefits of research. In a
context of asymmetric information on the cost and probability-of-success func-
tions, any of the three alternatives may be the best choice. In brief, some of the
considerations of Wright are the following. Compared to research contracts, the
disadvantage of both prizes and patents is that they induce the common pool
problem (socially excessive resources to innovation). Where this can be corrected
in the case of symmetric information (also found in Mortensen 1982), it cannot be
corrected for asymmetric information scenarios. However, the advantage of
prizes and patents is that they are more decentralized invention incentives that
use private information exclusively available to researchers. In this respect,
patents perform even better than prizes because the information on the benefits
of success is also incorporated, whereas the benefits of prizes are fixed. The
disadvantage of patents, however, is the incurred deadweight loss.
2.7 Summary and Concluding Remarks
This chapter has provided an overview of the models on patents that have
appeared in theoretical Industrial Organization. The purpose of this chapter has
been to estimate the state of the art and to see where niches can be filled. As a
start, I have explained the basic economic arguments of patents and other intel-
lectual property. Next, I have briefly outlined the patent-granting procedure of
the European Patent Office. This procedure has formed the organizing principle
behind the survey. More precisely, the theories were discussed in the reverse
chronological order of a typical patent procedure.
First, the stage of exploitation of a granted patent was examined. Models on
the length, breadth and height of patent rights were discussed, as well as models
dealing with the restrictions, particularly stemming from competition policy, that
a patentee faces when exploiting his rights. Next, models relevant to the pro-
cedural stage were reviewed. The most important decision an applicant has to
make in this stage is whether or not to reveal secret information to his competi-
tors. Another topic discussed is the normative question whether or not to allow
later applicants after the first applicant. Finally, the role of the patent office in the
patent regulation game was elaborated. The final stage dealt with was the stage
of competition in R&D: How does the prospect of obtaining a patent affect the
stage of R&D? Table 2.2 provides an overview of the topics and articles that are
discussed in this chapter.
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Table 2.2
Overview of the theoretical patent literature
TECHNOLOGICAL COMPETITION
Innovation Incentive
Alternatives
Reinganum (1989): patent races
Mortensen (1982): efficiency
Kaplow (1984): incentive structure
Hirshleifer (1971): information
Wright (1983): prizes, subsidies
GRANTING PROCEDURE
Information Disclosure
Permissive Patents
Role Patent Office
Horstmann et al. (1985): signalling
Scotchmer and Green (1990): novelty
La Manna et al. (1989): application date
La Manna (1992): rules
EXPLOITATION
Rights: Length
Breadth
Height
Restrictions
Nordhaus (1969): R&D monopoly
Kamien and Schwartz (1974); De Brock (1985): R&D
rivalry
Goyal and De Laat (1991): multiple inventions
David and Olsen (1992): learning economies
Klemperer (1990); Waterson (1990); Gallini (1992): one
market
Kitch (1977); Merges and Nelson (1992); Matutes,
Regibeau and Rockett (1993): more markets
Chapter 4: price discrimination
Scotchmer and Green (1990): disclosure
Chapter 3: improvement
Chapter 5: breadth
Gilbert and Newberry (1982): preemption
Hausman and MacKie-Mason (1988): price discrimina-
tion
Gilbert and Shapiro (1990): maximum price
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Most of the models that were discussed and that will be advanced in the
following chapters use a static, partial equilibrium framework. Partial equilibrium
analysis allows for more and richer detail. The same might be said about static
analysis; since the proceeding of time is not incorporated, more focus can be
placed on the static moment. Although many useful insights emerge from these
static and single market models, the inclusion of time into the analysis could
prove to be very illuminating, especially in the context of technical progress.
Some recent analyses use dynamic, general equilibrium models. An early analysis
is Judd (1985) on product innovation. But this article had its major impact out-
side the patent literature; it can be considered as one of the first new growth
models. Other analyses are Chou and Shy (1993), on the length of patent protec-
tion and its impact on new product development afterwards, and Helpman
(1993), on the issue of global patent protection in the Uruguay Round. Future
research can examine many known patent questions in a dynamic and general
equilibrium framework. But it is felt that static and partial analyses continue to
be useful, particularly when looking for and examining new questions.
Table 2.2 also gives an impression of the topics that will be discussed in the
following chapters of this book. As mentioned in section 2.5, patent height has
received surprisingly little attention in the literature, despite its revealed impor-
tance in industry and patent practice. Chapters 3 and 5 provide the first steps to
fill the gap. Chapter 3 will analyse patent height as an isolated dimension, while
chapter 5 will study height in combination with the breadth dimension. The
intersection of the breadth dimension with competition policy, more precisely the
policy regarding price discrimination, is examined in chapter 4.
Patent Height and
Competition in Product
Improvements
Empirical studies on the appropriability of inventions (for example, Mansfield et
al. 1981, Levin et al. 1987 and Griliches 1990) provide evidence that patent pro-
tection is limited. As mentioned in chapter 1 (fact b), many opportunities are left
open for competitors to invent around patents. One can therefore hardly claim, as
is commonly done, that patents provide pure monopoly power. They restrict at
most the opportunities for inventing around. The legal profession is far more
aware of this fact. Lawyers are often confronted with the imperfectness of patent
protection as the considerable amount of case law from patent disputes demon-
strates (see Cornish 1989 as a leading textbook on intellectual property).
Until recently, theoretical economists have hardly taken into account the
economic and legal practice of patent protection. Nordhaus' (1969) seminal work
on patent length, for example, assumes perfect protection during the lifetime of
the patent. The same assumption is also implicitly present in most models of
technological competition where the first firm that generates an invention obtains
a patent and takes all the profits, leaving the loser of the race no chances what-
soever (for an overview of patent races, see Reinganum 1989). Recent contribu-
tions aim at relaxing the assumption of perfect protection (Gilbert and Shapiro
1990, Klemperer 1990). Both studies allow for imitations beside the patent, pro-
vided that these imitations are not too similar. When substitutes in the form of
imitations are less similar to the patented product, the monopoly power of a
patentholder increases. Gilbert and Shapiro are therefore able to define the
breadth of patent protection rather generally as the ability of the patentholder to
raise price. Their focus is on the socially optimal mixture between patent length
and breadth. As extensively discussed in chapter 2, Klemperer defines patent
breadth more explicitly within a model of horizontal product differentiation, as
an interval where no competitors are allowed. The usage of a model of horizontal
differentiation turns out to yield richer conclusions about the optimal mixture,
reproducing and extending those of Gilbert and Shapiro.
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In this chapter, I focus on the height of patent protection. As outlined in
chapter 2, patent height is mainly determined by the stringency of the novelty
requirements used by examiners in the patent office. Most patent laws dictate
that an invention is only patentable if it is non-obvious and involves an inventive
step. These conditions are certainly satisfied for the small group of fundamental
inventions. But the judgement on patentability is more difficult where improve-
ments of existing products are concerned. When is an improvement obvious and
how much inventivity is required? It is the task of patent examiners to define the
bounds of patentability and infringement of current patents. The central question
in this chapter is how the height of patent protection affects the competition in
product improvements in a duopoly where one firm holds a patent, which
restricts the strategy set of the other.
Before stressing why the distinction between patent height and breadth is
important, let me first explain the difference more exactly. Whereas breadth is
defined as the extent of protection against imitations, height indicates the
protection against improvements. In terms of product characteristics, one could
say that height defines the minimal number of new elements which an invention
must contain, whereas breadth defines the maximum number of elements which
are allowed to be imitated. Suppose a patented product is made up of u ele-
ments. Think, for example, of such technical attributes as materials, design,
electronics schemes, etc., which define the invention in a unique way. Protection
height then indicates how many new elements ft are required in order not to
infringe an ongoing patent. Breadth defines the maximum number b out of the i>
that is allowed to be imitated without infringing.
The difference between imitations and improvements can be found on both
the cost and the demand sides. Although imitations may also require R&D
investment in order to obtain learning and imitation capabilities (Cohen and
Levinthal 1989), improvements are likely to cost more because new information
has to be generated. With regard to the demand side, as previously explained,
Klemperer (1990) treats imitations as horizontal differentiations of the patented
product. Consumers do not agree on the most preferred variety. Some consumers
prefer protected varieties, while others prefer imitations outside the protected
interval. Improvements are basically different from imitations in this respect.
Improvements can be considered as vertical differentiations. It is reasonable to
expect that, at equal prices, all consumers prefer an improvement to an older
version of the product. Patent height can then be thought of as defining a
protected region on the vertical product spectrum. Competitors that enter the
market are restricted in their choices of improvement. They must generate a
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minimum level of improvement in order not to infringe the current patent.' The
dimensions of breadth and height thus define protection against two different
types of competition; one resulting from horizontal differentiation and another
resulting from vertical differentiation. These two types of competition have a
differential impact on the patentholder. The effect of vertical differentiation is
that it relaxes price competition; therefore firms have a tendency to differentiate
their products maximally (Shaked and Sutton 1982). Horizontal differentiation
may have an opposite effect. At least for linear transport costs, as in the original
Hotelling (1929) analysis, firms differentiate minimally.
Taking these cost and demand features into account, two basic strategies for
inventing around a patent can be distinguished: an imitation strategy 'aside' the
patented product and an improvement strategy 'above' it. An example may clari-
fy the two possible strategies. Klemperer (1990, p. 114) mentions the patent of
Prince Manufacturing on the oversized tennis racket. The breadth of protection is
known to run from 85 to 130 square-inches rackets. A competitor pursuing an
imitation strategy can only enter with a similar racket outside this protected
range. But there is also another possibility, which is not examined by Klemperer.
A competitor can improve a racket inside the protected range in such a way that
it satisfies patent examiners. For example, a 100 square-inches racket can be made
stiffer by the use of a new fibre or a better design. Both cost and demand
properties can play an important role in choosing the appropriate inventing-
around strategy. An imitation strategy has a relative cost advantage but may be
more severely restricted by patent breadth because, being a horizontal differen-
tiation, the imitation may be chosen close to the patented product. A competitor
that pursues an improvement strategy has a natural tendency to create distance
away from the patent, but this tendency may be suppressed by high R&D costs.
The impact of the imitation strategy on the patentholder's profits has been exam-
ined in the above-mentioned models of patent breadth. So far, however, the im-
pact of the improvement strategy has not been analyzed.
This chapter will concentrate on the effects of novelty requirements once a
patent is granted. Scotchmer and Green (1990) have analyzed a related problem.
They discuss the social trade-off that occurs in setting the novelty requirements
when firms apply for patents. Novelty requirements appear to have a dual char-
acter. They determine the coverage of granted patents - the study object of this
chapter -, but they also affect the stage of R&D competition before the patent is
1. The literature on minimum quality standards also uses vertical differentiation models
(e.g., Ronnen 1991 and Crampes and Hollander 1991). The major difference with the
analysis presented here is that only the non-patentholder is restricted in my model
whereas in the other models mentioned both firms are restricted.
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possibly granted. This second aspect is studied in Scotchmer and Green (1990).
The main benefit of weak novelty requirements then is that technical information
becomes public at an earlier date so that other firms can build further on it
sooner. However, weak requirements may also induce the inventor to withhold
his invention, thereby keeping the lead, and aim at a more profitable invention
later on. Strong novelty requirements reduce the amount of wasteful duplicative
R&D by inducing firms that have fallen behind to drop out of the race. In order
to focus fully on the extent of protection, I will omit the stage of R&D competi-
tion here.
The plan of this chapter is as follows. In section 3.1, a model is constructed
which is based on the idea of improvements being vertical differentiations of a
new product. First, I examine the competition in product improvements in the
absence of patents. Section 3.2 will analyze the effects of patent height on the
competition in product improvements. In a nutshell, the major conclusions are
that low patent heights do not affect the natural market equilibrium without
patents, medium heights can be favourable and unfavourable for the patent-
holder, and high patents provide pure monopoly power. A short welfare analysis
is carried out in section 3.3. Section 3.4, finally, summarizes and provides some
directions for future research.
3.1 The Model
The starting point of the analysis is the appearance of a basic invention. In this
section, I assume that this basic invention is public property. The basic invention
is so raw that no consumer is prepared to buy it. Consumers can only extract
surplus from the basic invention if it is further developed. Defining the demand
side more precisely, the net surplus U of an individual consumer is given by the
following (indirect) utility function:
U = | mv - p if the consumer buys (3.1)
I 0 otherwise
where v e [0, °») is the degree of improvement (with the basic invention given by
v = 0), p is the price of improvement v and m is a parameter indicating the
intensity with which a consumer prefers improvements. The parameter m is uni-
formly distributed with density 1 on [z - 1 , z], where 1 < z < 2. A consumer only
buys if he gets a non-negative net surplus. Each consumer decides in each period
(the model will encompass more periods) whether or not to buy (one unit). The
utility function (3.1) is standard in the literature on vertical differentiation (see
Shaked and Sutton 1982). Applying this function in the context of technical
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change is justified because consumers are expected to evaluate product improve-
ments in much the same way as qualities of a product. Consumers prefer large to
small improvements, just like they prefer high-quality to low-quality products.
Two firms, 1 and 2, are potentially entering the new market with improve-
ments of the basic invention. Each of the firms is assumed to offer one improve-
ment at the most. There are two motivations behind this assumption. First, the
diversity of consumers' tastes (given by the range of m) is chosen such that there
is only room at the market for two improvements. Competition analysis then
requires each of the two firms to have one improvement at the most. Second, it is
true that in business practice one can often observe that a firm does not have one
patent but a number of related patents, all in the same technical field. But even
such a cluster of patents cannot provide perfect protection. Competitors can still
invent around the cluster. Essentially we are then back at the scenario studied in
this chapter: one firm has a patent (or a cluster of patents) and another firm
enters the market with an improvement (of the most advanced patent of the
cluster). Once chosen, I assume that an improvement cannot be changed. As we
will see below, there are circumstances under which it would be beneficial for a
firm to lower its improvement level. However, high fixed costs associated with
each improvement are assumed to prevent this (these costs are made before the
start and do not enter the analysis below).
The competition between both firms takes place in two stages. In the first
stage, each firm decides whether or not to enter the market and which improve-
ment to choose. Knowing which decisions are made in the first stage, each firm
then chooses a price strategy. This sequence reflects the fact that price decisions
are more flexible than improvement and entry decisions. The solution concept
that I employ for this two-stage model is the subgame perfect equilibrium. It can
be obtained by backward induction. First, I will determine the Nash equilibrium
in pricing strategies of the second stage. In the second stage, I will determine the
equilibrium strategies in product improvements and entry. Only pure strategies
are considered.
It is assumed here that both firms are characterized by the same R&D cost
structure, which is kept as simple as possible. There are no development costs
involved in the generation of improvements. It only costs time. Starting at time 0,
firm i introduces V; in period T,, where Tj = (XVj, for i e |1, 2) and 0 < a < 1. The
profit that is lost because of a later introduction time is the real development
cost. If both firms enter the market, the first-stage subgame is defined by a pair
of improvements {vg, v j , such that Vg < v .^ The subscript S denotes the firm that
has developed an improvement that is smaller than the other improvement. The
other firm has the larger improvement and is denoted by subscript L. Note that
each firm can develop either the small improvement or the large improvement.
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Assuming that both firms start their development in the same period, v^ is
always introduced later than Vg. As a consequence, the market structure can
change over time. The firm with Vg will enter in period Tg. It then has a
temporary monopoly position and sets a monopoly price, denoted by p^,. This
monopoly will last until the other firm enters at TL with VL- From T^ until a
doomsday J the market structure then will be a duopoly. By assumption, the
former monopolist can only react to the entrant by setting a new price, denoted
by ps, as a function of the entrant's price PL- Assuming that all consumers are
price and improvement takers, during monopoly each consumer has the choice
between buying Vg at price p^ or not buying at all. Consumer choices extend
when the later firm introduces VL at T^ Each consumer can then choose to buy v$
at price ps, VL at price p ^ or none of the improvements.
Price Competition
The following demand function is relevant in two cases. First, in the scenario in
which only one firm enters the market and remains a monopolist until doomsday
J. Second, during the period when the small improvement firm is alone in the
market and the other firm has not entered yet.
x(ps) = z - ps/vs (3.2)
for ps/vg > z - 1. Without affecting the basic results, I assume that the unit
production costs are zero. It can be shown that the monopoly price and profit per
period are p^* = zVg/2 and 7CS(PM*) = z^Vg/4- The lower market segment [z - 1,
z/2] is not served.
Now consider the demand functions in case of duopoly. The consumer who
is indifferent during duopoly as to the small and large improvement is given by
the preference parameter u = (PL - PS)/(VL - Vg). The firm with v$, which charged
PM before, now changes its price and charges p$. For computational ease, I
assume that the market is served completely during duopoly and take (v$ +
+ v j < z < 2.* The demand functions are then:
= u + 1 - z, XL(PL) = z - u (3.3)
The Nash equilibrium prices are ps* = (2 - Z)(VL - Vj)/3 and p ^ = (z + 1)(VL -
Vg)/3, with associated profits of ^(ps*) = (2 - z)*(v,, - Vg)/9 and Tii/Pi") = (z +
1)*(VL - Vg)/9 (see Tirole 1988 for an elaboration).
2. This condition turns out to be always possible in the analysis to follow. All equili-
brium values of Vj and v^ fulfil the condition that 1 < (vg + 2vJ/(2vs + v j < 2.
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Compefifion *'n Product Jmproi>emerifs
First, I will examine the pure monopoly scenario, where the monopoly position
lasts from the introduction time until the doomsday J. The monopolist will have
profits 7CS(PM*)- as determined above. The profit function of such a monopolist in
the first stage is:
*s(vs) = 0 - TS)%(PM*) (3.4)
In order to keep the analysis as simple as possible, I assume that pay-offs are not
discounted. A similar effect originates from the doomsday J, when everything
ends (for example because a complete new product is generated that takes all
demand). The monopolist is confronted with the following trade-off: his profit
per period increases if he develops a larger improvement, but this costs more
development time so that there will be less time to capitalize on his investments.
The next step is to calculate the optimal improvements as a function of each
other, given the equilibrium prices determined above. After substitution of the
time cost structure Tg = av§ and the optimal profit JIS(PM*) in (3.4), the optimal
improvement of the monopolist can simply be determined as v$* = J/(2a), with
the associated optimal profits of 7ig(vs*) = z*jV(16a). The optimal improvement
Vg* increases if the monopolist is given more time (later J) and if the development
costs are lower (smaller a). The optimal monopoly profit 7is(vs*) also increases if
the demand properties are more favourable; a higher z means that improvements
are more valued by consumers.
When two firms enter the new market, the profits of the firm with Vj contain
monopoly profits, gained from Tg until T ,^ and duopoly profits, from T^  until
doomsday J:
*s(vs; v j = (T, - Ts)7ts(pM*) + G - T0*s(ps") (3.5)
The profit function of the firm that enters later at T^  with VL is:
*L(VS; v j = G - T ,X(PL*) (3.6)
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize some important properties of the profit
functions (3.5) and (3.6). The profit per period 7CS(PM*) in equation (3.5) increases
in Vg. This property was already mentioned above in the pure monopoly case. In
order to simplify the notation, let q s zV4, so that ^(PM*) = qvs- The duopoly
profits per period Jts(ps )^ and ^(pu^) decrease in Vg for the small improvement
firm (check 3.5) as well as the large improvement firm (check 3.6). This property
is well known in the vertical product differentiation literature and is the result of
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more relaxed price competition as products are more differentiated (Shaked and
Sutton 1982). It can also be found in the way profits behave in VL- Since a larger
VL means a larger distance between both improvements, the profits per period
increase for both firms. Define r s (2 - z)V9 and s s (z + 1)79, so that ^(ps") =
T(VL - Vj) and TIL(PL^) = s(v^ - Vg). For the values of z taken here it holds that s > q
> r. This ranking will turn out to be important further on.
After substitution of the introduction times and the profits in the second
stage in the profit functions (3.5) and (3.6), the following improvement reaction
functions can be derived:
Vs*(vJ = v j q + r)/(2q) - rj/(2aq) (3.7a)
VL*(VS) = Vs/2 + J/(2oc) (3.7b)
where Vg, v^ e [0, J /a ] . An important property of (3.7a) is that it implies that 7tg
increases monotonically in Vg along the reaction curve. This can be checked by
substituting (3.7a) into (3.5) and taking the first derivative of % with respect to
Vg*, which turns out to be positive. The intuition behind this is the following. If
VL increases, Vg* also increases, but by less (since (q + r)/(2q) < 1). The number of
monopoly periods as well as the monopoly profit per period increase. The profit
per period in duopoly also increases because the distance between v^ and Vg be-
comes larger. These positive effects on 7^ outweigh the only negative effect of a
smaller number of periods before doomsday. The opposite holds for the firm
with the large improvement; Tt^  decreases monotonically in v^ along the reaction
curve (3.7b). The intuition is simple. Suppose v$ increases. As a consequence, VL*
will increase but only by half as much, so that the distance between both im-
provements becomes smaller. Considering, in addition, that the remaining time
before doomsday shrinks, it is clear that T^ decreases.
The Nash equilibrium in the first stage of competition in product improve-
ments can be found by solving the reaction functions (3.7a) and (3.7b) simultane-
ously for Vg and v^. Define this solution as the basic Nash equilibrium {vg*, v^ ) ,
given by:
Vs" = J(q - r)/(a(3q - r))
v,." = J(2q - r)/(a(3q - r)) (3.8)
Between Tg and T ,^ the upper segment of the market [b/2, b] is served by the
temporary monopolist with improvement Vj* at a price of p^* = zj(q - r)/(2oc(3q -
r)). When the other firm enters in period T^ with the large improvement v ^ , it
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serves more customers than the monopolist. The upper market segment, given by
[(2z - l ) /3 , z], is served at a higher price of p ^ = ((2z - a)Jq)/(3a(3q - r)). The
small improvement firm now serves the lower market segment [z - 1, (2z - l ) /3] ,
which was not served before, at a price of ps" = ((2z - l)Jq)/(3a(3q - r)).
In this basic Nash equilibrium, the overall profit of the firm with the small
improvement (itsf.v/')) turns out to be positive and lower than that of the firm
with the large improvement (^(v^)): q'jV(a(3q - r)*) < sq*jV(a(3q - r)*), since s
> q. It is not clear in advance which firm will have the large improvement. There
are in fact two basic Nash equilibria in pure strategies. One in which firm 1 has
the small improvement and firm 2 has the large improvement {v, = Vg^ , Vj = v^)
and one where this division of roles is reversed {v, = v^ , Vj = Vj^l.
3.2 The Effects of Patent Height
This section studies scenarios where the basic invention is privately owned. One
of the two firms, say firm 1, holds a patent on the basic invention. Two cases are
studied: [I] firm 1 cannot keep the basic invention secret, not even for a very
short period of time; and [27 firm 1 can keep the basic invention perfectly secret.
Any level of the first improvement can be protected by a patent. The patent sys-
tem under consideration is assumed to be a 'first-to-file' patent system. The
patent protection is of infinite length and of height h.' It is assumed that the
criterion for judging infringement is precise and known by the patentholder and
his competitor/ The meaning and effects of the patent height h are explained
below. To simplify the notation without affecting the results, I assume that J = 1
and that a = 1.
Secrecy is /mpossi'b/e; Patent on fne Basic Indention
In scenario [17, firm 1 is assumed to patent the basic invention immediately
(given the lack of secrecy and the first-to-file rule, firm 2 may do so otherwise). I
will come back to this assumption below. The technical information in the patent
3. Since competitors are assumed to choose an improvement of and not an imitation of
the patented new product, the breadth of protection is not important here. Case law
seems to indicate that the novelty requirements overrule the allowed similarity of
imitations (Cornish 1989). In other words, an identical variety is permitted provided that
it is improved sufficiently. Mixtures of patent breadth and height as well as optimal
strategies for inventing around are studied in chapter 5.
4. Waterson (1990) examines a patent system where it is not clear beforehand whether
the patentholder or the possible infringer wins in court. This uncertainty may affect the
patenting decision.
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application becomes public and causes both potential entrants to start their
development work with the same knowledge level. Hence, there is no asymmetry
as far as knowledge is concerned. However, there is asymmetry because firm 1
has a patent on the basic invention and firm 2 has not. The patent is not a barrier
to entry that cannot be overcome. It only protects a limited area beyond the basic
invention. More precisely, the protection of the patent with height h is the region
[0, h).* The non-patentholder is not allowed to choose his improvement in this
region. He has to choose his improvement in the free, non-protected region [h, 1].
The second stage of price competition is not affected by the institution of
patent heights. The first stage of competition in product improvements, however,
can yield different results. Both firms continue to choose their improvements
simultaneously. The strategy space of the non-patentholder 2 shrinks to Vj e [h,
1]. The strategy space of firm 1 remains unchanged v, e [0, 1]. This asymmetric
effect of patent height is the major difference with the models on minimum
quality standards of Ronnen (1991) and Crampes and Hollander (1991). In their
models, the minimum standard symmetrically limits the strategy spaces of both
firms. With firm 1 holding a patent, each of the firms can still choose the small or
large improvement in equilibrium. But we will see that, depending on the height
of protection, the improvements can become larger compared to those in the
basic Nash equilibria. We will also see that in one category of heights, one basic
Nash equilibrium will not occur.
The effects of patent height can be divided into five categories. The two
categories for extreme values of h are obvious. Low patents (0 < h < Vg^ ) do not
affect the basic Nash equilibria. Firm 2 can still have the small improvement
without being restricted effectively. In the other extreme category of high patents
(h > 1), firm 2 does not have enough time to develop an improvement that does
not infringe the patent of firm 1. The patentholder is then assured to have a
monopoly position until doomsday 1 and the only improvement that will be on
the market is v, = 1/2. For the medium values Vg~ < h < 1, three categories can
be distinguished (see Propositions 3.1.a and 3.1.b). Two categories contain heights
for which firm 2 is effectively restricted in the choice of the small improvement
(Proposition 3.1.a). These heights turn out to be unfavourable for the patent-
holder if he has the large improvement, because firm 1 loses profit compared to
the basic Nash equilibrium. For firm 2, the non-patentholder, these patent heights
5. In their judgement on non-obviousness and inventiveness, patent examiners mainly
rely on files of former patent applications. The body of knowledge in these files
represents to a large extent the (accessible) state of the art, which serves as a benchmark
for examination. This is the reason why the protection starts from 0, i.e., the patented
basic invention.
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are initially favourable. Proposition 3.1.a summarizes:
Proposition 3.2.a. For h e (vj", h) there are two Nash equilibria in pure strategies
(ft will be defined below): a basic Nash equilibrium with v, = Vj^  and Vj = vj"
and a new Nash equilibrium with v, = h en v, = Vi*(h). In the new Nash
equilibrium (a) both improvements are larger than in the comparable basic Nash
equilibrium; (b) the profit of the patentholder 1 decreases in h; and (c) the profit
of the non-patentholder initially increases and later decreases in h. For h e [h,
v^], the only basic Nash equilibrium is v, = Vg* en V2 = v^.
Firm 2 is effectively restricted in the choice of the small improvement and not in
the choice of the large improvement for the heights Vg* < h < v^. What are the
consequences? The one basic Nash equilibrium in which firm 1 has the small and
firm 2 has the large improvement remains unchanged. The other basic Nash
equilibrium, however, is no longer possible because firm 2 is not allowed to enter
the market with the improvement Vg^ . The smallest improvement permitted to
firm 2 is exactly equal to the height V2 = h.* Firm 1 will react according to (3.7b)
with an improvement v, = VL*(h). Note that both improvements h and v^*(h) are
larger than in the relevant basic Nash equilibrium with Vj = Vg" and v, = v^; h >
Vg^  holds by definition, and v^(h) > v ^ because dvL*/dvs > 0.
The optimal profit of the large improvement firm decreases in VL along its
reaction curve, as shown in section 3.2. Hence, if firm 1 has the large improve-
ment, its profit J^ decreases in h for h e (vg ,^ v^] . This can be seen in figure 3.1,
where n,' represents a lower profit level than rc,. Since the firm with the large
improvement has the higher profits in basic Nash equilibrium and these profits
now decrease in h for the patentholder, there must be a value for h where the
patentholder collects the same profits with the large improvement as with the
small improvement, with firm 2 choosing Vg = h. Label this critical value for firm
1 as h, defined as n^h, v^h)) = 7ts(Vs", v^). For h > h, the patentholder prefers
to have the small improvement instead of the large one.
What happens to the profits of firm 2 when it has the small improvement?
For h < h, firm 2 has to deviate from its reaction function (3.7a) and choose the
small improvement larger than in the basic Nash equilibrium. As a result, its
profits will initially increase in h. Profits will increase up to height h', where h' is
equal to the product improvement that firm 2 would choose if it were Stackel-
berg leader.
6.1 restrict the analysis to one patent. I assumed that an improver cannot obtain a patent.
Allowing for a second patent complicates matters since the basic inventor has to take
into account that his strategy space might also be restricted if the improver has a patent.
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In figure 3.1, 7I2' represents the (Stackelberg) profit level of firm 2 given
patent height h'. This profit level is higher than the one in the basic Nash equi-
librium, 7I2. Profits start decreasing for firm 2 from h' on / For h > h, the
patentholder does not even want the large improvement anymore and leaves it to
the non-patentholder, despite the fact that it yielded more profits in the basic
Nash equilibrium. The economic intuition behind this surprising result is that
patent height forms a credible commitment which the non-patentholder can ex-
ploit. Initially the non-patentholder is credibly committed to choosing a larger V5
than in basic Nash equilibrium. For even higher patents (h > h), the commitment
becomes so strong that the non-patentholder always has the more profitable large
improvement.*
7. I limit the analysis here to the case where h > h'. The maximum profits of firm 2 in
the turning point do not exceed the profits with the large improvement in the basic
Nash equilibrium. In the case of h < h', firm 2's profit only increases in h for h e <Vs",
ft). If the maximum profit in the turning point h' is larger than the profit associated with
the large improvement in the basic Nash equilibrium, then an extra category can be
distinguished in which firm 2 prefers the small improvement h and firm 1 prefers the
large improvement VL*(h).
8. This disadvantage for the patentholder may depend on two assumptions made above.
First, the assumption that firm 1 patents immediately may be important here because,
without the patent, the possibility would stay open for firm 1 to have the more profit-
able large improvement. As we will see below, however, from a critical height on, it is
beneficial again for firm 1 to have the patent. By waiting and patenting later, the
protection associated with an improvement patent becomes larger (VL > v$ + h). But firm
2 could then obtain the patent as well. A critical height must exist for which both firms
are indifferent to having the patent or not. It could well be the case that the profits
associated with this critical height, are lower than the profits of the firm with the small
improvement in the basic Nash equilibrium (e.g., if the profits associated with the
restricted large improvement are lower than those associated with the patented small
improvement and there is some probability of not obtaining the patent). For these cases,
firm 1 would patent immediately anyway.
Another way out of the disadvantageous patent position might be licensing. Al-
though licensing is excluded from the present analysis, I will comment on it briefly here.
Note that the patentholder has an incentive to offer, even freely, the improver a license,
allowing him to choose an improvement inside the protected region. Profits of the
patentholder would increase. The profits of the improver and license taker would,
however, decrease. Thus, unless the patentholder is able to precommit to license its
patent freely, a license contract would not emerge. And even if such precommitment is
possible (e.g., if the patent office recognizes the one-sided free gift and adjusts its
standards of examination, or if licensing is compulsory), the improver may be able to
precommit not to accept the free gift (e.g., by provoking a court or patent office
judgement). If the patentholder can precommit to license freely and the improver cannot
precommit not to accept, the basic Nash equilibrium would reoccur.
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V,*(h) . . . .-
Figure 3.1 Patent on the basic invention; firm 2 has the small improvement
This advantage for the improver, however, disappears. From a certain height
on, the commitment becomes an obligation; firm 2 must choose a larger improve-
ment than it would like to. Higher patents then yield more profit for the patent-
holder and less for the non-patentholder if the latter is also effectively restricted
in the choice of the large improvement. The following proposition holds:
Proposition 3.2.b. For h 6 (v^, 1) there is one Nash equilibrium with v, = Vg*(h)
and Vj = h. The Nash equilibrium is characterized by: (a) larger improvements
than in the relevant basic Nash equilibrium; (b) an increasing profit of the patent-
holder in h; and (c) a decreasing profit of the non-patentholder in h.
Firm 2 is effectively restricted in its choice of the large product improvement for
the patent heights h G (V^, 1). The choice of v ^ is not allowed and firm 2 does
best choosing h. The best reaction of the patentholder is Vg = Vj*(h). The only
Nash equilibrium is characterized by a small improvement of the patentholder of
Vi = Vg*(h) and a large improvement of firm 2 of Vj = h. Note that both improve-
ments are larger than in the relevant basic Nash equilibrium; h > v ^ holds by
definition, and Vg*(h) > Vg^  because dvgVdvL > 0. In section 3.1, I have demon-
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strated that the optimal profits of the small improvement firm always increase in
Vg along the reaction curve (3.7b). The profits of the patentholder thus increase in
h for h 6 (v^, 1). What happens to the profits of the non-patentholder? He has to
deviate from his reaction curve. The isoprofit curve that passes through the new
Nash equilibrium now represents its lower profit level.' Hence, the profits of
firm 2 decrease in h for h e (v^, 1). The patent height has changed for firm 2
from a profitable commitment into a profit-loosing obligation. The five categories
are summarized in table 3.1 with the values that follow from the used specifi-
cation.
Table 3.1
Effects of patent height with a patent on the basic invention
Patent Height Nash Equilibrium
h e [0, (q - r)/(3q - r)> V;" = (q - r)/(3q - r)
v," = (2q - r)/(3q - r)
h e [(q - r)/(3q - r), 1 - (2V(q7s)/(3q - r))] v, = Vj" = (q - r)/(3q - r)
v, = v," = (2q - r)/(3q - r)
Vj = V; = h
v, = v, = (h + l)/2
h e <1 - (2V(qVs)/(3q - r)), (2q - r)/(3q - r)] v, = v^" = (q - r)/(3q - r)
v, = V = (2q - r)/(3q - r)
h e <(2q - r)/(3q - r), 1) v, = v^  = (h(r + q) - r)/2q
v, = VL = h
h e [1, oo) v, = 1/2
9. It is possible that firm 2 does not enter the market for h < 1. This is the case from that
height on where the isoprofit curve in the new Nash equilibrium also cuts the 45" line
with Vj = VL- The profit of the entrant is zero if both product improvements are identical;
it is well known that Bertrand competition with homogeneous products leads to zero
profits. When lower than 1, this critical patent height is the upper limit.
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Per/êcf Secrecy 0/ fne Basic
The scenario described above is an asymmetric variant of the model of Ronnen
(1991) and Crampes and Hollander (1991) on minimum quality standards. The
secrecy scenario is specific to a context of technical progress and patent protec-
tion. If firm 1 can keep its basic invention perfectly secret, it will not patent
immediately. By waiting and patenting just before introduction, the patentholder
enlarges the protection of his patent, as will be shown below. Price competition
remains unchanged compared to section 3.1. The competition in product improve-
ments is now as follows. Firm 1 makes its choice of v, in the starting period. Just
before the introduction in period T,(v,) it takes a pofenf on Me improvement v, and
obtains protection of [0, v, + h].'° The lower limit is 0 because firm 2 will never
be allowed to enter with a deterioration. The upper limit is determined by the
fact that the patent office requires h to be the minimal inventive step of
improvement of the patented improvement v,. As soon as firm 1 applies for a
patent and enters the market, firm 2 chooses its improvement. Since the informa-
tion in the patent is public, firm 2 starts from the knowledge level revealed in the
patent application. The strategy space of firm 2 is Vj e (v, + h, 1]. A consequence
of this structure is that firm 1 will always have the small improvement and firm
2 the large improvement (v, < Vj). A major advantage for firm 1 is that it can
make its choice before firm 2. Instead of a Nash equilibrium, the relevant equili-
brium concept is therefore a Stackelberg equilibrium, with firm 1 being the leader
and firm 2 the follower. The basic Stackelberg equilibrium in improvements is
denoted by | v / , Vj*). The three categories of patent heights in the scenario of
Stackelberg leadership are summarized in table 3.2. Each category will be
explained below.
Table 3.2
Effects of patent height in the case of secrecy of the basic invention
Patent Height Stackelberg Equilibrium
h e [0, (V(2q - r) - V(q - r))/*/(2q - r)> v,* = (q - r)/(2q - r)
Vj* = (3q - 2r)/2(2q - r)
h € [(V(2q - r) - V(q - r))/2V(2q - r), 1/2] v,° = 1 - h
h e (l/2,oo) v," = l/2
10.1 assume that firm 1 patents the largest improvement available at that time as to rule
out the possibility that it takes a patent on the basic invention, while having generated
an improvement, in order to be able to have the larger improvement in equilibrium.
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Figure 3.2 Patent on the first improvement
In order to find the basic Stackelberg equilibrium, I first determine the reaction
function of firm 2 in this scenario:
Vj*(v,) = max ((v, + l)/2; v, + h) (3.9)
The unrestricted part of the reaction function can be used to establish the basic
Stackelberg equilibrium as v,* = (q - r)/(2q - r) and Vj* = (3q - 2r)/(2(2q - r)). This
Stackelberg equilibrium is depicted in figure 3.2 and is only relevant to low
patent heights, as will be shown below. The Stackelberg equilibrium for the
restricted part, Vj = Vj + h, turns out to be undetermined because the profits of
firm 1 always increase in v,, independent of height h. In order to be able to
determine which improvement(s) will appear on the market, I define v,* as the
improvement that blockades the market for firm 2. This means that firm 2's
strategy space in improvements is empty (firm 2 will not enter). The blockading
improvement here is v,* = 1 - h. Let the optimal improvement choice of a
monopolist be denoted by v,". If the monopoly improvement is larger than the
blockading improvement (v,** ^  v,^), firm 1 is better off choosing the monopoly
improvement because this also blockades the market and is optimal by definition.
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Additionally, if the monopoly profit of firm 1 is larger than its Stackelberg profit,
which is the case here, the upper category is established. For h e (1/2, °°), firm 1
will be a pure monopolist until doomsday with a product improvement of v,** =
1/2. For v ," < v,*, firm 1 cannot choose the monopoly improvement because firm
2 would then enter. Instead, firm 1 chooses the blockading improvement.
Compared to the optimal monopoly profits, the blockading profits decrease if v,®
is further away from v,**, i.e., when patents are lower. The loss in profits due to
the strategy of market blockade becomes large to the extent that, from a critical
patent height on, firm 1 is better off being a Stackelberg leader in duopoly than a
blockading monopolist. Label this height as h", defined as 7t,(l - h") s 7t/(v,^, V2*).
The two remaining categories can now be determined. For h G [h", 1/2], firm 1
will be a blockading monopolist until doomsday with the blockading improve-
ment v,° = 1 - h." For h e [0, h"), firm 1 will be Stackelberg leader in duopoly.
Proposition 3.2 summarizes the three categories of patent heights.
Proposition 3.2. For h G [0, h") the improvements developed in the Stackelberg
equilibrium are v / and V2*. For h e [h", 1/2] the patentholder is a blockading
monopolist with an improvement of v,° = 1 - h; the profits of the patentholder in-
crease in h until monopoly profits are reached for h = 1/2. The patentholder con-
tinues to be a monopolist for h e (1/2, °°) with an improvement of v," = 1/2.
3.3 Patent Height and Welfare
The static welfare in the market can be determined in a simple manner because
of the linear demand structures resulting from utility function (3.1). The sum of
consumer and producer surplus can be taken as an approximation of total wel-
fare. A product improvement generates a level of welfare equal to 3/2 of total
profit, both under monopoly and under duopoly. Maximization of welfare is thus
equivalent to maximization of joint profits. It can be easily shown that with a
patent on the basic invention (scenario [27), the optimal patent height from a
social point of view is given by h* = (r + s)/(2s - q + r)) inside the category h e
(v^, 1) in which the Nash equilibrium with v§ = Vg*(h) and v^ = h occurs. All
heights in the category [0, h") where a Stackelberg equilibrium with v,* and V2*
occurs are socially optimal in scenario [2J.
These welfare conclusions are concerned with the static efficiency once the
11. The critical height h" in the specification used is not larger than the natural distance
between the small and the large improvement in the basic Stackelberg equilibrium (h" <
^ - v,*). The third category, for low patents, then, is h e [0, h")- Firm 1 will first come
up with v^. Afterwards, firm 2 follows with Vj*.
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basic invention is generated. However, a more complete welfare analysis in the
context of technical progress would take into account the necessity of an
incentive for research. The presence of a basic invention as a starting point is
appropriate for competition analysis but not for welfare analysis. How can this
research incentive be taken into account? In Klemperer (1990) and Gilbert en
Shapiro (1990), it is introduced in the form of a minimal profit V for the firm that
undertakes R&D. In the underlying case of patent height, the question raises
which firm, 1 or 2, is to be given the incentive V. After all, both firms carry out
R&D. In a very specific sense, the profits of the patentholder and the improver
stand for special incentives. If the patent office wants to induce basic research, it
would make the profit of the patentholder equal to V. The patentholder's profits,
namely, represent the possible gains from basic research, which is, in a rather
limited way, defined here as research that has no direct links with previous
research. When patenting the products of basic research, the inventor does not
have to take into consideration the minimal steps of improvement. Therefore, if
the novelty requirements are more stringent, he only benefits because more
protection is provided. He does not face the disadvantage of higher patents,
which are harder to overcome. Applied research and development could be
defined as research that builds more on previous research. It is in this specific
sense that the non-patentholder's profits represent the gains from applied
research and development. If the patent office therefore wants to promote app/i'ed
researc/j and deue/opmenf, it should set the height such that the non-patentholder
obtains profit V. Depending on the size of V, the optimal height can thus be in
any category.
3.4 Conclusions
This chapter has shown that the height of patent protection as determined by the
stringency of novelty requirements can affect competition in product improve-
ments. Low patent protection does not affect the natural market equilibrium in
product improvements. This result holds regardless of whether the basic inven-
tion can be kept secret. In the scenario with perfect secrecy the inventor can
already obtain a monopoly position with medium-height patent protection. If
secrecy is impossible, the medium category of patent heights is unfavourable to
the patentholder since the improver can commit credibly to the more profitable
strategy. High patent protection is again favourable to the patentholder. His
profits then increase in height, even up to the monopoly level. It should be
stressed that these conclusions are only valid under a set of simplifying assump-
tions which might be restrictive.
Because of the limitations of the model, some possible applications can only
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be given with great care. First, it is an empirical fact, although many of their
inventions, firms do not patent all of them (see fact a in chapter 1). Because low
patent protection does not affect competition, the application costs could be
sufficient reason not to patent. Second, in the specific sense explained above, the
model might also apply to technology policy. Patent height can be used as an
instrument to give relative weights to incentives for basic research vis-â-vis
applied research and development." There is a trend in Europe towards uni-
form patent heights (section 4.3 will outline the details of the European Patent
System). Suppose that the uniform patent height of the European Patent System
will be the mean of national patent heights. The model predicts that uniform
patent height has differential effects on individual countries. Countries with
above average high novelty requirements, such as Germany for example, are
expected to shift from basic research towards applied research. Countries with
low novelty requirements, like for example Portugal, are expected to shift to-
wards basic research.
As explained in the introduction to this chapter, there is a fundamental
difference between patent height and patent breadth. While this chapter has
purely focused on the height dimension, the interaction with the breadth
dimension would also be an interesting object of study. Chapter 5 will examine
this interaction; an integrated model, including both breadth and height, will be
developed to study optimal strategies for inventing around a patent. Before this
integration is established, the next chapter will first study more extensively the
dimension of breadth. The relation between patent breadth and the practice of
price discrimination will be examined.
12. The emphasis on basic or applied research can be found in national patent policies.
Japan, for example, could be considered to have a comparative advantage in applied
research and product improvements. Patent protection in Japan is rather low in the sense
that each separate claim can be patented (Ordover 1991). It would be premature to
conclude that there is a causal relation between low patents and advantage in improve-
ments in Japan, but the co-existence is not illogical. The US and Germany, both countries
that can be considered to have a comparative advantage in basic research, have
relatively high patents (Ordover 1991).

Price Discrimination,
Dynamic Efficiency and
Patent Breadth
The tension between patent and competition policy has received much attention
in Industrial Organization. It is generally understood that the purpose of patents
is to stimulate technical progress. A patent can be necessary to protect an
invention because new knowledge that is generated by a firm through research
and development (R&D) easily spills over to competitors. A patent provides a
temporary monopoly position which enables a firm to extract revenues from the
invention and compensate for its R&D expenditures. Although the patent system
thus enhances technical progress, static efficiency is disturbed because of the
misallocation of resources of the monopolist. This trade-off between static
efficiency and technical progress raises tension between patent and competition
policy; while patent policy offers monopoly power, competition policy often
restricts it. The restrictions on the patentholder's rights, stemming from competi-
tion policy, have already been discussed in chapter 2. An important example
where restrictions are stringent and the tension is seriously felt is the practice of
price discrimination by a patentholder. Schmalensee (1981) and Varian (1985)
have examined the general welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination.
They have determined rather restrictive conditions for social welfare to increase
under price discrimination. Hausman and MacKie-Mason (1988) qualify these
results by showing that in scenarios that are typical of new patented products,
the tension between patent policy and competition policy is softened. When new
markets are served and scale economies are present, social welfare increases
under price discrimination.
In this chapter, I will examine whether allowing for price discrimination by a
patentholder is a good instrument, from a social welfare point of view, to
provide an innovation incentive. An important condition for price discrimination
is some market power. The breadth of patent protection, as recently analyzed by
Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and Klemperer (1990), essentially determines the
degree of market power of a patentholder. As explained in chapter 2, the breadth
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of a patent defines the allowed similarity between imitations and a patented in-
vention. Imitations can be seen as varieties that generate the same gross surplus
as the imitated product. Patent breadth can be regarded as an instrument défi- i
ning the number of protected varieties of a patented product. Like in chapter 3,
let us take the example of a new tennis racket (see Klemperer 1990, p.115), and
suppose that a new fibre makes it possible to design an oversized tennis racket.
The patent protection may then run from 85 to 130 square-inches. Since not all
consumers may prefer the same variety, it can be said that patent breadth defines
a protected region on the horizontal product spectrum.
More generally, new inventions always contain components that are not new
- in some way or another, inventions always build upon other inventions (fact c
in chapter 1 provides more backgrounds on this point). A patent office has to
decide in two phases of a common patent application procedure (see chapter 2
for an extensive description of a granting procedure) how similar an invention is
allowed to be to another invention. First, technical examiners judge whether the
claimed invention satisfies the conditions for patentability. One of the conditions
is that an invention must be sufficiently novel, which means that it must contain
not only a minimum of new components but also a maximum of known compo-
nents. Second, during the opposition phase, when competitors can make objec-
tions against the grant, the patent office must determine when these objections
are acknowledged. A patent system that tolerates much imitation during exami-
nation and opposition is said to offer narrow protection. If the degree of imita-
tion allowed for is low, patent protection is called broad.
The breadth of patent protection for a new product may differ in two
markets, for example because these markets are located in countries applying
different patent laws. Consequently, if a firm holds two national patents, its
monopoly power differs, cefens panbus, from country to country. The optimal
exploitation of both patents then involves price discrimination. This chapter
shows that for dynamic efficiency it is better to allow for price discrimination by
a patentholder. In addition to the scenario described in Hausman and MacKie-
Mason (1988), price discrimination in a dynamic context is thus another exception
to the welfare superiority of uniform pricing which is often prevalent.
The chapter is organized as follows: section 4.1 studies the dynamic efficiency
under price discrimination and uniform pricing, without reference to patents. In
section 4.2 the breadth of patent protection is used to derive the demand
functions. Section 4.3 will go into the recent developments in Europe concerning
patent protection. Finally, section 4.4 presents the conclusion.
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4.1 Price Discrimination and Dynamic Efficiency
Consider a potential inventor who has to be given an incentive to invest in R&D
in order to generate a product innovation. The incentive can only be given in the
form of a minimum profit level V that can be gained with the new product. Two
questions are relevant to the optimal incentive design. First, what is the optimal
profit V needed to induce an optimal innovation level? Second, once the optimal
V is known, how to provide it? The first question is hard to answer without
having some detailed information about the social value of the innovation and its
demand and cost characteristics. Fortunately, the second question can be
answered separately from the first one. Take the minimum profit level V fixed, as
done in Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and Klemperer (1990). The provision of a
positive profit (jt) incurs inevitably static welfare losses (WL), i.e., the losses
compared to welfare under competitive prices or perfect price discrimination. In
order to be able to assess the desirability of price discrimination or uniform
pricing, I propose a ratio that indicates how efficiently the profit incentive V can
be provided. This ratio is given by the welfare loss per unit of profit, WL/jt, and
is defined here as the dynamic ej^ 'cienci/. If the welfare loss per unit of profit is
lower, the innovation incentive can be provided more efficiently. Kaplow (1985)
advances a comparable ratio in judging monopolistic practices of patentholders.
He proposes to compare the incremental reward to the incremental monopoly
loss of a certain practice. If the reward, relative to the loss, of one restrictive
practice is higher than that of another, the first practice should be preferred. A
similar ratio is also present in Klemperer (1990). The main objective of Klemperer
is to find the patent breadth that minimizes the ratio of social cost to profit.
Patent lifetime can then be used to bring the profit level of the patentee at the
required level V. This chapter will compare two pricing practices of a patent-
holder. If the profit associated with either practice is insufficient, I assume that a
neutral patent policy instrument can bring the profit at the minimum level V.
If the new product of the patentholder is introduced in more than one
market, the question arises whether dynamic efficiency improves when the
inventor is allowed to apply price discrimination (of the third-degree type)', or if
he is forced to set uniform prices. I assume that the firm has sufficient market
power to be able to practice price discrimination. Obviously, the profits gained
from price discrimination are at least as large as the profits gained from uniform
pricing, since the option of uniform pricing is also open under price discrimina-
tion. With respect to the static welfare losses, one can refer to the well-known
1. See Phlips (1989) for an extensive (booklength) treatment of the economics of price
discrimination. For a shorter review see Varian (1989).
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result in the price discrimination literature that a necessary condition for welfare
to increase with price discrimination is that OMtput increases, compared to the
uniform price setting; a sufficient condition for welfare increase is that the prq/îf-
abi'/i'ty of the new output exceeds that of the old output, both valued at the discri-
minating prices (Varian 1985).
At this point, it can be concluded that dynamic efficiency is enhanced under
price discrimination if the static welfare loss with price discrimination is smaller.
Important examples are those where a market not served under uniform prices is
served under price discrimination. Other examples where static welfare might
increase through price discrimination are products whose production technology
exhibits declining marginal costs, because of scale or learning economies, but
only under the conditions indicated by Hausman and MacKie-Mason (1988).
However, it is not clear whether dynamic efficiency improves or worsens if
static welfare does not increase with price discrimination. I will examine this for
two markets with linear demands, which are both served under uniform prices.
There are at least two reasons why linear demands are examined. First, linearity
is often not a bad first approximation of a demand curve. Thus, eventual results
are generally applicable. And second, as Schmalensee (1981) and Varian (1985)
have shown, in the case of linear demands the output stays the same under price
discrimination and static welfare loss is therefore larger under price discrimi-
nation. So in the case of linear demands it is indeed not clear what happens with
dynamic efficiency.
Consider two independent markets with linear demand curves:
*i(Pi) = ai - f,p,; Xj(pj) = aj - f ^ (4.1)
The marginal cost is set equal to zero. Then, it can be easily shown that the
optimal prices in market 1 and 2 are p,* = a,/2f, and pj* = aj^fj , respectively.
The associated profits in each market are 7t,(p,*) = a,V4f, and Jt2(P2*) = 82V 4fj. It
can furthermore be shown that the deadweight losses are WL,(p,*) = a,V8f, in
market 1 and WL2(p2*) = ajVSfj in market 2. The resulting dynamic efficiency is
equal to 1/2. Thus, in order to provide one unit of 7:, welfare losses of 7t/2 are
born.
Now let us look at the uniform price setting. The relevant part of the joint
demand function, where both markets are served, is given by:
x, + Xj = aj + aj - (f, + fz)p (4.2)
The optimal uniform price p^* = (a, + a2)/(2(f, + fj)) yields a total profit for both
markets of ^(p^*) = (a, + a2)V(4(f, + fj)). The deadweight loss per market is now
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WL,(p»») = f,(a, + a,)V(8(f, + f,)*) and WL,(p_*) = f,(a, + aj7(8(f, + f,)*). The loss
in profits (labelled as An) due to uniform pricing is indeed non-negative: An =
Jti(Pi*) + ^(Pa*) - *u(Pu*) = (3^2 - a2fi)V(4f,f2(f, + fj)). Compared to the case of
price discrimination, the decrease in welfare loss is AWL = WL(p,*, pz*) - WL(p^*)
= (ajfj - a2f,)V(8f,f2(f] + f2)). For a ^ - ajf, * 0, uniform pricing is indeed welfare-
improving (AWL > 0). The loss in profits due to uniform pricing is proportional
to the lower welfare loss. Dynamic efficiency therefore remains unchanged:
WL(p/)/7iu(pu*) = WL(p,*, p2*)/(rc,(p,*) + w,(p,')) = 1/2
The absolute welfare loss under linear demands is larger with price discri-
mination, as was already shown by Schmalensee (1981) and Varian (1985).
However, the welfare loss per unit of profit, dynamic efficiency, is equal under
price discrimination and uniform prices. In the underlying context where a
minimum profit level has to be provided in order to induce R&D, allowing for
price discrimination is neutral to requiring uniform prices. This result implies an
important reservation toward the prohibition of price discrimination in the
competition policy practised in most countries. In the next section, where a 'less
partial' study of price discrimination is undertaken, a reserved attitude toward
policies forbidding price discrimination is justified even more - it will be shown
that dynamic efficiency is enhanced with price discrimination.
4.2 An Address Model of Patent Breadth
In this section, a model is developed which explains the position of the demand
curves the patentholder faces, as a function of the protection provided. Suppose
that all varieties of the patented product are represented by an address w on the
horizontal product spectrum, which extends from 0 to 1. By definition, the
address of the patentholder is at 0. Each firm can only have one variety. The
ordering in the interval [0, 1] is such that varieties located further away from 0
are less similar imitations*: an imitation at 0 is an exact duplication, and an
imitation at 1 is vaguely similar. The breadth b of the patent defines the region
protected by the patent to the 'right' of the patentholder: [0, b), with 0 S b S 1.
Other firms are not allowed in this protected region because they would then
infringe the patent. It is assumed that the border of what is judged to be infringe-
2. The patented product can also be assumed to be at the middle of the linear spectrum,
or at any point on a circular spectrum, with protection on the 'left' and on the 'right'.
Because of the symmetry at both sides, the analysis would not be very different from the
one presented here.
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ment is precise and known by the patentholder and competitors.' The claims
and description in the patent file and their interpretation by the patent office and
the courts define this protected region. It is furthermore assumed that the free
range [b, 1] is completely filled up with competitors, for example because
imitation is costless. The marginal cost of production of the new product is 0 for
both the patentholder and the competitors. The competitors charge a price equal
to the marginal cost of 0. The gross surplus provided by these imitations is
identical to the original innovation. Each consumer has a most preferred product
variety, which is denoted by w*. I take a continuum of consumers with a
uniform distribution of w* on [0, 1], with density 1. The net surplus U of an
individual consumer is given by the following utility function:
U = f v - p - t d if the consumer buys (4.3)
10 otherwise
where v is the gross surplus, p is the price and d is the Euclidean distance from
the consumer w* to the patentholder at w = 0: d = |w* - w|. Since the pat-
entholder is given by w = 0 here, the distance d is also uniformly distributed on
[0, 1], with density 1. The parameter t is analogous to the transport cost in the
Hotelling (1929) model; here, it is a utility penalty associated with consuming a
less preferred variety. Consumers located in the free region face no travel costs
because there are competitors at each location. The patentholder has to compete
with the imitator at the border b for the consumers in the interval [0, b). All
consumers are assumed to buy one unit. Let w' represent the consumer who is
indifferent to buying the patented product at price p and the product that is
supplied at the border b at price p = 0. The address of the indifferent consumer
is w' = (tb - p)/2t. The demand function x(p; b) of the patentholder is:
x(p; b) = b /2 - p /2t (4.4)
This demand curve is linear, like the ones in the previous section. The linearity
follows from the specification of the travel costs, which are linear in distance, and
from the uniformity of the distribution of consumers along the line. The breadth
b determines for a large part the degree of monopoly power of the patentholder,
which is visualized by the position of the demand curve. The demand curve
shifts in if the breadth and, consequently, monopoly power decreases. The slope
3. Waterson (1990) examines a patent system where it is not clear beforehand whether
the patentholder or the possible infringer wins in court. This uncertainty may affect the
patenting decision (see chapter 2 for more details on the Waterson model).
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of the demand curve is determined by the unit travel cost. If the unit travel cost
is higher, the demand curve is less steep, which means that the demand is less
sensitive to price changes.
What are the effects of the institution of patent breadth on static welfare?
Maximum static welfare would be obtained with a zero breadth when firms are
located all along the line offering the new product at the competitive price p = 0.
The total welfare would be W = v. A positive patent breadth causes two types of
welfare losses: (i) the pure fraue/ cosfs (TC) for consumers inside the protected
area, who have to travel to the patentholder at the left or to the firm at the
border; and (ii) the mark-up-induced-net-travel costs, or loosely defined the
rfeadweig/zf /oss (DL), due to above-marginal cost pricing by the patentholder.
Consider first the welfare losses due to travelling. In order to focus on the
travel costs, I assume for the moment that the patentholder charges the com-
petitive price p = 0. The indifferent consumer is w" = b/2. The consumers to the
'left' of w" buy from the patentholder and those to the 'right' of w" buy from
the competitor at the border. The consumers buying at the border face a welfare
loss of „-/'' t(q - b)rfq = b^t/8. Because of symmetry, the same holds for the other
side and, thus, total welfare loss due to travelling, or to the absence of products
in the protected area, is:
TC = bV4 (4.5)
The other type of welfare loss DL occurs because of the mark-up of the pat-
entholder on top of the marginal cost. More consumer surplus is lost because,
first, consumers that continue to buy from the patentholder have a lower net
surplus due to the higher price; and, second, consumers that switch to the
competitive substitute at the border have to travel a longer distance. This loss of
consumer surplus is only partly made up by the gain in producer surplus. It can
be shown that the deadweight loss is given by:
DL = p74t (4.6)
The profit function 7t(p) of the patentholder can be determined by using demand
function (4.4). The optimal price that maximizes this profit function 71 = x(p)p is
p* = bt/2. The associated optimal profits are 7t* = b^t/8. The optimal price of the
patentholder p* makes the deadweight loss in (4.6) equal to b^t/8. The total static
welfare loss WL that is due to the institution of patent breadth is illustrated by
the shaded area in figure 4.1 and can be easily calculated as t(w')V2 + t(b -
w')V2, which reduces to:
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Figure 4.1 Welfare loss due to patent breadth
WL = TC + DL = 5bVl6 (4.7)
Dynamic efficiency in this market is constant and equal to 5/2. It is built up as
follows: The travel cost to profit ratio, TC/TI*, is constant and equal to 2. The
deadweight loss to profit ratio, DL/JC*, is equal to 1 /2 for the optimal price p* =
bt/2. Note that without any basics under the demand structure, as in the
previous section, only the deadweight loss is caught. The welfare loss which is
born because consumers must travel when there are no substitutes, is missing in
a 'more partial' analysis. This missed welfare loss turns out to be decisive in the
following analysis.
Dynamic EjÇîciency with l/Mi/brm Prices
Consider two markets with different patent breadth, where the protection in
market 1 is broader: b, > bj. The most obvious reason for the difference in
breadth is that the markets are situated in countries where there exist different
laws concerning patent granting and patent disputes. Chapter 7 explains why
two countries which interdependently choose their patent policy, may differ in
patent breadth. Another reason might be that the protection provided for the
same product within one country differs because of different patent examiners
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and judges. The inventor holds a patent in both markets and is located at 0 in
each market. Suppose that the patentholder is not allowed to practice price
discrimination; he would then have to charge a uniform price p^ , in both markets.
What is his optimal uniform price? As before, first determine the joint demand
function by adding the demand functions. The relevant part of the joint demand
function where each demand is positive, is:
x(p; b,, bj) = (b, + b,)/2 - p / t (4.8)
for 0 < p < bj + t. The optimal uniform price can be easily determined as p ,^* =
t(b, + b2)/4. The corresponding profit is 7iu(Pu*) = t(b, + bjjVS. These price and
profits are relevant if both markets are served by the patentholder. However, if
there exist substantial differences in breadth in both markets, it may be more
profitable for the patentholder to serve only the strong market b,. This is because
the requirement of uniform pricing has a negative effect on the profit of the
patentholder as a result of his deviation from the optimal price pj* in each
country. This loss in profit can become large to the extent that the optimal profit
in the strong market b, exceeds the uniform profit in both markets together. The
critical value for the narrow breadth is bj = (V2 - l)b,. For bj > (V2 - l)b,, the
uniform profit 7tu(Pu*) is larger than the optimal profit in the strong market,
7i,(p,*). The patentholder will only serve the strong market if bj < (V2 - l)b,. We
have already seen that the dynamic efficiency of providing the R&D incentive in
one market is 5/2. If both markets are served by the patentholder (bj à (V2 -
l)b,), the following holds:
Proposition 4.1. Dynamic efficiency is worse with uniform prices than with price
discrimination if the patent breadth in both markets differs. The dynamic
efficiency with uniform prices is optimal and equal to the dynamic efficiency
with price discrimination if the breadths are identical.
Proo/i TC is given for each market by equation (4.5). DL is calculated by
substitution of p^* in equation (4.6). The dynamic efficiency with uniform prices
is then: WL/TI^* = 1/2 + 4(b,* + bjVfr , + b,)l Suppose b^ = A.b,, with V2 - 1 < X.
S 1. We obtain WL/it,» = 1/2 + 4(1 + X*)/(l + *•)*• WL/rC decreases in X. and is
minimal for A. = 1. For X = 1, WL/««* = 5/2.
What is the economic intuition behind the proposition? First, note that the
dynamic efficiency, as opposed to the static efficiency, is independent of the size
of the total patent breadth. It is the distribution of the total breadth over the two
markets that matters. An indicator for the distribution of the total breadth is X.
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(defined as bj = Xb,, with V2 - 1 < X < 1). The patentholder looses profits if he has
to charge a uniform price, because he then deviates from the optimal price in
each market. Define the loss of profits as Arc s (rc,* + rc/) - rc^,* = P(l - X)*, where
p" is a parameter that takes a positive value. The loss in profits Arc decreases in A,,
that is to say, if the breadth is less unevenly distributed. What is the effect of A.
on the two types of welfare losses? The deadweight loss, DL, is smaller under
uniform price setting than under, for the patentholder, optimal prices per market.
The difference in deadweight loss is ADL = DL(pi*) - DL(p^) = p(l - X)72. The
welfare gain thus increases if the breadths diverge. If X decreases, the negative
effect of loss in profits is compensated at a constant rate by the reduction in
welfare loss DL.
The other type of welfare loss that occurs purely because of travelling, TC, is
determined for the fixed competitive price of p = 0. By definition, it is irrelevant
whether the price in a market is the discriminating price pi* or the uniform price
Pu*. Hence, the welfare loss TC does «of compensate for the profit loss. In order
to keep TC/Tty* as small as possible, the profit loss Arc = fi(l - X)* has to be
minimized in A.. This yields A, = 1. The dynamic efficiency is then 5/2. Therefore,
the reason behind the worse dynamic efficiency of uniform pricing is that the
different breadths have full implications for travel cost but not for the patent-
holder's profits. The patentholder cannot fully exploit the patent breadths,
because he is restricted to set a uniform price.
4.3 Economic Implications of Converging Patent Breadth in Europe
Before discussing the issue of patent breadths, I will first give some historical
backgrounds of the current patent systems in Europe. Since the end of the
nineteenth century, most countries in Europe have a national patent system
(Machlup and Penrose 1950). The European patent system is more recent. In the
light of the general aim for integration, the European Community has tried to
unify national patent systems. The first step towards unification was the Treaty
of Strassbourg in 1963. European countries were obliged to conform parts of their
national patent laws to statements of the treaty. Although the treaty itself had
already been formulated in 1963, it was not until 1980 that it became operative.
The second step towards a common EC patent was taken in 1973 with the Euro-
pean Patent Convention (EPC) of Munich. A European patent is centrally granted
by the European Patent Office in Munich but regarding the specification it is, to
a large extent, subject to national patent laws. A firm chooses the EPC-connected
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countries* for which it seeks patent protection. Rather than separate procedures
in each chosen country, one procedure is enough for a European patent. The EPC
came into operation in most countries in 1980. The logical next step in fulfilling
the aim for European unification is the design of a common European patent that
applies to all European countries and that is subject to a common European
patent law. Such a patent, a Community Patent, was created by the Community
Patent Convention of 1975, but is not made operative yet.
Vanhaverbeke and Van Cayseele (1993) show that, by 1990, the EPO has
taken over almost the complete 'European patent market' from the national
patent systems, the most important reason being the cost of patenting. On
average, a European patent is less expensive than three national patents.
Therefore, most firms that want protection in three or more European countries
apply for a European patent.
It is sometimes argued that a European patent is nothing more than a set of
parallel national patents that fall under the national patent laws. This may be
true of, for example, the lifetime of the patent, but it is not true in general. The
EPC makes exceptions, and certain parts of national patent laws are not valid for
European patents. One important exception is the breadth of protection. A Euro-
pean patent has a uniform breadth, equal in all designated countries, while
national patents all have different breadths (Pieroen 1988). In some countries,
such as Germany and the Netherlands, national patents are broad, while in other
countries, such as Great-Britain, national patents are narrow.'
Thus, breadth of protection of national patents thus differs. Consequently, if
a firm holds various national patents, its market power differs, cetens panbws,
from country to country. A conflict then occurs between patent and competition
policy. Optimal exploitation of the different degrees of market power involves
price discrimination by the patentholder over the different countries. The practice
of price discrimination, however, is forbidden by European competition policy in
accordance with articles 85-86 of the Treaty of Rome on abuse of market power,
and articles 30-36 on the free movement of goods (Goyder 1988). But if forbid-
ding price discrimination, the European community, indirectly, would not respect
the rights that countries provide to patentholders. This would be in conflict with
article 222 of the Treaty of Rome, where it is stated that "the Treaty shall not
prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property owner-
4. Fifteen countries have joined the EPC: Sweden, United Kingdom, Germany, Nether-
lands, Luxembourg, Belgium, France, Spain, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Austria, Italy,
Greece, Denmark and Ireland.
5. The uniform breadth of European patents can be characterized as being intermediate,
with a tendency towards narrow interpretation (Pieroen 1988).
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ship" (Goyder 1988). Legally, the distinction between the existence and the exercise
of intellectual property rights is used by the Court of Justice of the EC to make
judgements about conflicts between patent and competition policy (Friden 1989).
The legal concept of existence refers to the conditions for granting patents, such
as the novelty requirements. Exercise refers to the effects that granted patents
will have, i.e., the rights that the patentholder will be able to exercise, such as
price discrimination. The Court of Justice has disclosed, by means of case law,
that the existence of national patents is not affected by Treaty rules such as
articles 30-36 and 85-86. Countries are thus free to define what conditions they
pose on inventions. However, the exercise of the national intellectual property
rights is affected by the competition policy of the EC. For this reason, the practice
of price discrimination in the case of national patents with different breadths of
protection is thus not allowed (according to European competition policy).
The proposition derived in the previous section directly applies to the
European context. If a firm holds two national patents with different breadths
(for example, a British and a German patent), then, given the fact that European
competition policy prohibits price discrimination, the provision of the minimum
profit to this firm to make it innovate in the first place is not efficient. The
efficiency distortion is less severe if the two breadths are more similar. From a
dynamic efficiency point of view, however, it would be best to permit the firm to
practice price discrimination over the two countries. The institution of a
European patent with uniform breadth, where there is no difference in profits
from uniform pricing or price discrimination, is therefore beneficial from the
dynamic efficiency viewpoint. These benefits are likely to become effective. As
mentioned previously, a firm can choose between a European patent and national
patents and due to the lower application cost, a European patent is preferred to
three or more national patents.
4.4 Conclusions
A well-known result in the price discrimination literature is that, under linear
demand curves, price discrimination worsens static efficiency (Schmalensee 1981,
Varian 1985). In this chapter it is shown that, if a firm has to be given a
minimum profit level in order to make it innovate, the dynamic efficiency of
providing such an incentive is equal under price discrimination and uniform
pricing, given linear demand curves. Moreover, when differences in demand
functions are caused by patent breadth, the practice of price discrimination of a
patentholder is superior to uniform pricing.
Although the simple model presented in this chapter yields powerful results,
some limitations of the analysis should be kept in mind. First, only linear de-
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mands are examined. Non-linear travel costs and non-uniform distributions of
consumers along the product spectrum, leading to non-linear demand curves,
should be examined in future research. The same holds for opening possibilities
for the patentholder to choose more than one variety within his protected region.
Furthermore, the only difference between markets in the above analysis is patent
breadth. Of course, there are other factors that cause differences in the demand of
the patentholder which may offset the difference in breadth and change the
conclusions derived here.
If, however, the focus is purely on breadth, chapter 7 advances a model
which explains why national patent breadths may differ. In a two-country model
with positive externalities (if one country enlarges its patent breadth, the innova-
tion incentive for the other country's innovators are improved as well), the effects
of various asymmetries between both countries are examined. This model can be
considered as underlying the assumption of two different national breadths that
was made in this chapter.
Before introducing the international setting, the next chapter will develop a
model, at industry level, that integrates the dimensions of breadth and height.
Various modelling elements from chapter 3 (on height) and chapter 4 (on
breadth) are combined into one framework.

On the Exploitation
of Patent Protection
How can a patentholder exploit his patent if the protection is imperfect and
competitors can invent around the patent? As previously exemplified, much
more than economists, jurists are aware of the fact that patent protection is
imperfect: "To the extent that intellectual property is capable of generating
market power, it offers its owner (and his associates) the opportunity to reduce
output and raise prices. What it does not bring about is the condition in which
the monopolist behaves as though he were the only competitor on the market.
Yet the more naive arguments in favour of one or other exclusive right often
imply that this alone will be the effect of according the right sought." (Cornish
1989, p. 18). When we take a closer look at a typical patent procedure (for
example, the European procedure discussed in chapter 2), the imperfection of
patent protection and the various opportunities for competitors to invent around
indeed become clear.
Briefly recapitulating, a patent-granting procedure starts with an application
that must contain a specification of the invention. This specification is made up
of two parts: a description of the invention, possibly accompanied by drawings,
and the claims which indicate the exact protection desired. If an application
successfully passes the phases of examination and opposition, a patent is granted,
possibly after amendment. The protection provided by the patent is partly
determined by the specification and partly by the patent office and the court. The
exact protection which was asked for, is written down in the claims. But the
court does not have to take these claims literally (in a 'fencepost' system it does);
it may interpret the claims in a broader and wider sense (a 'signpost' system). A
similar invention that is slightly different from what is written down in the
patent specification can also be judged to be covered by the protection. Besides
the formulation and interpretation of the claims, the novelty requirements which
are used by the patent office in the examination phase, also define the extent of
protection of a granted patent. The protection is weak if a current patent can
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easily be overcome by a small improvement. If the novelty requirements are
stronger, patents, once granted, provide more protection.
Thus, there are several opportunities for competitors to circumvent the
patent. They can, for example, produce an imitation which does not fall within
the interpreted claims, or generate an improvement which fulfils the novelty
requirements. Given these opportunities, what is the value of the patent for the
patentholder? How much profit can he extract from it? And his competitors? As
shown in chapters 3 and 4, the literature on product differentiation, and more
specifically the address branch, provides useful tools to examine these questions.
Incremental innovations, in the form of imitations or improvements, can be
thought of as being differentiations of a certain basic innovation. The competition
that occurs between the basic innovator and incremental innovators, or between
incremental innovators themselves, can be described by means of address models
from the product differentiation literature. This chapter explores the further
possibilities of these differentiation models in the context of imperfect patent
protection. More precisely, it will work toward a model where patent breadth
and height can be studied simultaneously. Given breadth and height of protec-
tion, a competitor can determine his optimal strategy of inventing around the
patent, which can either be an imitation or an improvement strategy. For
eventual policy conclusions (this chapter will only perform positive rather than
normative analysis), the effects of the breadth and height standards on the choice
of inventing-around strategies may be interesting and will therefore also be
examined in this chapter.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 briefly defines and formalizes
important dimensions and outlines the shape of patent protection. The next
sections deal with the question of how the patentholder can exploit this
protection. First, section 5.2 studies the profit opportunities for a patentholder
facing no competition. Next, scenarios in which the patentholder faces compe-
tition from firms that invent around the patent are examined: section 5.3 studies
competition from improvement, section 5.4 studies competition from imitation
and section 5.5 studies competition from both sources. Finally, section 5.6
discusses the results and provides some concluding remarks.
5.1 The Shape of Protection
As previously shown, the patent dimensions of breadth and height can be
formalised by using simple models of product differentiation. Let me briefly
repeat the main concepts. First, consider patent breadth. The breadth of a patent
defines how similar imitations of a patented invention are allowed to be.
Imitations can be seen as varieties of the patented product. Patent breadth can be
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viewed as defining the number of varieties of a product innovation that are
protected by the patent. Take the example of a new tennis racket (see Klemperer
1990, p. 115 and chapter 3 and 4, where this was also mentioned). Suppose that a
new fibre, for example, Du Pont's 'Kevlar' or Akzo's 'Twaron' (see chapter 1),
makes it possible to design an oversized tennis racket of, say, 105 square inches.
The patent breadth protection on the new racket may then run from 80 to 130
square inches. Since not all consumers may prefer the same variety, it can be said
that patent breadth defines a protected region on the horizontal product
spectrum. Suppose that all varieties of a patented product can be represented by
an address w on the horizontal product spectrum, which extends from 0 to 1. By
definition, the address of the patentholder is at 0. The ordering in the interval [0,
1] is such that varieties which are located further away from 0 are less similar
imitations. The patent breadth b (> 0) protects the range [0, b), where no
competitors are allowed. I assume that the border of what is judged to be
infringement is precise and known by the patentholder and competitors. The
claims and description in the patent file and their interpretation by the patent
office and the courts define this protected region.
Next, consider the dimension of height. This dimension indicates how new a
new product must be, or to what extent a product must be improved, in order
not to infringe a current patent. The stringency of the novelty requirements used
by patent examiners mainly determines the height of protection. The dimension
shows up most clearly if inventions are related. Similar to chapter 3, I will
therefore focus in this chapter on inventions that improve existing products.
Height then defines the protection provided by a patent against improvements.
Again, take the example of the new tennis racket. Patent height indicates how
much a 105 square inch racket must be improved (for example, by using a new,
stiffer fibre) in order not to infringe the current racket patent. Since it is
reasonable to expect that all consumers prefer an improvement to a product that
was improved, patent height can be thought of as defining a protected region on
the vertical product spectrum. Improvements of a basic invention can thus be
represented by an address v on the vertical product spectrum, which extends
from 0 to v*. The address 0 represents a basic invention and v* the final improve-
ment possible. Let v be the address, or the improvement level, of the patent-
holder, which might be the basic invention, given by v = 0, or any improvement
on (0, v*]. The height h provides protection for innovation v in the interval [0, v
+ h]. Competitors are not allowed here (except, of course, if they have a license
permission which is, however, not included here). The lower bound of this
protected interval is 0 because an improvement must always be larger than what
is publicly known. The patented improvement and the basic invention on which
it is based, are the state of the art used by patent examiners as a standard
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measure. The upper bound is v + h. If the improvement v is patented, the next
improvement must be h larger, which is at least v + h. In other words, it must
fulfil the minimum novelty requirements. If not, the patent on innovation v is
infringed.
Finally, there are the dimensions of patent length and width." Patent length
needs no further explanation. Although the width dimension is not included in
the following analysis, I will give a definition anyway. An invention may contain
an idea that can be applied in various products. Sticking to the tennis racket
example, the new material the original racket or the improvement was made of
could also be used in, for example, fishing rods or squash rackets. The number of
applications that are reserved for the patentholder are determined by the patent
width. Notice the difference between breadth and width: patent breadth is
concerned with the protection on one product spectrum, whereas patent width
defines the number of protected product spectra. Because the focus in this
chapter is on profits and not on welfare in general, the length of patent
protection is less interesting. Calculating the total patentholder's profit is simply
a matter of discounting the instantaneous profit, which is determined by breadth
and height, over the duration of the patent. Under certain assumptions, the same
holds for the width dimension. If the applications are offered on independent
markets and the reserved applications are present at the start of the patent
without extra cost, it is simply a matter of multiplying the profit per application
with the number of reserved applications.*
The total patent protection per reserved application is a function of breadth,
height and duration. For one application in one period of the patent life, the
protection breadth and height can be represented by a rectangular as in figure
5.1. This protection is valid for a new or improved product with the address 0 on
the horizontal product spectrum and the address v on the vertical product
spectrum.
1. The survey in chapter 2 distinguished two branches of models on patent breadth. The
first branch, where breadth is defined for one market, and the second, which is labelled
here as width, for more markets. Patent 'scope' is also used by several authors (Klem-
perer 1990, Merges and Nelson 1992). I interpret patent scope as a ^enero/ indication of
the extent of patent protection. A more precise indication distinguishes the dimensions
of breadth, height and width.
2. Relaxing these rather strong assumptions, the non-address branch in product differ-
entiation (for example Dixit and Stiglitz 1977) might be useful to examine patent width.
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v + h
Figure 5.1 The shape of patent protection: height and breadth
5.2 Patent Exploitation by a Pure Monopolist
As mentioned above, this chapter focuses on the breadth and height dimensions
of patent protection. The length is assumed to be infinite, although this is a
stronger assumption than strictly required (see footnote 12). I will focus on one
application, so that the width dimension is also excluded. What are the profit
opportunities for a patentholder who enjoys this protection? This section will
consider simple benchmark cases where the patentholder does not have to cope
with competition: the protection completely covers the interval [0, 1], for b > 1,
and the height interval [0, v*], for h > v* - v. This will provide some insights into
the profit opportunities of the patentholder under perfect protection, as is often
assumed, for example in models of patent races. First, I will examine the separate
effects of patent height and breadth. After that, the combined effects are studied.
fa) Per/ecf Height Protection
As explained above, since all consumers prefer a larger improvement to a smaller
one, a model of vertical differentiation can be used to examine the height
dimension. The innovation of the patentholder has an improvement level v
indicating the gross surplus provided by the innovation. This improvement level
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v is taken to be exogenous in this section; in the next section v is a deliberate
choice of the patentholder. Consumers are heterogeneous in the sense that they
evaluate the decision whether or not to buy v in different ways, for example
because their incomes differ. The (indirect) utility function that was also used in
chapter 3 is taken again:
U = f mv - p if the consumer buys (5.1)
I 0 otherwise
where U is individual net utility and m is the improvement preference intensity
parameter of an individual consumer, which is uniformly distributed with
density 1 on the interval [0, 1]. The price of v is p. A consumer buys only if his
net utility is non-negative and he buys one unit. This will be the case in each of
the models to follow. The demand function which corresponds with utility
function (5.1) and perfect protection against competition through improvement (h
^ v ' - v ) is:
x = 1 - p/v (5.2)
For convenience, I set, here and in the rest of the chapter, the marginal produc-
tion cost equal to 0. The profit function is it = p(l - p/v). The optimal price is p*
= v/2, yielding a profit of 7t* = v/4. This is what can be gained with an
improvement v, which is perfectly protected against further improvements.
(W Per/ecf Breadf/i Protection
The address w of the patented product on the horizontal product spectrum [0,1]
is 0. The ordering in this interval is such that towards 1, the addresses represent
imitations which are less similar to the patented product at 0. At 0 an imitation is
thus an exact duplication and at 1 an imitation is vaguely similar. The gross
surplus which these imitations provide, however, is identical to the original
innovation. As in chapter 4, horizontal differentiation is caught in the following
(indirect) utility function:
U = f v - p - t d if the consumer buys (5.3)
I 0 otherwise
where d is the Euclidean distance from the consumer w* to the patentholder at
w: d = |w* - w|. Each consumer has a most preferred product variety, which is
denoted by w*. I take a continuum of consumers with a uniform distribution of
w* on [0, 1], with density 1. Since the patentholder is given by w = 0 here, the
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distance d is also uniformly distributed on [0, 1], with density 1. The parameter
t is analogous to the transport cost in the Hotelling (1929) model; here it is a
utility penalty associated with consuming a less preferred variety.
The demand for the patentholder under perfect protection (b > 1) that results
from (5.3) is given by:
(5.4)x = 0
(v - p)/t
1
if p >
ifv S
i fv -
: v
p > v
t > p >
- t
0
Given demand function (5.4), what is the optimal profit for the patentholder?
Prices based on the first part (for p > v) cannot be profit-maximizing since
demand and therefore profit is zero. Based on the second part of the demand
function, the profit function is 7t = p(v - p)/t, which is maximized for p = v/2,
yielding an optimal profit of 7t = vV(4t). For consistency, the optimal price p
must belong to the relevant price interval [v - 1 , v]. The upper limit of this price
interval, v, is always fulfilled. With respect to the lower limit, p is larger than v -
t for v < 2t. Demand is non-negative for v > t. Based on the third part of the
demand function, the profit function is simply n = p; it increases in p in the
relevant price range [0, v - t]. The optimal price for this range is therefore the
highest possible price, p = v - t, yielding an optimal profit of it = v - t. Now
compare the optimal profits in both price regimes. For v < 2t, the price strategy p
= v/2 always yields higher profits in the second regime than the alternative price
strategy p = v - 1 . In the third regime p = v -1 yields more than p = v/2.
Summarizing, the optimal price is p* = v/2 for inventions that are small
relative to consumer unit travel cost (t < v < 2t). Charging this optimal price for
such an innovation yields optimal profit JI* = vV4t. For relatively large
inventions (v > 2t), the optimal price is p* = v - 1 , yielding an optimal profit of 7t*
= v - t. The total market [0, 1] is served then. So, without any competitors in [0,
1], 7C* is what can be gained with an invention that is perfectly protected against
competition through imitation.
(c) Combining Per/ect Height and Breadfh Protect/on
Since an innovation is characterized both by its degree of imitation and its degree
of improvement, I need a utility function which includes both uertica/ and hon'zon-
ta/ cftjfjferenfiafion. The following utility function is a combination of functions (5.1)
and (5.3) (see Neven and Thisse 1990 for a similar utility function, and De Palma
et al. 1985 and Economides 1986 for less similar functions with two distinguish-
ing characteristics):
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lo
U = I mv - p - td if the consumer buys (5-5)-
otherwise
If all consumers had an m equal to 1, (5.5) would be a pure horizontal differ-
entiation model. And if t were equal to 0, or, if all consumers' addresses were at
the producer's, (5.5) would be a pure vertical differentiation model. Here, each
individual consumer has two characteristics. First, as in (5.1), his improvement
preference intensity parameter m e [0, 1], and second, as in (5.3), the distance d
e [0, 1] between his most preferred variety and the one that is actually offered.
The derivation of the demand function, associated with the patentholder's
product at 0 on the horizontal product spectrum and at v on the vertical product
spectrum, is less simple now because there are two distributions involved. The
distributions of m and d are assumed to be independent; the location of a con-
sumer on [0, 1] does not say anything about the intensity m in which he values
improvements. I assume furthermore that the patentholder does not know the
combination of characteristics of each consumer.
In order to simplify notations further on, define u s mv, so that u is
uniformly distributed on [0, v] with density 1/v; and define 8 = td, so that ô is
uniformly distributed on [0, t] with density 1/t. The joint density of u and 8 is
l/(vt). The demand for the patentholder is then given by the shaded area in
figure 5.2.a and 5.2.b and consists of those consumers with characteristics m and
d who have a non-negative net utility: u - 8 > p. For p < v < p + t (i.e., in the
case that even consumers who appreciate improvement most do not buy if their
travel costs td are high), the demand is given by:'
r /
• • * 0 • *
1/vt rf8 du = (v - p)7(2vt)
This demand is illustrated in figure 5.2.a by the shaded area in the differentiation
box. For v £ p + t, the demand is given by:
/
o J 1/vt d8 dp + t(v - p - t)/(vt) = 1 - p /v - t/2v
The shaded area in figure 5.2.b depicts this demand.
3. See Papoulis (1984), chapter 6 for an extensive treatment of joint statistics and
functions with two random variables.
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v - p t
(a) (b)
Figure 5.2 Demand for the patentholder as a monopolist
Resuming, the demand function based on the utility function which combines
horizontal and vertical differentiation is thus:
x = 0
(v - p)7(2vt)
1 - p/v - t/(2v)
if p > v
i f v > p > v - t
if v - t > p > 0
(5.6)
This demand function is continuous. The second part (v > p > v - t) is strictly
convex, the third part is linear (v - t > p > 0) in p. Demand will never be 1
because price cannot be negative; consumers who have a low improvement pref-
erence intensity parameter combined with large distance costs do not even buy at
zero price. The profit function Ji(p) = x(p)p is also continuous. The optimal price
is p* = v/3, for t < v < 3t/2. This part is relevant to inventions which have
relatively low improvement levels. The optimal profit is 7t* = (2v*)/(27t). For
relatively large inventions (v > 3t/2), the optimal price is p* = (2v -1)/4, yielding
a profit of it* = (2v - t)V(16v). This can be checked in the following way. Based
on the second part of the demand function, the optimal price (for p < v) is the
one which maximizes JI = (p(v - p)*)/(2vt), namely p* = v/3. For v < 3t/2, p*
belongs to the relevant range [v -1 , v]. Demand stays non-negative here for v > t.
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The optimal profit with p* = v /3 is it* = (2v^)/(27t). Based on the third part, the
profit function is re = p(l - p / v - t)/2v. This profit function is maximized for p* =
(2v - t)/4 which yields 7t* = (2v - t)V(16v). Now compare both optimal profit
levels, 7i* = (2v*)/(27t) for the second part and 7t* = (2v - t)V(16v) for the third
part. It turns out that for v < 3t/2, the optimal profit level for the second part 7t*
= (2v*)/(27t) is indeed always larger, and for v > 3t/2 the optimal profit 7C* = (2v
- t)V(16v) is larger in the third part.
What can we learn from this combined model? A patentholder who enjoys
perfect protection does not have to cope with competition, but his profit
opportunities are still restricted. This restriction on profit is caused by the
conditions on the market with respect to demand. If, as assumed, the patent-
holder supplies only one product (i.e., one variety and one improvement level of
the product), some consumers will not buy. The reason is that the lost utility
associated with buying a less preferred variety is too high, so that no positive net
surplus remains, or that the level of improvement is not sufficiently appreciated,
or a combination of both. This can be seen in both cases of small and large
improvements by looking at the expressions for the optimal profits. Both profits
increase, be it with different speed, if the travel costs of consumers are lower.
Abstracting from any research and development cost, the same holds for the
improvement level.
5.3 Inventing Around by Competitors: Improvement
Scenarios where the patent does not cover the complete intervals are considered
now. I will examine the pure effects of patent height in this section. Competitors
can only locate in the unprotected region of the vertical spectrum, [v + h, v*]. In
the next sections, the economic effects of breadth and, after that, of breadth and
height combined are studied.
But, first, let me briefly comment on an important feature of the analysis in
this chapter. Throughout the complete analysis, I will examine games where two
firms, the patentholder and a competitor, choose their strategies simultaneously.
One can, of course, object that the natural assignment of strategic roles would be
for the patentholder to be Stackelberg leader and for the competitor to be the
follower. This is because the patentholder can be expected to be first in the new
market and therefore able to choose before a potential entrant. Yet the Nash
equilibrium analysis (where both firms choose simultaneously) is useful for
several reasons. First, if in the pre-patent stage (which is not included here) the
eventual patentholder and the eventual competitor were involved in a patent race
and this race had a close finish, then it is not likely that the patentholder can
make his decisions on entry, price and innovation prior to the other racer. In
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such scenarios, which are quite common, Nash equilibrium is more appropriate
than Stackelberg equilibrium. Second, suppose the patentholder indeed enters the
market earlier than his competitor. Still, one can then concentrate fully on the
stages when the competitor has actually entered. If the patentholder cannot
commit to his price and innovation strategy chosen before entry, Nash
equilibrium type of competition will occur. Besides the various scenarios where
Nash equilibrium is relevant, a third reason to examine Nash equilibria is that
the analysis, especially in section 5.5, is simpler and yields conclusions that are
qualitatively similar to those obtained from Stackelberg equilibria. This can be
checked in the series of footnotes where Stackelberg equilibria are examined.
To examine the basic economic impact of patent height, consider a scenario
where two firms, the patentholder and one improver, potentially enter the
market. The model used is a game that includes three stages of competition. In
the first stage firms decide whether or not to enter the market. In the second
stage both firms choose their improvement level (now thus endogenous), based
on the entry decisions in the first stage. In the final stage firms choose price
strategies, given the improvement choices of the previous stage. The order of the
stages is determined by the decreasing degree of flexibility of the decisions. Price
decisions are more flexible than improvement decisions; improvement decisions,
in turn, are more flexible than entry decisions. Only pure strategies will be con-
sidered. The solution concept is the subgame perfect equilibrium. As conventio-
nal, the game will be solved by backward induction.
Starting with the last stage of price competition, I will first model the
demand structure. An individual consumer has the following (indirect) utility
function:
U = f f + m^ - pi i = 1,2 (5.7)
10
Firm i has an improvement v, and charges a price pj. I take the patentholder as i
= 1 and the competitor as i = 2. Furthermore, I assume an exogenous but natural
division of roles: the improvement level of the patentholder is smaller than the
improvement level of the competitor (v, < Vj). Each consumer enjoys an autono-
mous gross surplus f, which is taken such that the market is completely served in
duopoly equilibrium: f > Pi/v,. Define m' as the consumer who is indifferent to
buying v, at p, and V2 at pj. This consumer is given by m' = (pj - Pi)/(v2 - v,).
The demand function for the patentholder then is:
*i = (Pa " Pi)/(V2 - v,) (5.8)
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The demand function for the improver is the complement: Xj = 1 - x,. Still
assuming zero marginal product cost, the gross profit functions (i.e., without
research and development costs) for the patentholder and the improver are:
*i(Pw P2; v,, Vj) = p,(pj - p,)/(v2 - v,); (5.9)
MPa/ Pi; v,, V2) = pj(l - (PJ - p,)/(vj - v,))
As solution concept for the stage of price choices of 1 and 2, I use the non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium. A pair of prices (p,*, pj*) is an equilibrium if
iti(p,*, P2*; v,, Vj) > n,(p,, P2*; v,, Vj) and ^(pj*, p / ; v,, v j > Jtjfo, p,*; v,, Vj), for
all pi, P2 â 0. Using the gross profit functions in (5.9), the following Nash
equilibrium in prices occurs:
P.*(P2*) = (v, - v,)/3; p2*(p,*) = 2 K - v,)/3 (5.10)
The associated gross profits in equilibrium are:
*i(pA P2*) = (V2 " v,)/9; J^(P2*, p,*) = 4(V2 - v,)/9 (5.11)
The Nash equilibrium always exists.* Firm 2, the improver, is able to undercut
the patentholder since, by charging P2 < Pi, he would capture the complete
market. But this undercutting price strategy (more precisely given by pj = pi* - e,
where e is small and positive) is always dominated by the price strategy pj* in
Nash equilibrium (5.10). The gross profits of both the patentholder and the
improver, as given by (5.11), increase in distance between improvements in price
equilibrium. There is a natural tendency for the improver to improve as much as
possible in order to create distance and relax price competition. According to
Shaked and Sutton (1982), this is due to the vertical differentiation character of
competition in product improvements. Notice that the improver serves the upper
segment of the market [1/3, 1], where consumers who appreciate improvement
most (large m) are located, while the original innovator serves the lower segment
4. It is assumed here that the patentholder and the improver choose prices simulta-
neously. A first-mover advantage for the patentholder might be the possibility to choose
the price before the improver does. A Stackelberg price equilibrium is then appropriate
with the patentholder being the Stackelberg price leader and the improver being the
follower. The prices in Stackelberg equilibrium are p,* = (vj - v,)/2 and P2* = 3(vj - v,)/4,
with corresponding profits of 7t,* = (Vj - v,)/8 and Tij* = 9(Vj - v,)/16. Notice that these
Stackelberg prices and profits of firm 1 and 2 are both higher than the ones in Nash
equilibrium.
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[0,1/3]. The improver's larger improvement level enables him to charge a higher
price and yet have larger demand. This makes his gross profit (four times) larger
than that of the original innovator.
The novelty requirements h that are used by patent examiners determine the
minimum distance between both improvement levels: Vj - v, > h. The novelty
requirements can become restrictive for the improver if research and develop-
ment (R&D) costs of improvements are incorporated. Suppose that increasing
R&D leads to a higher gross surplus v being generated by the product innova-
tion, and suppose that this is decreasingly so. A simple innovation cost function
which catches the idea of exhausting improvement opportunities is:'
c(v) = ocv* a > 0 (5.12)
The net profit functions (i.e., gross profit minus R&D costs) then are 7t,(v,, Vj) =
(Vj - v,)/9 - av,* and ^(v, , Vj) = (4(vj - v,))/9 - avjl A pair of improvements (v,*,
V2*) is an equilibrium if 7t,(v,*, Vj*) > 7t,(v,, Vj*) and ^(v,*, V2*) > ^(^i*/ v,*), for all
v,, Vj > 0. In this case the optimal improvements are independent of each other.
The Nash equilibrium in improvements is:
v,*(vi») = 0; Vj*(v,*) = 2/9a (5.13)
The net profit of the improver, jtj* = 4/(81a), is (two times) larger than the net
profit of the patentholder, 71,* = 2/(81a).' Because of the exhausting improve-
ment opportunities, the net profit advantage of the improver, relative to the
patentholder, is smaller than the advantage in gross profit (which was four times
larger, see 5.11).
Three categories of effects of patent height can be distinguished in this
simple model. If the patent height is relatively low (h < 2/(9a)), it does not affect
the natural choice of the improver. The protection of the patentholder then does
5. This innovation cost function is in accordance with Wo/jff s Law. "Wolff was a German
economist who in 1912 published four 'laws of retardation of progress'. Essentially, he
argued that the scope for improvement in any technology is limited, and that the cost of
incremental improvement increases as the technology approaches its long-run perfor-
mance level." (Freeman 1982, p. 216, footnote 2)
6. Based on the Stackelberg price equilibrium (see footnote 4), the improvement choices
are v,* = 0 and Vj* = 9/(32oc), yielding profits of TC,* = 9/(256a) and 71/ = 81/(1024a).
Since the improvement choices are constant, a Stackelberg equilibrium in improvements,
based on the Nash price equilibrium, does not differ from a Nash equilibrium in
improvements.
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not enlarge his market power. For intermediate heights (2/(9oc) < h < 4/(9a)), the
improver is restricted and the best he can do is to deviate minimally from his
optimal improvement and choose Vj = h. Since he must deviate from his optimal
choice V2*, his profits decrease in h. In this range of height, the profits of the
patentholder increase in h because the distance in improvements becomes larger
and thus relaxes price competition (compare 5.10 and 5.11). For high patent
protection (h > 4/(9oc)), the improver does not even enter because his profits
would then be negative. The patentholder becomes a pure monopolist. These
three categories of height effects shift upwards if improvements are less costly to
generate (i.e., a smaller a in expression 5.12). Height is then only restrictive for
higher values.
The effects of patent height on the competition in product improvements give
some indication of how novelty requirements can be used as an instrument of
technology policy. If, for example, a government wants to stimulate basic
research, it can provide more profit to the patentholder, who generates the
product innovation first, by setting stronger novelty requirements. If, on the
contrary, it wants to stimulate applied research and development for improve-
ments of products, a patent policy of weak novelty requirements is the more
appropriate instrument. Some minimum incentive for basic research always exists
because, even if novelty requirements are negligibly weak, the improver freely
chooses for some novelty and, consequently, the patentholder has positive profits.
It should be stressed here that these conclusions on patent height policy are very
premature and based on a simple model. More serious policy implications should
be based on richer models.
5.4 Imitation
I will first give some backgrounds of the model of horizontal differentiation
which is used here to model breadth/ Hotelling (1929) came to the conclusion
that two firms in a linear city will locate both at the centre, in other words,
differentiate minimally, if they compete for consumers who have linear travel
cost. His conclusion was later corrected by D'Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse
(1979), who showed that the price equilibrium at which his statement of minimal
differentiation was based, only exists when both firms are located far enough
from each other. If located too closely to the other, a firm can gain by under-
cutting the price and capture the whole hinterland of its opponent. This holds for
both firms. As a result, a price equilibrium does not exist when firms are located
7. See Friedman (1983) for a more extensive discussion of horizontal differentiation
models and the existence of price equilibrium.
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closely to each other. Several solutions have been proposed over time for this
problem. I will shortly expose some of them here. Eaton and Lipsey (1975, 1978)
use a 'no-mill price-undercutting' assumption as to rule out the inconsistent
expectation of the price-undercutting firm. D'Aspremont et al. (1979) specify
quadratic transport costs. The price equilibrium then exists but the principle of
minimal differentiation turns into one of maximal differentiation. The economic
justification of quadratic travel costs, however, is not clear. One could make a
counter argument saying that travelling may involve a fixed cost, partially
offsetting the marginally increasing variable travel costs, for example because a
consumer has to invest a fixed amount in travel equipment, or faces a constant
utility penalty if he cannot buy his most preferred variety, independent of
distance. Transport costs are then marginally decreasing. Another solution is
formulated by Salop (1979). He describes spatial competition on a circle, instead
of a line, where a firm has to undercut a competitive price equal to the marginal
cost in order to capture the hinterland of a neighbour. Under these conditions the
undercutting price strategy is never profitable. Economides (1984) starts from the
original Hotelling model and includes a third alternative for consumers, besides
the products of both firms. This creates a positive reservation price (consumers
have zero reservation prices in the Hotelling model). A firm has to take into
account this third alternative when it tries to undercut its opponent. The result is
that the range of existence of the price equilibrium widens. Dasgupta and Maskin
(1986) study a mixed strategies equilibrium for the Hotelling model rather than
the pure strategies equilibria discussed so far. They show that a mixed equilibri-
um, with intermediate differentiation, does exist for all location choices. Ander-
son and Neven (1991), finally, examine competition of the Cournot-type instead
of the Bertrand-type as is usually done in differentiation models. They show that
Cournot competition yields minimial differentiation (spatial agglomeration).
In the following analysis the transport costs are taken linear in distance for at
least two reasons. First, as pointed out previously, marginally increasing trans-
port costs are, though technically handy, economically unappealing. Second, the
analysis of patent breadth would yield less interesting results if the imitator
always want to differentiate maximally, since patent breadth never would then
be restrictive. With linear transport cost, there is no tendency towards maximum
differentiation. In fact, the imitator will, by assumption, be located at the border
of protection at b. In other words, he will always have an imitation that is
marginally allowed for by court. If imitation was more costly further away from
the patented product, the tendency for minimal differentiation would even be
stronger and b would be the free choice of an imitator. In this section on patent
breadth and imitation, I will only include the stages of entry and price competi-
tion. Location (i.e., imitation) decisions are exogenous.
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fa) One /mjfflfor at b
I start with the same utility and demand structure as described in section 5.2.b.
The patentholder is located at 0, the imitator is located at b. Imitation is assumed
to be costless. The market is assumed to be served completely. This is indeed the
case if the gross surplus of the product is larger than the highest delivery price of
the patentholder or the imitator: v > max (p, + t, pj + bt). A consumer buys from
firm 1 if v - p, - td, > v - P2 - tdj. The consumer who is indifferent to buying
from the patentholder or the imitator is located at address w = (pj - p, + tb)/(2t).
The demand function for the patentholder is:
x, = 0 if Pi > P2 + tb (5.14)
(pj - p, + tb)/(2t) if pj + tb > p, > p , - tb
1 if Pi * p , - tb
The demand function for the imitator is X2 = 1 - x,, by assumption of full market
coverage. Firm 1 can undercut firm 2 by charging a price of p, = P2 - tb - e,
where, as before, e is small and positive. At this undercutting price, the consum-
ers in the hinterland of firm 2, given by 1 - b, all buy from the patentholder,
making his total demand equal to 1. At a slightly higher price of Pi = P2 - tb, the
total demand of the patentholder is just b, because the consumers in the hinter-
land [b, 1] do not buy from him but from the imitator. The demand function of
the patentholder is thus discontinuous. This makes his profit function also
discontinuous. D'Aspremont et al. (1979) have shown that the discontinuity, or,
more precisely, the non-quasi-concavity, is a serious problem in the original
Hotelling (1929) location model because a Nash equilibrium in prices does not
exist when undercutting is profitable. In the underlying model, price under-
cutting is only possible for one player, the patentholder. As the patentholder is
located at the border 0, there is no hinterland to capture for the imitator. The
problem of profitable undercutting also arises in this application of the Hotelling
model. As will be shown below, a Nash equilibrium in prices only exists if b is
sufficiently large.
The first and third part of the demand function (5.14) can be excluded for
further analysis. The first part, where demand is equal to 0, can never be optimal
for the patentholder; he can always do better by charging a lower price and have
some demand and thus profit. The same holds for the imitator regarding part
three. Based on the second part of the demand function, the price reaction
functions of the patentholder and the imitator are Pi*(p2*) = (P2 + bt)/2 and
pj*(p,) = (p, + 2t - bt)/2. If it exists, the prices in Nash equilibrium are:
p,»(Pî») = t(b + 2)/3; p2*(p,*) = t(4 - b) /3 (5.15)
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The associated profits in equilibrium are:
Hi(Pi*, P2*) = t(b + 2)718; Jt^p,», p,*) = t(4 - b )7 l8 (5.16)
Note that the assumption of the patentholder being located at b is justified; in
equilibrium, the imitator, if he were to choose, would want minimal differen-
tiation (note that in 5.16, d^/rfb < 0, for b 6 [0, 1]). The location of the imitator,
as close as possible to the patentholder and still allowed for by the patent office
and by court, is b.
Now I will first determine when these equilibrium prices are in the relevant
price interval p,* € [pj* - tb, pj* + tb] (i.e, the second part of 5.14). Next, I will
check when an undercutting price strategy is profitable for the patentholder.
It can easily be shown that the equilibrium prices are in the relevant interval
for b > 2/5. This is the first restriction. Now consider the undercutting price
strategy of firm 1. The undercutting price is pi = P2 - tb - e, resulting in a
demand of 1 and yielding a profit of JC, = pj - tb - e. This undercutting profit
must not be profitable: Jt,(pi*, P2*) > pj* - tb - e. This condition can be written as
(using 5.16):
t(b + 2)718 à t(4 - b) /3 - tb - c (5.17)
Condition (5.17) is satisfied for b > 6^6 - 14 (= 0.7). So if the patent breadth is
smaller than about 0.7, no Nash equilibrium in pure price strategies exists.*
Conclusions on patent breadth policy only hold for the range b e [0.7, 1]. The
market shares of the patentholder and the imitator are [0, (b + 2)/6] and [(4 -
b)/6, 1], respectively. The imitator has the larger profits. Increasing patent
breadth levels out market shares, prices and profits. The trade-off in patent
breadth policy is between providing sufficient innovation incentive on the one
hand, and stimulating, through imitation, both competition, which lowers the
deadweight losses of patent monopolies, and diffusion, which enlarges consumer
surplus, on the other.'
8. For cases where the patentholder can first choose his price, knowing the expected
reaction of the imitator beforehand, the Stackelberg equilibrium prices are p,* = t(b +
2)/2 and p^* = t(6 - b)/4, yielding profits of 7t,* = t(b + 2)716 and 7tj* = t(6 - b)732. The
non-undercutting condition is more restrictive in the Stackelberg scenario: only for b S
2V41 -12 (= 0.81) the Stackelberg equilibrium in prices exists.
9. The exact trade-off is relatively easy to determine here. The welfare losses can be split
up in two parts. Firstly, there are pure travel costs which occur when both firms charge
competitive prices equal to the marginal cost. This welfare loss is WL, = tb74 + t(l -
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In the remainder of this chapter, three scenarios will be examined where the
problem of profitable price undercutting by the patentholder is less restrictive.
The first (section 5.4.b) is fragmentation in the free range. As a result of the free
competition then emerging in the range [b, 1], prices will be equal to the
marginal cost and undercutting this competitive price cannot be profitable.
Besides, if the patentholder undercuts the imitator at the border, there will be
another imitator waiting next. The second scenario (section 5.5.a) softens the
price-undercutting problem by introducing different improvement levels. The
patentholder has to overcome the difference in improvements before his price-
undercutting strategy becomes effective. If consumers furthermore evaluate
improvements differently, as in the third scenario (section 5.5.b), the problem of
discontinuous demand and profit functions disappears.
CW Fragmentation in Me Free
The interval [0, b) is protected. Suppose that the free range [b, 1] is completely
filled up with competitors. These competitors charge the competitive price equal
to the marginal cost, which is in this case p = 0. Again, I take utility function
(5.3). The consumers that are located in the free region face no travel costs
because there are competitors at each location. The patentholder has to compete
with the imitator at the border b for the consumers in the interval [0, b). I assume
that all consumers buy (v S tb). The demand function for the patentholder is:
x = 0 if p £ tb (5.18)
(tb - p)/(2t) if 0 < p < tb
The optimal price, based on the second part of the demand function, is p* = tb/2,
which is always in the relevant price interval. The optimal profit is 7t* = b^t/8.
Some basic policy conclusions can be extracted from this version with free
competition. The profit of the patentholder is an indication of the effectiveness of
patent policy in providing an innovation incentive. Compared to the presence of
only one imitator, patent breadth provides less profit with fragmentation in the
b)V2. The second type of welfare loss occurs because both firms charge above-marginal-
cost prices. This 'price-induced-net-travel cost' is WLj = (P2 - p,)V4t. After substituting
the prices in Nash equilibrium, the total welfare loss is given by: WLq. = t(31b* - 44b +
22)/36. If a social planner is only concerned with minimizing the total static welfare loss
WLr without providing a minimum profit for a patentholder, it optimally sets a breadth
of b* = 22/31. If the social planner aims at providing a minimum profit level for an
inventor at minimum static welfare loss, it optimally sets the patent breadth b* = 11/14,
which is the one that minimizes the ratio WLj/n,*. For these optimal patent breadths,
the Nash price equilibrium exists.
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free range. The reason is that the patentholder must compete with an imitator
who charges a competitive price equal to the marginal cost. The trade-off for a
social planner then goes as follows: discouraging imitations in the free range
enlarges the innovation incentive but lowers the consumer surplus in the free
range because consumers then have larger travel costs. How exactly this trade-off
is best handled is not dealt with here.
5.5 Improvement and Imitation Combined
This section analyses a duopoly where a competitor is in the market with a
product that is both an imitation and an improvement of the patenholder's
product. As in section 5.3, the stages where firms make entry decisions and
choose improvement levels are included and take place before the price com-
petition. Such an analysis serves at least two goals. Thus far, the patent office
only requires a minimum level of improvement or an imitation with a minimum
distance away from the patent. A product that is both an improvement and an
imitation provides the opportunity to study the optimal circumventing strategy
of a competitor: aside or above the patented product. It offers furthermore the
opportunity to investigate the combined effects of the patent policy instruments
of breadth and height. First, subsection faj will examine the case of homogeneous
(with respect to the preference intensity parameter m) consumers. After that,
subsection ("W will examine the more complex case of heterogeneous consumers.
(a,) Homogeneous Consumers
The improvement levels of the patentholder and the imitator differ: v, < Vj.
Consumers are taken to be homogeneous in the sense that they evaluate the
difference in improvement levels all in the same way. In the next subsection con-
sumers are taken to be heterogeneous in this sense. Consumers thus only differ
in their most preferred varieties on the horizontal spectrum. All consumers are
assumed to buy (which is the case for Vj > max (p, + tb, p, + t(l - b)). A
consumer buys from firm 1 if v, - p, - td, > Vj - pj - tdj. The indifferent consumer
is located on the horizontal spectrum at w = (p^  - Pi - (vz - v,) + tb)/(2t). The
demand function for the patentholder is:
x, = 0 if p, > P2 + tb - (vj - v,) (5.19)
(Pz " Pi " (V2 " v,) + tb)/(2t) if p2 + tb - (vj - v,) > p, > p^ - tb - (v^  - v,)
1 if p, - tb - (vj - v , ) > p , S 0
The demand function for the imitator is the complement: Xj = 1 - x,. The price
reaction functions based on the second part of the demand function are Pi*(p2) =
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(P2 + bt - (Vj - v,))/2 and pj*(p,) = (p, + 2t - bt + Vj - v,)/2. If it exists, the price
Nash equilibrium is:
P,*(P2*) = (t(2 + b) - (y, - v,))/3; (5.20)
P2*(Pi*) = (t(4 - b) + v, - v,)/3
with the associated equilibrium gross profits:
*i(Pw P2*) = (t(b + 2) - (v, - v,))7(18t); (5.21)
2*/ P.*) = (t(4 - b) + V, - V,)7(18t)
From (5.21) we learn that the equilibrium profit of the patentholder increases in
patent breadth while the profit of the competitor, who is imitator and improver
at the same time, decreases in breadth. This effect of breadth on profits was also
detected in section 5.3. As the protected interval on the horizontal spectrum
increases, the market power of the patentholder increases with it, at the cost of a
loss of market power of the competitor. Another conclusion from (5.21) is that
the patentholder's profit decreases in distance between improvements, while the
competitor's profit increases. Since consumers are homogeneous in this model,
from a vertical differentiation point of view, there is no price-relaxing effect
emerging from distance. A larger distance here just means that the competitor
has more advantage relative to the patentholder.
What are the conditions under which the Nash price equilibrium as given by
(5.20) does exist? Note that the price strategy of undercutting the imitator is not
possible if the distance in improvement levels is too large. If Vj - v, > pj - tb, the
patentholder can never reach the consumers in [b, 1]. The third part of the
demand function thus disappears if p2 < (vj - v,) + tb. For the equilibrium price
P2*, this condition becomes: b > 1 - (vj - v,)/(2t). For these b's, undercutting is not
possible and the Nash price equilibrium always exists. The condition for non-
profitable price undercutting if the third part of the demand function (5.20) exists
is more complex. I refer to Van Dijk (1993) for the derivation of this condition.
Here, I suppose that the patent breadth (and, thus, the location of the imitator)
fulfils the conditions for existence of the Nash price equilibrium. Now look at the
stage before the price competition, when both firms choose their improvement
levels. The net profit functions contain the gross profit functions (5.21), which are
at their equilibrium values after price competition, and the R&D cost function
(5.12):
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*i(v,, v j = (t(2 + b) - (v, - v,))7(18t) - ccv,*; (5.22)
H2(v* v,) = (t(4 - b) + v, - v,)7(18t) - av^
This yields the improvement reaction functions v ,*^) = (t(b + 2) - V2)/(18at - 1)
and Vj*(v,) = (t(4 - b) - v,)/(18at - 1). Notice that dv,*/dvj, dv^/dv, < 0. So if the
competitor chooses a larger improvement level, the patentholder can best choose
a smaller improvement, and vice versa. We know from (5.21) that the patent-
holder's gross profits decrease in difference between improvement levels and that
those of the competitor increase. The Nash equilibrium'" in improvement
choices is:
v,* = (3ot(b + 2) - l)/(6a(9at - 1)); v,» = (3at(4 - b) - l)/(6a(9at - 1)) (5.23)
Both improvement levels are assumed to be positive (which is the case for 3at(b
+ 2) > 1). The distance between both improvement levels in Nash equilibrium is:
y / - y / = t(l - b)/(9at - 1) (5.24)
Expression (5.24) has some important implications for patent policy. Broader
patent protection makes the 'natural' distance in improvements, Vj* - v,*, smaller.
If a competitor is forced to choose his imitation further away from the
patentholder, he is not prepared to invest as much in R&D for product improve-
ment in order to create vertical distance. As mentioned, the profit of the
patentholder directly increases in patent breadth. This direct effect is enforced by
an indirect effect of breadth on the improvement choices. The distance between
equilibrium improvements, as given by (5.24), decreases in patent breadth b.
Because the distance in improvements shortens, broadening protection has this
indirect, positive, effect on the profit of the patentholder. The patentholder faces
less competition if the other chooses a smaller improvement.
After substitution of the equilibrium improvements (5.23) in the net profit
function, it turns out that the equilibrium profit of the competitor is always
10. The patentholder can have a first-mover advantage and choose an improvement level
before the competitor. This first-mover advantage does not necessarily show up in the
price stage. The Stackelberg equilibrium in improvements, based on the Nash equili-
brium prices in (5.20), is given by v,*(v2*(v,)) = 6t(3at(b + 2) - l)/z and V2*(v,*) =
(t(18at(4 - b) + b - 10)/z, where z = 324a¥ - 54at + 1. The distance in improvements is
only positive for b > 4(9at - l)/(36at - 1). Along the same lines, the Stackelberg equili-
brium in improvements, which is based on a Stackelberg price equilibrium can be
determined.
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higher than that of the patentholder. More precisely, the difference in equilibrium
profits is:
u,(v,», v,*) - 7t,(v,*, V ) = t(l - b)(18ot - l)/(3(9at - 1)) (5.25)
This result, which also occurred in the pure breadth and height scenarios,
suggests that R&D competition may better be described by using so called
waiting games rather than the commonly used patent races. In a waiting game for
two players, it is better to be second than to be first. Dasgupta (1988) pointed out
that the spill-overs from the R&D output of the first firm to the second can be a
reason for the profit of the second to be larger. In the model described here, it is
even better to be second in the absence of spill-overs in R&D for improvements
from the patentholder to the improver. This conclusion must, of course, be
qualified in light of the assumptions of the model. It may be weakened, first, by
the division of roles imposed in the competition in improvements where the
patentholder always has the smaller improvement and, second, by the specifi-
cation of costly imitation or by the introduction of a time lag for inventing
around, during which the patentholder is a monopolist. But, on the other hand, it
may be enforced when R&D costs for the original product innovation are incor-
porated.
(W Heterogeneous Consumers
Consumers are now also characterized by the parameter m, which is identical for
both products and uniformly distributed on [0, 1] with density 1. The indirect
utility function (5.5) which combines imitation and improvement is taken again,
but now with a constant f which is sufficiently large as to make the product
cover the market completely in equilibrium. The demand function of the patent-
holder is made up of consumers for whom it holds that: m(v, - v,) - t(dj -d,) < pj
- p,. Define u' s m(vj - v,) which is distributed uniformly on [0, (vj - v,)] with
density 1/(V2 - v,). The distance from a consumer to the patentholder at 0 is
given by d, and to the competitor at b by dj. What I need now is the distribution
of (dj - d,). I first focus on the range [0, b] where d, e [0, b] and dj e [0, b] with
density 1. In the range [0, b], it holds for all consumers that dj + d, = b.
Therefore, dj - d, = 2dj - b, so that (dj - d,) e [-b, b] with density 1/2. In order to
simplify notations, define ô' s t(d2 - d,) which is distributed on [-tb, tb] with
density l/(2t). The joint distribution of u' and Ô', which are independent, has
density l/(2t(v2 - v,)). The division of the market is given by the line: u' - 5'= pj -
Pi (see figure 5.3.a and 5.3.b). The consumers who buy from the competitor are
located above and to the left of this line. Those who buy from the patentholder
are located below and to the right of this line.
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Figure 5.3 Demand in duopoly
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Two types of demand functions can be distinguished, depending on the
relative size of the product spectra: horizontal dominance and vertical domi-
nance." The demand functions are horizontally dominated if the horizontal
spectrum [-tb, tb] is larger than the vertical product spectrum [0, Vj - v,] (see
figure 5.3.b). Vertical dominance is present if Vj - v, > 2tb (see figure 5.3.a). I will
work out the case of vertical dominance first.
I refer to Appendix A part (a) for the overall demand function. The demand
functions of the patentholder and the competitor are continuous in prices. Since
discontinuity of the demand function was the major problem in the original
Hotelling model and the model inspired by it in section 5.4 (a), the combination
of horizontal and vertical differentiation turns out to be a useful extension. The
reason why the discontinuity of demand and profit functions disappears is the
following: if the patentholder undercuts the price of his opponent and attracts the
consumer at b, he does not attract the complete hinterland of his opponent at the
same time. There is no mass point at b. It depends on the improvement prefer-
ence parameter m of a consumer in [b, 1] whether or not this consumer is
attracted.
However, now there is a problem at another level. Although the profit
functions are continuous, they are not continuous in first derivatives (in price).
Therefore, the price reaction functions are not continuous either. The complexity
of determining the Nash equilibrium (or equilibria) in prices here - with six-part
demand functions, profit functions, relevant price intervals and discontinuous
price reaction functions - requires a special approach. Therefore, I will not try to
determine the overall Nash equilibrium (or equilibria) in prices. Instead, I will
focus on one part of the demand function. For this part I will determine the gross
profit functions and the Nash price equilibrium. I will check furthermore the
conditions under which the equilibrium is consistent with the part of the demand
function on which it is based, and when it exists. In fact, I will use the middle
third part of (A.3):
x, = b(p, - p,)/(v, - v,) • (5.26)
which is relevant to pj - tb > p, > pj - tb - b(Vj - Vj). Demand function (5.26) is
the base for the analysis. The gross profit functions are given by: Jt,(p,, pj; v,, Vj)
= p,b(p2 - p,)/(vj - v,) and ^(p , , p,; v ,^ v,) = pj(l - b(p, - p , ) ) / ^ - v,). The
corresponding price reaction functions are Pi*(pî) = P2/2 and p2*(p0 = (bp, + Vj -
11. This typology can be found in Neven and Thisse (1990) and Ireland (1987).
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v,)/(2b), which generate the price Nash equilibrium:
PI*(P2*) = (V2 - v,)/(3b); p/(p,») = 2(v, - v,)/(3b) (5.27)
Turning into the stage of improvement competition, the (constant) optimal
improvement choices which are based on the net profits, are:
v,» = 0; V2» = 2/(9ccb) (5.28)
Given these equilibrium improvement levels v,* and Vj*, and the equilibrium
prices pi* and pj*, the condition that the prices belong to the relevant interval of
the demand function on which the analysis is based (part (iii) of (A.3) in
Appendix A) is: b < (V(36at + 1) - l)/(18at). A small development cost parameter
a and a small unit travel cost make this relevant range of b larger (for example,
for a = 0.5 and t = 0.5, the range is b e [0, 0.48]). The associated net profits in the
Nash equilibrium in improvements are:
n , (V , y / ) = 2/(81ab'); s,(v,», v,») = 4/(81ab*) (5.29)
Note that both profits decrease in patent breadth b. That part of the demand
function was chosen where the patentholder only serves consumers in [0, b]. The
competitor not only serves part of the market segment [0, b], but also the
complete market segment [b, 1], where he faces no competition from the
patentholder. Therefore, if b increases, the segment [b, 1], where the competitor
has monopoly power, shrinks, his optimal price decreases and conse-quently his
profit decreases. The patentholder then faces a lower price of his competitor and
the best he can do is also lower his price (recall that his reaction function is
p,*(pj) = P J / 2 ) . This results in a smaller profit for the patentholder as well.
What circumventing innovation strategy can a competitor best choose if a
product located at 0 on the horizontal and vertical spectrum is protected with
patent breadth b and patent height h? First, some explanation of the working of
patent laws and the legal practice is necessary before examining the above
question. Two patent rules, derived from Cornish (1989), summarize the basic
legal framework. The first rule is that an inventor is granted a patent if his
invention fulfils the novelty requirements. A sufficiently novel invention can thus
never infringe a current patent; examiners in the patent office have checked for
this. The rule is independent of the imitation choice of the inventor. The
invention is allowed to resemble a current patent to a large extent or not at all, as
long as the inventive step relative to the current patent is sufficiently large. The
second rule is that a competitor who keeps sufficient distance with his imitation
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Figure 5.4 Areas of non-infringement
does not have to fulfil the novelty requirements in order not to infringe the
current patent. If he does not meet the novelty requirements, he will not be
granted a patent himself, but still he will not infringe. These two rules describe
three areas in the differentiation box where inventing around is non-infringing.
In the first area, (a) in figure 5.4, inventions are sufficient improvements of the
basic invention. This feature overrules the fact that they are insufficiently
dissimilar imitations. In area (b), inventions are both sufficiently novel and
sufficiently different. Inventions in area (a) and (b) are patentable. The inventions
in area (c) are not patentable since they are not sufficiently novel. They are,
however, tolerated because they are sufficiently different from the basic inven-
tion.
Let us now return to the question of optimal strategies for inventing around.
A competitor can either choose to focus fully on improvement (in area (a)), or
generate a sufficiently distant imitation with some improvement level (in area (b)
or (c)).'* First, consider the fmprouemenf strategy. If the competitor chooses a
12. Another possible strategy is to wait until the patent has expired and the restrictions
imposed by breadth and height withdraw. See Gallini (1992) on this strategy. Here, it
becomes clear that the assumption of infinite patents made in the beginning is too
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duplication of the patented product at the horizontal spectrum, he has to fulfil
the novelty requirements in order not to infringe the patent. Since the
patentholder and the improver are then at the same location on the horizontal
product spectrum, horizontal distance (difference) plays no role in competition.
Recall from section 5.4 that a firm which only differentiates through improve-
ment and not through imitation, has a profit of ^2(^ 2*/ ^i*) = 4/(81<x) with the
improvements Vj* = 2/(9a) and v,* = 0 at the market. This improvement choice is
allowed for if patent height is low: h < 2/(9cc). The improver can best choose Vj =
h if the patent height is intermediate (2/(9ot) < h < 4/(9oc)). His profit then is
Jt^h, 0) = 4h/9 - ah*. For high patent protection (h > (4/9<x)), however, he cannot
make a positive profit with a pure improvement strategy.
The other possible imitation strategy of a competitor is to choose an imitation
at b which is thus sufficiently different according to patent breadth rules. The
imitator's profit then is ^(v;*, v,*) = 4/(81ocb*) (see 5.29). This net profit decreases
in patent breadth. There may be a critical patent breadth which makes this
strategy of imitation too costly. It turns out, however, that in the case of vertical
dominance, the pure improvement strategy is always dominated, for any
combination of breadth and height. To see this take b = 1. The imitation strategy
then yields 4/(81a), which is equal to the unrestricted profit with the pure
improvement strategy. For all b < 1, the imitation strategy dominates.
Thus, the conclusion is that a competitor who wants to invent around the
patent chooses to imitate sufficiently aside the patent and improve somewhat
above the patented product. If the improvement level of the circumventer
happens to fulfil the novelty requirements, he can obtain a patent himself.
Otherwise, he is just tolerated by the patent office and court. At first sight, it is
not clear intuitively why the imitation strategy is best in the presence of vertical
dominance. One tends to think that inventing around probably occurs where the
available space is largest, which in this case is above the patent with an
improvement. However, two arguments can be brought forward in favour of the
imitation strategy. First, the assumption of costless imitation versus increasingly
costly improvement creates a force towards the imitation strategy. Second, as the
imitator wants minimal differentiation, the imitation strategy is less attractive if
the patent protection is broader. This negative effect of patent breadth cannot
become very strong in the case of vertical dominance, where the horizontal
spectrum is smaller than the vertical spectrum.
strong. What in fact is assumed is a patent lifetime which is sufficiently long to exclude
the 'waiting for the expiration date' strategy.
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Horizontal
Next, consider the case of horizontal dominance (2tb > Vj - v,). The complete
demand function of the patentholder (and his competitor) is written out in part
(b) of Appendix A. For reasons explained above, I will once again concentrate on
one part of the demand function. Part (iii) of A.6 is taken here, since it is in the
middle range and linear, which makes it easiest to work with:
x, = (2bt + 2p, - 2p, - (v, - v,))/(4t) (5.30)
The relevant price interval is p, e [pj - tb, pj + tb - (vj - v,)]. Because the further
analysis is technically similar to the above case of vertical dominance, I will not
present all calculus details here. The derivation of the price reaction functions,
the Nash price equilibrium and the Nash improvement equilibrium can be found
in Appendix B.
Only those results which are necessary to determine the competitor's optimal
strategy for inventing around are given here. First, the conditions for consistency
of the Nash price equilibrium with the part of the demand function used are pre-
sented in table B.I in Appendix B. These intervals form the working space for the
further analysis. Second, as previously (check the Nash improvement equilibrium
B.7 in Appendix B), patent breadth has a negative effect on the natural distance
in improvements. Forcing to keep at greater distance on the horizontal spectrum
results in a smaller distance on the vertical product spectrum.
Comparing the strategies for inventing around, an improvement or an
imitation strategy, yields richer results than in the case of vertical dominance. In
the latter case, the optimal strategy, for any combination of patent breadth and
height, was an imitation strategy aside the patent. In the case of horizontal
dominance, the optimal strategy depends on both the combination of breadth and
height and on the values of the parameters a (the improvement cost) and t (the
travel cost). First consider the imitation strategy. The net profit level in Nash
improvement equilibrium of the competitor who keeps sufficient distance with
his imitation and generates some improvement is given by:
7Tj = (72at - l)(12at(4 - b) - l)7(144a(36at - 1)*) ' (5.31)
The improvement strategy, defined as choosing a duplication on the horizontal
spectrum and aiming purely at improvement, yields profit of:
TCj = 4/(81cc) if height is not restrictive (h < 2/(9a)) (5.32)
4h/9 - ah* if height is restrictive (2/(9a) < h < 4/(9a))
0 if height is blocking (h > 4/(9a))
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This profit function is taken from section 5.3.
First, I will compare the imitation profit and the improvement profit if height
is not restrictive (h < 2/(9a)). The optimal strategies for inventing around depend
only on patent breadth (and values of a and t). Table 5.1 presents the intervals of
patent breadth where the imitation strategy and the improvement strategy are
optimal. The lower border is determined by the consistency restrictions derived
in Appendix B. From table 5.1. it can be concluded that, like in the previous case
of vertical dominance, the imitation strategy dominates the improvement strategy
for most patent breadths and parameter values. Only for a's which are small
relative to t (for example, a = l/(12t) or a = l/(10t)), the improvement strategy
can dominate the imitation strategy. Thus, only if the improvement cost is low
relative to the consumer travel cost (the travel cost is, in fact, an indication of the
imitation cost), inventing above the patent can be more attractive than inventing
aside the patent. The improvement strategy actually dominates for large patent
breadths.
Table 5.1
Breadth intervals of optimal inventing-around strategies if height is not restrictive
a
l/(12t)
l/(10t)
l/(4t)
l/(2t)
1/t
l/(0.5t)
Imitation Strategy
[0.500, 0.615]
[0.480, 0.846]
[0.429, 1]
[0.414,1]
[0.407, 1)
[0.403, 1]
Improvement Strategy
[0.615, 1]
[0.846, 1]
-
-
-
-
Next, consider cases where the patent height is restrictive but does not
blockade the market (2/(9a) < h < 4/(9a)). The improvement strategy is even less
appealing now. The patent height dictates the improver to deviate from his
optimal improvement and choose a larger improvement that does not infringe
the patent. Besides breadth, patent height also affects the optimal circumventing
strategy now. Figure 5.5 presents the numerical example of t = 1 and a = 1/12. I
chose these values because we know from table 5.1. that for a = l/(12t), the
range where the improvement strategy is optimal is large. Figure 5.5 illustrates
the point that for higher patent protection the improvement strategy becomes less
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attractive. For unrestrictive height (h < 2.67) and large breadth (b > 0.62), the
improvement strategy is optimal. For restrictive height, the improvement strategy
is only optimal for higher values of patent breadth (for example, for h = 4.00 the
improvement strategy continues to be optimal for b > 0.93). From h = 4.12
onwards, the imitation strategy is optimal. This illustration is typical of cases
where a is small relative to t; the improvement strategy can be optimal then. For
cases where the oc's are larger relative to t, the improvement strategy is never
optimal. Finally, if the height is such that it blockades improvements completely
(h > 5.33), an improvement strategy is not even possible. An imitation strategy is
always optimal then.
1 • -
0.62
0.5 t—
improvement
strategy
imitation
strategy
2.67 4.12 5.33
Figure 5.5 Optimal inventing-around strategies (for t = 1 and a = 1/12)
5.6 Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter has developed a framework, built on address models of product
differentiation, in which patent dimensions can be examined. After defining four
dimensions of patent protection (length, width, breadth and height), the analysis
focuses on two of them: patent breadth and patent height. Sections 5.2 to 5.4
present preliminary models in order to examine the simple bench-mark cases of
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monopoly and isolated dimensions. Section 5.5 is the core of this chapter and
presents an integrated model of breadth and height. I add a preference parameter
to the utility function originally used by Hotelling (1929). The result is a demand
structure in which both horizontal and vertical differentiation become visible. So
far, the only study which combines these two types of differentiation has been
Neven and Thisse (1990). In contrast with the utility function used here, Neven
and Thisse specify quadratic transport costs. As d'Aspremont et al. (1979) have
shown, quadratic transport costs lead to maximum differentiation in a pure
horizontal differentiation model. In order to avoid a tendency for maximum
differentiation, which would make the analysis of patent breadth trivial since the
competitor would always locate as far away from the patentholder as possible so
that breadth would never be restrictive, I have specified linear transport costs, as
in the original Hotelling model.
Besides creating the possibility to study patent breadth and height simul-
taneously, a positive by-product of adding the preference parameter to the
Hotelling utility function is that price undercutting strategies, which can prevent
the existence of price equilibrium in Hotelling's model, are no longer harmful.
The disadvantage, however, is that the analysis of the demand and price reaction
functions becomes extremely complex. This has forced me to examine only one
part of the demand functions in this chapter. A full analysis incorporating all
parts of demand is not included.
In brief, the conclusions are as follows. Patent exploitation by the patent-
holder is dependent on the standards, breadth and height, set by the patent office
and the court. These standards affect the profit opportunities of the patentholder
because they determine the strategy space for competitors who surround the
patent. Competitors may invent 'above' the patent with an improvement of the
patented product, or 'aside' the patent with an imitation. Which circumventing
innovation strategy is actually optimal depends on cost and demand parameters
as well as on the patent office standards. The exact conditions for choosing an
imitation or improvement strategy are not particularly important because they
depend on specific modelling assumptions. The result that both innovation
strategies can be optimal and are guided by dimensions of the patent system is
far more important.
The analysis raises a number of other questions. For example, what are the
consequences for the competition in R&D as described in most patent race
models? According to Mortensen (1982) there is a socially better allocation of
R&D if the winner does not take all but compensates the loser(s). Patent
dimensions may be appropriate policy instruments to create such a situation,
where the winner of a patent race obtains such a level of protection that the loser
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is given enough opportunities to compensate for his R&D expenditures.
Furthermore, the purpose of a patent is to provide an incentive for a firm to
perform R&D. The incentive is basically given by providing a minimum profit
level which can be gained with an innovation. Various mixtures of patent
dimensions are possible to provide this minimum profit. The problem then is to
find a mixture which causes the smallest static welfare loss. One part of this
problem, the effects of patent dimensions on profit, is discussed in this chapter.
The other part, the effects on welfare, remain to be studied. Another research
question concerns diffusion. True welfare gains occur in the process of diffusion
through the economy, with the innovations preferably being supplied competi-
tively. Since patent dimensions also affect the opportunities for competitors, they
may have a decisive influence on the speed and amplitude of diffusion. Finally,
the patent dimensions discussed may also affect the extent of spill-overs between
various innovators. See Steurs (1993) for a model of spill-overs where patent
dimensions can play an important role.
Another possible direction based on the analysis in this chapter is empirical
research. Some examples of hypotheses that can be formulated on the model
explained in this chapter are as follows: first, low and broad protection leads to
more improvements, and narrow and high protection to more imitations; and,
second, the larger the patent protection provided (higher and broader), the less
room there is in the market and, thus, the higher the concentration. However,
apart from the problems faced to obtain the appropriate data for testing these
hypotheses, the theoretical foundation as advanced in this chapter is rather
limited, since only models which focus on one patent and two innovations in a
market are analysed, and as such not appropriate for direct empirical testing. A
more indirect empirical test, though still based on this chapter, will be carried out
in the next chapter, which will study the patenting performance of firms pursu-
ing improvement and imitation strategies.
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Appendix A: Derivation of the Demand Curves
(a) Verficfl/ Dominance (fy " "i > 2tW
The demand for the patentholder (and for the competitor) on the interval [0, b] is made up of
different parts:
x, = 0 if p, S pa + tb (A.1)
(bt - p, + Pj)7(4t(Vj - v,) if p, + ft * p, à pj - tb
0>(P2 - Pi)/(V2 - v,) if pj - tb S p, 2 pj + tb - (vj - v,)
b - (bt + p, - pj + Vj - v,)7(4t(v, - v,)) if pj + tb -(Vj - v,) * p, * p, - tb - (Vj - v,)
b if pj - tb - (y, - v , ) 5 p , ^ 0
On the interval [b, 1], the difference in travel distance (dj - d,) is constant and equal to -tb. The
market division in the segment [b, 1] is u' = p, - p, + tb. In this segment the demand function for
the patentholder is:
x, = 0 i fp , ! ip , - tb -b (v , -v , ) (A.2)
(PJ - p, - tb)/(vj - v,) - b if PJ - tb - b(vj - v,) à p, â pj - tb - (v, - v,)
1 - b if PJ - tb - (Vj - v,) â p, > 0
Depending on the patent breadth, the demand in the segment [b, 1] starts in the third or in the
fourth part of the total demand function. Consider the case where it starts in the third part (for v,
- v, S 2tb/(l - b)). The total demand over the whole market [0, 1] is:
x, = (i) 0 (A.3)
(ii) (bt - p, + p,)7(4t(vj - v,)
(iii) (b(p, - p,)/(v, - v,)
(iv) (b(pj - p,)/(vj - v,) + (pj - p, - tb)/(vj - v,) - b
(v) (PJ - p, - tb)/(vj - v,) - (bt + p, - pj + Vj - v,)7(4t(vj - v,))
(vi) 1
Respectively, if p, £ pj + tb (i); if p, + tb £ p, £ p, - tb (ii); if p, - tb £ p, £ p, - tb - b(vj - v,) (iii);
if pj - tb - b(Vj - v,) S p, 2 pj + tb - (Vj - v,) (iv); if pj + tb - (Vj - v,) 2 p, 2 p, - tb - (Vj - v,) (v);
and if pj - tb - (Vj - v,) S p, Ï 0 (vi).
(W Horizonfa/ Dominance (I>J - a, < 2fW
The division of the market segment [0, b] is:
x, = 0 if p, ^ PJ + tb (A.4)
(bt - p, + Pj)7(4t(Vj - V,) if PJ + tb £ p, ;> PJ + tb - (Vj - V,)
(2bt + 2pj - 2p, - (vj - v,))/(4t) if pj + tb - (Vj - v,) ;> p , ;> p , - tb
b - (bt + p, - pj + Vj - v,)7(4t(v2 - v,)) if pj - tb £ p , £ pj - tb - (Vj - v,)
b if pj - tb - (Vj - v,) à p, S 0
On the interval [b, 1], the difference in travel distance (dj - d,) is constant and equal to -tb. The
market division in the segment [b, 1] is u' = pj - p , + tb. In this segment the demand function for
the patentholder is:
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x, = 0 if p, S pj - tb - b(vj - v,) (A.5)
(P: " Pi " *)/(Vj - v,) - b if p, - tb - b(Vj - v,) > p, > pj - tb - (v, - v,)
1 - b if pj - tb - (v, - v,) > p, £ 0
The demand on the segment [b, 1] must be added completely to the fourth part of A.4. The total
demand on [0, 1] is:
x, = (i) 0 (A.6)
(ii) (bt - p, + pj7(4t(v, - v,)
(iii) (2bt + 2pj - 2p, - (v, - v,))/(4t)
(iv) b - (bt + p, - pj + Vj - v,)7(4t(v, - v,))
(v) (PJ - P. - *)/(Vj - v,) - (bt + p, - pj + Vj - v,)7(4t(v, - v,))
(vi) 1
Respectively, if p, 5 pj + tb (i); if pj + tb > p, £ pj + tb - (Vj - v,) (ii); if pj + tb - (v, - v,) S p,
- tb (iii); if pj - tb S p, > p, - tb - b(Vj - v,) (iv); if pj - tb - b(vj - v,) > p, £ pj - tb - (vj - v,) (v);
and if pj - tb - (v, - v,) £ p, £ 0 (vi).
Appendix B: Nash Price and Improvement Equilibrium for Horizontal
Dominance
Part (iii) of the demand function A.6 is taken:
x, = (2bt + 2p, - 2p, - (v, - v,))/(4t) (B.I)
This part holds for the price range:
pj + tb - (v, - v,) > p, > pj - tb (B.2)
The price reaction functions emerging from the gross profit functions n, = x,(p,)p, and Jij
are:
p,» = (2bt + 2p, - (v, - v,))/4; p,» = (4t - 2bt + 2p, + v^  - v,)/4 (B.3)
They yield the following Nash equilibrium in prices:
p," = (2t(b + 2) - (v, - v,))/6; p," = (2t(4 - b) + v, - v,)/6 (B.4)
The associated gross profits are:
«i(Pi^. P2"; v,, v j = (2t(b + 2) - (v, - v,))7(72t); (B.5)
«2(Pi ,^ PÎ"; v,, vj) = (2t(4 - b) + v, - v,)V(72t)
Based on the net profit functions (optimal gross profits minus R&D costs), the impro-
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vement reaction functions are:
v,» = (2t(b + 2) - V2)/(72at - 1); v,» = (2t(4 - b) - v,)/(72at -1) (B.6)
yielding Nash equilibrium improvements:
v," = (12at(b + 2) - l)/(12a(36at -1)); V = (12at(4 - b) - l)/(12a(36at -1)) (B.7)
The net profit levels in the Nash improvement equilibrium are:
i"/ P2^ v,", vj") = (72at - l)(12at(b + 2) - l)V(144a(36at -1)')
P2", v,", VjN) = (72at - l)(12at(4 - b) - l)7(144a(36at - 1)') (B.8)
The part of the demand function on which the analysis is based is consistent with its
relevant price interval as given in (B.2) for:
W p , > , " , V,") > p/*(v.", v,") - tb;
(W p , > , " , v,") < p,"(v A v,") + tb - ( V - v,"*) (B.9)
Now, substitute the Nash equilibrium improvements in the Nash equilibrium prices in
order to obtain expressions with parameters only. Then substitute these prices and the
equilibrium improvements in the conditions (B.9). The lower border (a) reduces to: b £
(24at)/(60at - 1). The upper border (6) reduces to: b > -2(12at - l)/(12at + 1). I assume
that 12at - 1 > 0. Then the upper border (W is never restrictive for b > 0. To get an
impression of the lower border, table B.I presents relevant breadth intervals for some
combination of a and t.
Table B.I
Consistent breadth intervals
a Breadth
l/(12t) [0.500, 1]
l/(10t) [0.480, 1]
l/(4t) [0.429, 1]
l/(2t) [0.414, 1]
1/t [0.407, 1]
l/(0.5t) [0.403, 1]
l/(0.1t) [0.401, 1]
l/(0.01t) [0.400, 1]

Passing the European
Patent Office: Evidence
from the Data Processing
Industry
6.1 Introduction and Theoretical Backgrounds
Not all patents applied for are eventually granted. Applications must pass a
granting procedure which examines and selects inventions. As explained in chap-
ter 2, in most systems a patent is only granted for an invention (i) that is new; (ii)
involves an inventive step; and (iii) is industrially applicable. This chapter
analyzes the success ratio, defined as the proportion of all applications granted a
patent, of individual firms in a particular sector: the data-processing industry.
What factors determine the success ratio of a firm? As this question is examined
for one specific industry, the limitation of analyzing one single industry must be
acknowledged. On the other hand, limiting the analysis to a single industry
allows one to make some assumptions about relatively 'homogeneous' conditions
for all firms. I will not try to answer the question using juridical variables. Thus,
interfirm success ratio differences are not, for example, looked for in patent
attorneys which may differ in quality. On this point I assume a transparent and
competitive market for legal support. The same holds for in-house patent depart-
ments of large firms. These departments are assumed to be equally capable.
This chapter examines whether the success ratio can be explained by the type
of innovation strategy of the applicant firm. The basic theory underlying this
analysis has been described in chapter 5 and will only be roughly sketched here.
There are similarities between types of product differentiation and innovation
strategies. As Comanor (1967) and De Bondt (1977) have pointed out, an impor-
tant goal of research and development (R&D) is to achieve product differen-
tiation. A firm which differentiates itself from competitors thereby creates some
market power. Although the prospect of market power provides some incentive
to perform R&D, the incentive is stronger in the case of patent protection. As
explained in chapter 5, a patent defines a protected region around the product,
which competitors are not allowed to trespass with their differentiations. This
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area of protection might well be larger than the natural distances chosen in free
competition. The presence of a patent system therefore provides stronger incen-
tives to invest in product differentiation than in the absence would be the case.
The address branch of the product differentiation literature distinguishes two
types of differentiation. The first is horizontal differentiation and is relevant if not
all consumers agree on the most preferred variety. For example, some consumers
prefer a red car while others prefer the same car in white. The second type is
vertical product differentiation. The most obvious form of this type is quality. At
equal prices, all consumers will prefer a higher to a lower quality.
There is a parallel between these two types of differentiation and two major
categories of innovation strategies that can be observed in business practice. The
classification here is a simplification of Freeman (1982) to two basic types of
strategies. The first is a pioneering innovation strategy. Firms that have adopted
pioneering innovation strategies allocate more resources to basic research. Their
major goal is to generate new or improved products and processes. These inno-
vations are protected primarily by means of patents. Firms pursuing pioneering
strategies can rely on patent protection because most innovations they generate
are sufficiently novel to pass the patent office. Improvements, but also new
products, can be considered as vertical differentiations of existing substitutes.
Each consumer will prefer, at equal prices, an improvement to an older version
of the product. The other possible strategy is an mn'fafroe innovation strategy,
where more resources are allocated to applied research and development, rather
than basic research. The major goal of imitative firms is not to be first with an
innovation, but to keep up with the technological leaders in the industry. Their
imitations are not basically different but mainly modifications of original inno-
vations. They might be considered horizontal differentiations.
The patenting performance of the two innovation strategies is examined
under a single patent system, in this case the European Patent System. Given a
consistent patent office policy, pioneering innovation strategies are expected to
outperform, with respect to success ratios, imitative strategies. The argument is
that a pioneering strategy requires more basic research, which explores novel and
unknown technical paths. The novelty requirements of the patent office are there-
fore met more easily. An imitative strategy aims at modifying and redesigning
products with applied research and development. Due to the stronger connection
with existing products, the fruits of imitative research pass the patent office less
easily.
The underlying study is the first to examine the patent-granting procedure in
detail. Griliches (1989) provides some estimates of the waiting times between
applications and grants in the US patent office, but he has merely intended to
describe the patent procedure. Pakes (1986) and Schankerman and Pakes (1986)
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use information from the patent procedure, i.e., the annual renewal fees, in order
to estimate the value of patents already granted. They do not, however, examine
the possible relation between the value of a patent and the underlying research
and development. The study of Mansfield, Schwartz and Wagner (1981) is most
related to the present study as it examines innovation and imitation strategies in
the presence of patent protection.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 describes the two data sets
and takes a closer look at the data-processing industry. Section 6.3 is the core of
the chapter and presents the estimation results. Section 6.4 examines the success
ratios and the waiting times for different countries in the European Patent Office.
Finally, section 6.5 offers some concluding remarks.
6.2 Description of the Data
European Paienf
As was extensively described in chapter 4, the European Patent Office (EPO),
which performs the administrative tasks of the Munich European Patent Conven-
tion (EPC), came into force in the second half of 1978. Since then, firms have
been able to apply for a European patent. Rather than applying for separate
patents in various European countries, a firm may apply for a European patent,
which is valid in all EPC-connected countries the firm chooses. Important parts
of national patent laws are still valid for the European patent; there is, as yet, no
common European patent law. As expected, the EPO has gradually taken over
the work of the national patent offices in Europe. The most important reason for
this is that a European patent is often less expensive than various national
patents. In general, patent attorneys suggest following the European route if
firms want protection in three or more European countries, in which case a
European application is less expensive (see Vanhaverbeke and Van Cayseele 1993
for more evidence on this issue).
The first data set used here contains information on European patent appli-
cations. The set is called 'espace bulletin' and is published by the EPO six times
a year. The cd-rom used for this study is the fifth of 1993 and contains all patent
applications filed in the EPO from June 1978 to August 1993, plus their procedu-
ral status. It is possible, for example, to check whether an application has been
withdrawn or granted, which firm is the applicant, from which country the appli-
cant originates and to which technical field the invention belongs, according to
the International Patent Classification (IPC). A major advantage compared to
other available sets - for example, that of the US patent office - is that it enables
one to check whether or not an application is approved, and when.
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(W 77ie Doffl-Processmg
The second data set used here is on the data-processing industry. The data-
processing industry is not synonymous with the computer industry. Although
the data-processing industry mainly consists of computer firms, part of the
telecommunication industry also belong to it. The development of the data-
processing industry began around 1951, when the first commercial electronic
computer, the UNTVAC I, was installed at the US Bureau of Census. Before,
individual inventors in the eighteenth and nineteenth century had made much
progress in building calculating machines. But the major impulse towards
modern computers was provided by the Second World War, as a result of which
electronics and communications techniques had improved considerably. The
industry grew rapidly in the 1950s and by 1961 it contained 26 American, 7
British, 3 German, 2 Dutch, 1 Italian and 1 French firms (Williams 1985, Margeri-
son 1978). The rise of the data-processing industry in the 1960s and 1970s is
described by Hoffmann (1986). During that period the market was dominated by
IBM and the lead position of IBM has continued to the present. IBM still had the
first position in the period 1986-1990, which is the period studied in this chapter.
However, the dominance of IBM decreased in the 1980s. In 1986 IBM had a
market share of 28.3% which decreased to 23.5% in 1990. The four-firm revenue
concentration ratio was 41.8% in 1986 and 38.4% in 1990. Thus, of the 4.8% loss
in market share of IBM, only 1.4% went to the three firms after IBM. This is
largely the result of the entrance of Japanese firms (see Duysters and Hagedoorn
1994 for the internationalisation of the data-processing industry in the 1980s).
The data set used in this study covers the 100 largest firms in the data-
processing industry worldwide (by 1990 data-processing revenues) for the period
1986-1990. These data have been collected by a private consulting firm, called the
Gartner Group, and are summarized in its report "Yardstick Top 100 World-
wide", September 1991. Table 6.1 exhibits some key figures of the data-processing
industry taken from this data set and the EPO. Combining rows 1 and 2 in table
6.1 indicates that the firms active in the market do not tend to concentrate on
data-processing: on average, only 31.5% of the corporate revenues originate in the
data-processing market. In this data-processing market, the revenues were
growing at the high average rate of 17.5% in the years 1986-1988, but slowed to
8.2% for the years 1989-1990. The annual R&D expenditures are 207.7 million
dollar on average. The average R&D intensity (R&D expenditures per revenues)
is 9.2%.
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Table 6.1
Annual key figures of the top 100 data-processing (DP) firms in 1986-1990 (Revenues and
expenditures in millions of dollars; employment in # employees)
Corporate Revenue
DP Revenue
R&D expenditure DP
DP Employment
R&D Employment DP
# Applications
# Grants
Mean
7,171.1
2,259.5
207.7
16,563.7
1,853.1
131.0
32.5
Standard
Deviation
11,998.3
5,a53.4
619.7
41,136.8
4,181.6
327.6
91.9
Minimum
237.8
207.8
0
662
0
0
0
Maximum
59,765
54,891.2
5,715
375,587.2
35,714.0
1980
619
6.3 Determinants of Success Ratio Differences
Having provided some backgrounds of the data sets and the industry, the analy-
sis can now focus on the specific problem posed in this chapter. First, I will
explain the variables that are included in the estimations. The estimation method
and the results are presented in the next subsections.
(a) Varwb/es o/ Specz/jcaflow
The dependent variable is the success ratio of grants to applications for each
individual firm in the data-processing industry ('success'). The success ratio is
calculated for EPO applications in the period 1986-1990.1 take all applications of
a firm in the IPC classes b41*, gO6* and hOl* (main and supplementary). These
classes fairly well describe the data-processing industry. Next, I look at the
number of grants until August 1993 resulting from these applications. An
application may have been withdrawn by the applicant, disapproved by EPO
examiners, or may still be in process. Most of the 1986-1990 applications are still
in the examination process. Thus, the success ratio does not give the absolute
proportion of applications being awarded a patent. However, the differences
between the provisional success ratios are still expected to provide the necessary
information on interfirm differences. A priori, there is no reason to believe that
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the waiting times in the EPO are not identical for each firm' (section 6.4 will
address this issue).
Out of the top 100, 35 firms have not filed an application, so that the success
ratio for these firms cannot be calculated. In one series of regressions, I have
therefore set the success ratios for these firms equal to zero. The reason for doing
so is that the fact itself that a firm does not apply for a patent does provide
useful information about its innovation strategy. The absence of applications
strongly suggests an imitative strategy. In order to check for the impact of this
operation, I have carried out another series of regressions including only firms
with 5 or more EPO applications. The sample then reduces to 44 firms. I have
taken 5 applications instead of 1 in order to reduce the effect of extreme variables
(if a firm applies for only one patent and is granted this patent, the success ratio
is 1 and a complete outlier compared to the rest).
The basic theory behind the success ratio was explained in section 6.1. To
recapitulate, the hypothesis is that a pioneering strategy, aiming at new or im-
proved products and processes using of basic research, has a higher success ratio
than an imitative innovation strategy, which is aimed at imitation and keeping
up. The available data set does not contain direct data concerning the distinction
between basic and applied research expenditures. Thus, I am looking for indirect
variables that indicate the degree of basic research that firms perform, or are
expected to perform. Most of the independent variables presented below are
inspired by this notion.
The first explaining variable proposed is the ratio of patent applications to
R&D expenditures, also known as the propensity to patent (see Scherer 1983).
This variable, labelled as 'propens', is obtained as follows. The total number of
applications in the period 1986-1990 is divided by the total R&D expenditures for
data processing in that same period. No lag between R&D and patenting is
included because there is evidence that most patent applications are filed early in
the innovation process (Hall, Griliches and Hausman 1986). I thus obtain the
number of applications per million dollar of R&D. It should be stressed that the
absolute R&D expenditures will not provide information on the strategies chosen:
imitation may cost as much R&D as improvement. The same argument holds for
the R&D intensity, defined as the R&D to revenues ratio. The propensity to
patent, however, does provide some information on the type of research per-
formed. Following a pioneering strategy, much R&D results in patent applica-
tions. Imitative strategies yield less patentable output, and result in a smaller
1. Actually, some country dummies are introduced to deal with possible differences in
waiting times.
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number of applications per unit of R&D expenditures. A positive sign is therefore
expected for 'propens'.
The second and third variables are inspired by the notion that diversification
induces more basic research. Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962) have argued that a
more diversified firm can spread risks better and is therefore more inclined to do
basic research. Moreover, the output of basic research can be used in more,
maybe unexpected, market segments, making the pay-off of basic research
higher. As mentioned previously, basic research leads to more successful patent-
ing because the novelty requirements are met more easily. In this study, I
distinguish internal from external diversification. By interna/, I mean the diver-
sification within the data-processing market. A measure for the internal diversifi-
cation is the number of DP market segments in which the firm has been active in
the period 1986-1990, divided by the total number of segments during that
period. Label this variable as 'droers'. I expect a positive sign for 'divers'. The
segments within the data-processing market are mainframes, superminis, mini-
computers, microcomputers, cad/cam/cae, peripherals, data communication
hardware, software, maintenance, services and other. Over the period (5 years)
concerned, the total number of segments was 55. The variable 'divers' is thus
continuous by approximation. The other variable is associated with the exteraa/
diversification of a firm. This variable is defined as the total revenues from the
data-processing market divided by the total corporate revenues, for the period
1986 to 1990. Label this variable as 'speci'a/is'. The same arguments as in the case
of internal diversification can be used to justify the inclusion of 'specialis'. A
negative sign is therefore expected. However, it is felt that, since the spill-overs
within the market are probably stronger than those coming from outside the
market, 'specialis' will play a less important role than 'divers'.
The fourth explaining variable is proposed to describe the main focus of a
firm, which can either be on innovation or on marketing. Define the variable
'martef ' as the ratio of Sales and Marketing employees to R&D employees in data
processing. A firm that stresses R&D and wants to compete primarily through
innovation is expected to know the technical fields and current patents better and
thus to have a higher success ratio. In contrast, a firm that focuses on sales and
marketing as a means to compete, knows less of the existing technologies in the
market, has less patenting experience, and is thus expected to achieve a lower
success ratio. A negative sign is expected for 'market'. The next variable is
concerned with the personnel in the research department. Let 'rc/equip' be defined
as the R&D expenditures per R&D employee. The idea behind this variable is
that researchers involved in basic research have more equipment at their
disposal. So a positive sign is expected for this variable.
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The final two variables are suggested to catch some fixed effects. The first is
a country dummy. Each country has a different national patent system, which
may affect the strategies of firms as well as the experience with patent offices in
general. Furthermore, the waiting times of processing in the EPO may differ
between the countries of origin of the applicants. Some countries may have to
wait longer than other countries. The data-processing firms are divided into three
groups by region of origin of their headquarters: United States ('LZS'), Japan ('/P')
and Europe ('EC').* The regressions will include two of the three dummies ('US'
and 'JP').
The second dummy variable included indicates the primary market segment
(by revenue) in which the firm is active. The 11 segments are regrouped into 3.
The first ('computer') contains the core of the data-processing industry with the
mainframe, supermini, minicomputer and microcomputer segments. The second
group ('rtoncore') contains the cad/cam/cae, peripheral and data communication
segments. Finally, the third group contains the software, services and mainte-
nance segments ('support'). I expect that 'computer' and 'noncore' play a larger
role than 'support', because this last group contains such segments as service and
software, which can rarely be protected by patents.
CW Esf/maf/ow
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimations can cause two problems in the context
studied here. First, the dependent variable 'success' cannot be smaller than 0 or
greater than 1 and is thus doubly truncated: values smaller than 0 must be set
equal to 0 and values greater than 1 must be set equal to 1 (see Maddala 1983 for
more details on truncated and censored variables). The second problem is caused
by the many zero observations for the variable 'success', especially in the large
sample series (A). These zero observations can 'force' the constant of the estima-
ted OLS line too much toward zero. Instead of OLS, a two-limit (also known as
'doubly truncated') Tobit estimation model is more appropriate for two reasons.
First, the Tobit model deals properly with the lower limit of 0 and the upper
limit of 1 of the dependent variable 'success'. Second, the Tobit model also takes
into account the many zero observations of the 'success' variable (which is
particularly important in the (A) series). In fact, the two-limit Tobit model
provides three estimates: (i) of the chance that the success ratio is zero, i.e.,
whether or not a firm is granted at least one patent (this is a probit); (ii) of the
chance that all applications are granted a patent (another probit); and (iii) of the
2. The US group contains 62 firms (including one Canadian firm), the Japanese group 19
firms (including three Taiwanese firms) and the European group 19 firms.
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success ratio, given that it is not equal to 0 or 1 (regression part).
W Results
Two series of Tobit estimations are carried out. Table 6.2 summarizes the results:
in one series (A in table 6.2) the success ratio of firms that have not filed any
applications in the EPO in the period 1986-1990, is set equal to 0. In the other (B),
firms with fewer than 5 applications are expelled. The major difference between
the A-series and the B-series of estimations is the constant term. In the A-series,
the constant has a negative sign (all significant at a 0.5% level) indicating the
presence of a threshold. Since in the B-series the constant has a positive sign, the
firms with fewer than 5 applications face the threshold and cause the negative
sign of the constant in the A-series. According to estimation A (iv), for example,
where 'divers' is the only explaining variable, a minimum level of internal
diversification is required (in this case 0.3309/0.7018 = 0.47, i.e, on average a firm
has to be active in about 5 of the total 11 market segments) in order to be
granted a patent.
I will discuss the estimation results per variable, starting with those that
perform relatively badly. The first is 'rdequip'. The equipment per R&D
employee does not have the expected effect on the success ratio. Both in A (i)
and in B (i), the variable 'rdequip' does not have a positive sign. Since both
coefficients are statistically not significant at the 10% level, no conclusions can be
drawn about the effects of the R&D expenditures per R&D employee on the
success of passing the EPO. The second variable is 'market'. This variable, which
was constructed to catch the main focus of a firm, on marketing or on
innovation, does not perform well. 'Market' does not have the expected sign in
estimation A(i), while it does have it in B (i). In both cases, however, the
coefficient is not significant at the 10% level. Firms pursuing pioneering strategies
apparently take into account the marketing of their products as much as firms
pursuing imitative strategies. Thirdly, the variable 'specialis', included as an
indication of the external diversification of a firm, has the expected negative sign
in both A (i) and B (i). But this variable is only significant at the 10% level in A
(i) and not in B (i). Thus, external diversification, for spreading risks and
absorbing spill-overs from outside the data-processing market, does not seem to
be very important in explaining the success ratios.
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Table 6.2
Results of the
Series
Variable
Constant
Divers
Propens
US
JP
Computer
Noncore
Specialis
Market
Rdequip
Mean log-lik.
Std. error
# Cases
two-limit Tobit estimations
(i)
-0.4039
(-3.007)
0.6458
(4.944)
0.1635
(3.314)
0.0450
(0.562)
-0.0932
(-1.155)
0.1836
(1.569)
0.2558
(2.691)
-0.1416
(-1.525)
-0.0183
(-0.586)
-0.2581
(-0.871)
-19.055
0.2248
100
A
(ii)
-0.4751
(-4.546)
0.6818
(5.321)
0.1992
(4.029)
0.0216
(0.288)
-0.0952
(-1.168)
0.1056
(0.907)
0.2313
(2.472)
-
-
-
-20.287
0.2282
100
(iii)
-0.3403
(-4.151)
0.6692
(7.629)
0.2165
(3.005)
0.0066
(0.089)
-0.0664
(-0.759)
-
-
-
-
-
-24.371
0.2408
100
(iv)
-0.3309
(-5.139)
0.7018
(7.521)
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-29.091
0.2542
100
(i)
0.2068
(2.167)
0.2922
(2.858)
0.0306
(0.867)
-0.1728
(-2.554)
-0.1703
(-2.865)
0.0273
(0.307)
0.0275
(0.412)
-0.0990
(-1.235)
-0.0003
(-0.024)
-0.1497
(-0.718)
21.011
0.1113
44
B
(«)
0.1798
(2.070)
0.2779
(3.299)
0.0616
(2.819)
-0.2083
(-3.586)
-0.1794
(-3.015)
-
-
-
-
-
19.540
0.1147
44
(iii)
-0.0218
(-0.360)
0.3574
(3.394)
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
11.603
0.1421
44
Nofe: The dependent variable is 'success'. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. The
standard errors used to calculate these t-statistics are heteroscedastic-consistent
estimates.
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The results concerning the dummy variables for market segments and
countries are mixed. The segment dummies 'computer' and 'noncore' in equa-
tions A (i) and (ii) have the expected positive sign. But only 'noncore' firms, and
not 'computer' firms, have significantly higher success ratios than 'support' firms
(at the 5% level). However, this conclusion does not hold for the B (i) estimation:
both segment dummies are not significant at the 10% level. The country dummy
variables 'US' and 'JP' perform very well in the B (i) and B (ii) estimations. They
both have a negative sign, statistically significant at the 1% level. So US and
Japanese firms have lower success ratios than European firms. Section 6.4 studies
these country differences in more detail. The country dummies do not perform
well in the A-series; in all of the estimations both dummies are not significant at
the 10% level.
The next variable, 'propens', performs well in general; it has the expected
sign and is statistically significant at the 0.5% level in all regressions but B(i).
Therefore, it can be concluded that a high propensity to patent (applications to
R&D expenditures ratio) of a firm in the data-processing industry is indeed an
indication of the degree of fundamental research and as such associated with
good patenting performance.
Finally, the variable for internal diversification, 'divers', performs very well.
In each of the seven estimations (A-series and B-series), this variable has the
expected sign and is statistically highly significant. Notice that in the estimations
with 'divers' as the only explaining variable, i.e., A (iv) and B (iii), the standard
error of the estimation is only a small fraction larger than in the estimations
including all explaining variables (A (i) and B (i)). So 'divers' is the most impor-
tant variable in the estimations.
Since larger firms are more diversified in general, one might object that/ïrm
size does the job rather than the degree of diversification. In order to check for
that, I have defined 'dpreu', the revenues in the period 1986-1990, as an indication
of size. The variables 'divers' and 'dprev' indeed correlate significantly. The two-
limit Tobit estimation (necessary because 'divers' also lies between 0 and 1,
inclusive) for the large sample (A-series, 100 cases) is given by: divers = 0.3631
(14.840) + 1.5635E-6 (3.918) dprev (t-values in parentheses). The relation is less
strong for the small sample (B-series, 44 cases): divers = 0.5052 (13.566) +
2.4178E-6 (1.849) dprev. However, 'dprev' performs worse than 'divers' in
explaining the success ratios. For the large sample, the Tobit method results in
the following estimation: success = -0.1607 (-2.353) + 1.7039E-6 (5.049) dprev. The
sign of 'dprev' is the expected one and significant at the 0.1% level. However,
compared to estimation A (iv), with 'divers' being the only explaining variable,
the t-statistic of 'dprev' in the above estimation is smaller (5.049 compared to
7.521 in A (iv)), and the standard error of the estimation is larger (0.3842
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compared to 0.2542 in A (iv)). Therefore, for the large sample it can be concluded
that internal diversification has more influence than size in explaining the success
ratios. For the small sample this conclusion holds even stronger. The Tobit model
yields the following estimation: success = 0.1694 (5.703) + 5.5318E-7 (1.349) dprev.
'Dprev' is statistically not significant at the 5% level, while 'divers' is highly
significant if it is the only explaining variable (check B (iii)). Thus, also for the
small sample, it can be concluded that diversification has more influence than
firm size in explaining the success ratios.
Finally, I have checked whether there is a relation between the success ratio
and the profitability of a firm. To correct for the size effect, I have taken as the
profitability variable the DP operating income over the period 1986-1990 divided
by the DP revenues for that same period. For the sample of all 100 firms, an OLS
regression is performed with profitability as dependent and success ratio as
independent variable. The coefficient of the success ratio has a negative sign, but
is statistically not significant at a 10% level. The adjusted R* is very low (about
1%). The same regression is also performed for the smaller sample of 44 firms
with 5 and more applications. Again, the coefficient of the success ratio has a
negative sign but is now statistically significant at a 5% level. The explained
variance of profitability (adj. R*) is equal to 8.1%. One should, however, be very
careful in interpreting these results. It is not necessary so (and even doubtful)
that, since the success ratio is inversely related to profitability, pioneering inno-
vation strategies are less profitable than imitative strategies. The country effect
can also be important. We saw that US and Japanese firms have lower success
ratios in the period 1986-1990. If US and/or Japanese firms are more profitable,
we would thus also get a negative sign. For the large sample of 100 firms, I
found no evidence for US or Japanese firms being more profitable. For the
smaller sample, however, there does seem to be some evidence. US firms are
more profitable than European firms (significant at a 5% level), while Japanese
firms are not. Thus, there is some evidence that the inverse relationship between
success ratio and profitability is related to country differences. In fact, as we will
see in the next section, Japanese and US firms have a lower success ratio than
European firms over the period 1986-1990 partially because they have to wait
longer for their grants.
6.4 National Waiting Times and Success Ratios
The results with respect to the country dummies in the above regressions (the B-
series) indicate that US and Japanese data-processing firms have significantly
lower success ratios than European firms for their applications during 1986-1990.
There are two possible reasons to explain this. First, US and Japanese firms may
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have to wait longer for their grants. Fewer of their 1986-1990 applications are
then processed, resulting in lower success ratios. This possibility will be
examined in subsection (a). A second reason may be that US and Japanese firms
just perform worse because of their country of origin, while European firms may
perform systematically better in the EPO. This possibility will be examined in
subsection (b).
(a,) NafiOMaZ Waiting Times
The waiting times for the data-processing industry are first determined for the
year of application 1986 and are calculated as follows. I have taken all appli-
cations of a country in 1986 and checked how many of those were granted a
patent in the period 1986 to August 1993. Next, I checked how many of these
total grants were granted after how many years. The categories of waiting times
are: 2 (and less), 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 (and more) years. I will examine the waiting
times for the US, Japan, Germany, France and the United Kingdom. For each of
these countries, I construct a cumulative distribution of their waiting times. Using
the Kolmogorov-Smimov test', I test in pairs whether these lag distributions
differ. The null hypothesis is that distributions do not differ. The alternative
hypothesis is that m must wait longer than n, where m and n are the total grants
of a country. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic D^ „ is the largest difference
between the cumulative distribution of m and that of n. Given the large samples
and the one-tailed test I want to perform, I can use the statistic X* = 4D^ „*
mn/(m + n) which is approximated by the Chi-square distribution with 2 degrees
of freedom (Siegel and Castellan Jr. 1988).
Table 6.3 summarizes the results. From the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests in
table 6.3, a country ranking can be constructed for the waiting times for the data-
processing industry in 1986. In order of decreasing waiting time, the ranking
which emerges is: 1. Japan; 2. US; 3. UK; 4. Germany; and 5. France. Only the
difference between the US and Japan is not significant at the 5% level. The higher
speed of processing European applications, as given by the British, German and
French applications, might thus partially explain the higher success ratios of
European firms found in the regressions in section 6.3.
3. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is a non-parametric test which can be used to check
whether two (or more) distributions have an identical distribution underlying them. For
more details, see Siegel and Castellan Jr. (1988).
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Table 6.3
National differences in waiting times in the data-processing industry in 1986
Countries Kolmogorov-Smimov X*
Statistic
Significance
m = 315 French grants D^ „ = 0.0997
n = 640 German grants
m = 640 German grants D^,, = 0.1268
n = 127 UK grants
m = 127 UK grants D^ „ = 0.1938
n = 950 US grants
m = 950 US grants D^ „ = 0.0430
n = 767 Japan, grants
8.390
6.812
16.837
3.132
0.02 > p > 0.01
0.05 > p > 0.02
p < 0.001
0.30 > p > 0.20
Table 6.4
National differences in waiting times in the data-processing industry during 1978-1985
Countries Kolmogorov-Smirnov X*
Statistic
Significance
m = 1725 French grants D^,, = 0.1167
n = 3466 German grants
m = 3466 German grants D^ „ = 0.1545
n = 765 UK grants
m = 765 UK grants D^ „ = 0.1153
n = 5961 US grants
m = 5961 US grants D^ „ = 0.0762
n = 3779 Japan, grants
62.782
59.848
36.054
53.132
p < 0.001
p < 0.001
p < 0.001
p < 0.001
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In order to get larger samples and to check whether these differences in
processing speed have been existing from the start, I have carried out identical
tests for applications filed in the period 1978-1985. The results are presented in
table 6.4. Exactly the same order of waiting times also emerges from these
samples. From large to small times, the ranking is: 1. Japan; 2. US; 3. UK; 4.
Germany; and 5. France. All differences are highly significant (< 0.1% level).
Is this phenomenon specific to the data-processing industry? Table 6.5 sum-
marizes the results for all applications granted (i.e., in all IPC classes) in the
period 1978-1985. Again, the same order as before is found here with very strong
evidence. It can thus be concluded that the difference in waiting times is not
specific to the data-processing industry.
Table 6.5
National differences in waiting times for all grants during 1978-1985
Countries Kolmogorov-Smirnov X* Significance
Statistic
m = 14191 French grants D^, „ = 0.0609 148.093 p < 0.001
n = 33661 German grants
m = 33661 German grants D ^ = 0.1636 773.401 p < 0.001
n = 9198 UK grants
m = 9198 UK grants D^ „ = 0.1176 402.416 p < 0.001
n = 34785 US grants
m = 34785 US grants D ,^« = 0.0516 138.045 p < 0.001
n = 20660 Japan, grants
It should be emphasized here that I have only observed the differences in natio-
nal waiting times. It is outside the scope of this study whether these differences
are due to preferential treatment given by the EPO to European applicants, for
example, or to the organizational structure within the EPO, or to any other
factors.
CW Mjfiona/ SHCCCSS Rafr'os
In order to isolate the differences in EPO success ratios of countries from the
differences in waiting times, I will focus on the period 1978-1985. The vast
majority of applications during that period were processed by August 1993 for
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each country. Thus, differences in waiting times do not affect differences in
success ratios. Table 6.6 presents the success ratios of countries in the data-
processing IPC classes as well as the overall success ratios of countries.
The overall success ratios do not seem to differ much from the ratios in the
data-processing classes for each country. The examination of data-processing files
thus appears to be not more or less stringent than that of other files. From table
6.6 it can furthermore be concluded that the lower success ratio of Japan which
was found in the data-processing industry in section 6.3 is a severe misrepre-
sentation. Japanese firms generally perform better than European firms, both in
data processing and overall.
Table 6.6
EPO success ratios during 1978-1985
Country
Japan
France
Germany
US
UK
Data Processing
0.855
0.785
0.717
0.659
0.552
Overall
0.833
0.762
0.731
0.623
0.581
How can these differences in EPO success ratios of countries be explained? One
possible explanation may be found in the novelty requirements of the national
patent offices. If applicants are used to stringent examination, they are more
likely to carefully select the inventions they file. In a less stringent system, they
would then perform better than applicants who are used to looser national
examination. For countries outside the EPC, one might bring forward the
argument mat their national offices have already screened the applications,
because those applicants may be expected to first file in their national office and
then in the EPO.'' The better the screening (i.e., the higher the novelty
requirements), the higher the success ratio for that country in the EPO. I thus
expect lower national success ratios to lead to higher EPO success ratios. The
national success ratios are taken from the WIPO publication "100 Years Protec-
4. This is also common practice for much European applicants.
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tion of Industrial Property" (Geneva, 1983), which contains the total number of
applications and patents granted in a country for the period 1883-1982. I assume
that the national patent offices treated residents and non-residents in the same
way. The national success ratios then indicate the experience of national appli-
cants with their patent office. The EPO success ratios have been calculated for the
period 1978-1985 because, as indicated previously, almost all applications from
that period were processed by August 1993. The sample contains 36 countries (all
countries I could find data for, both in the EPO and in the WIPO publications).'
For reasons outlined above, a two-limit Tobit model is used again. With the EPO
success ratios ('eposuccess') as dependent and the national success ratios
('natsuccess') as independent variable, the estimation is given by:
eposuccess = 0.7392 (10.891) - 0.2581 (-2.648) natsuccess
The t-ratios are given in parentheses. The coefficient of 'natsuccess' has the
expected sign and is statistically significant at a 0.5% level. It can thus be conclu-
ded that national success ratios are indeed of influence in explaining the EPO
success ratios.
The argument brought forward above might be called 'Porterian' in the sense
that stronger domestic screening implies better foreign performance. Another,
more indirect and speculative, reason behind the inverse relationship might be
found in the type of incentive provided by a patent system. The choice between
the two innovation strategies, pioneering or imitative, may depend on the
dimensions of the patent system, as explained in chapter 5. If a patent system
sets high barriers for applicants, by means of high novelty requirements, the
pioneering strategy might become more costly, but provides more protection
against further improvement in return. Firms that pursue pure pioneering
strategies benefit from the advantage of high protection without investing more
in basic research (because they will meet the novelty requirements anyway).
Therefore, stringent novelty requirements can be thought to encourage pioneering
strategies. Indirectly, strong domestic novelty requirements then lead to better
patenting performance in the EPO, by inducing pioneering innovation strategies.
5. The following countries have been included: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Brasil, Bulgary, Canada, Cyprus, (former) Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, (former) Soviet Union, South Africa, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, US, (former) West-Germany, (former) Yugoslavia.
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6.5 Conclusions
This chapter has argued that firms which pursue pioneering innovation strategies
are more successful in obtaining patent protection than firms which pursue imita-
tive innovation strategies. A pioneering strategy aims at profits resulting from
new or improved products and processes. This strategy requires more basic
research, which explores novel and unknown paths that are only weakly related
to existing products, an therefore its fruits are better patentable. The novelty
requirements are met more easily. An imitative strategy, on the other hand, aims
at modifying and redesigning existing products and makes more use of applied
research and development. Due to the stronger connection with existing prod-
ucts, the fruits from applied research and development pass the patent office less
easily.
This theory has been tested for the data-processing industry in the period
1986-1990. Since no direct data on basic vs. applied research were available, the
success ratios of data-processing firms in the EPO are explained by indirect
variables which indicate the degree of basic research. One such variable is
diversification. As argued in Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962), more diversified
firms are expected to do more basic research because they can better spread the
risks and apply the results in more fields. Indeed, the variable for diversification
within the data-processing market turns out to be the most important in
explaining the success ratios. Another variable, the propensity to patent, also
performs well. Pioneering research does not only result in more patent applica-
tions but also in better patenting performance.
Another result is that US and Japanese firms achieved lower success ratios
for their applications in the period 1986-1990. However, it is found that this is
due to the longer waiting times between applications and patents granted in the
EPO for US and Japanese firms, compared to European firms. Without this
difference in waiting times, Japanese applicants in general have higher success
ratios than European and US applicants. Furthermore I have found some
evidence that national patent offices act as screening institutes for the EPO.
Countries without stringent screening, visualized by low novelty requirements,
perform worse in the EPO than countries that apply more stringent screening.
The question may be raised why countries set different patent heights. In the
conclusion of chapter 3,1 suggested that countries that perform relatively well in
basic research might set high protection, whereas countries that are more special-
ized in applied research and development might set low protection. In the next
chapter, a model is developed that examines international differences in patent
protection. Although the analysis focuses on patent breadth, the conclusions also
hold for other dimensions, such as length and height.
An Address Model of
Patent Breadth with
Two Countries
Drawing on Hotelling's model of spatial competition, we develop an address
model in which normative and positive aspects of the choice of patent breadth in
an international setting can be examined. In each of two countries a number of
different entrepreneurs face the following sort of opportunity: by investing a sum
c in product research and development the entrepreneur makes possible the
production of an entire spectrum of products. Any entrepreneur's incentive to do
so is determined jointly by patent breadths in the two countries where the
spectrum of products will be sold. As before, patent breadth is measured by the
portion of the product spectrum over which the patentholder exercises monopoly
power. In each country there is a population of entrepreneurs, each of whom can
develop a different product spectrum; entrepreneurs differ with regard to the
magnitude of the development cost c that must be incurred to create the spec-
trum of products.
Even in a one-country setting this poses a difficult and typical policy problem
because there are many incentive problems to be solved, one for each entrepre-
neur, while there are two policy instruments, patent breadths in the two coun-
tries. To complicate matters, if we assume that in making decisions with regard
to patent breadth, each country has regard only to the welfare of its own citizens,
significant international externalities distort the policy-setting game.
Given patent breadths in the two countries, only those entrepreneurs who
(correctly) anticipate that they can cover their development costs do, in fact,
develop (and, of course, patent) their separate product spectrums. Knowing the
distribution of opportunities and associated development costs in the two coun-
tries, and knowing how entrepreneurs will respond to the incentives created by
patent breadth, each country non-cooperatively chooses its own patent breadth to
maximize a weighted sum of profit and consumers' surplus earned by the coun-
try's citizens.
We establish the following results. First, when countries place equal weight
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on profit and consumers' surplus of their own citizens, relative to the social
optimum, patent breadths are too narrow. This result reflects the existence of a
positive externality flowing from each country's patent breadth to the profit and
consumers' surplus enjoyed by citizens of the other country. Second, the first
result generalizes to other facets of intellectual property rights. Intellectual
property rights tend to be too weak if countries non-cooperatively choose them
to maximize total surplus of their own citizens. Third, to the extent that profit is
weighted more heavily than consumers' surplus in political objective functions,
the tendency for property rights to be too weak in equilibrium is offset. Indeed,
if the weight given to profit in the political objective function is large enough,
property rights will be too strong in equilibrium. The final result is that, except
in very special circumstances, equilibrium patent breadths are not identical in the
two countries, and in all cases there is a continuum of optimal mixes of patent
breadth, only one of which is symmetric. Further, if equilibrium patent breadths
are sufficiently asymmetric, there is no symmetric patent policy that Pareto-
dominates the original equilibrium.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.1 discusses the literature that
is related to the questions posed here. The core model with one country is pre-
sented in section 7.2. Section 7.3 examines the entry game, i.e., the stage where
firms make decisions on their innovations. The stage where two countries choose
their patent policies interdependently is studied in section 7.4. Some concluding
remarks and possible applications are discussed in the final section 7.5.
7.1 Related Literature
Chapter 2 has already discussed the theoretical patent models from the Industrial
Organization literature. All these models (for example, Nordhaus 1969, Klempe-
rer 1990, Scotchmer and Green 1990), essentially analyse a trade-off between
innovation incentive and monopolistic welfare loss. In an international context,
this trade-off between R&D incentives and deadweight losses occurs at the level
of global welfare, but is complicated by the distribution of benefits and costs over
individual countries. Extending Nordhaus (1969), Berkowitz and Kotowitz (1982)
have examined the optimal patent length for a small country. The size of process
innovation is a function of patent lengths in a small country and in the rest of the
world. The small country assumption ensures that no retaliation of other
countries is to be expected if the country shortens the national patent life.
Whether a single country should set long or short patent lifetimes depends on
the industrial organization of the domestic invention market. Berkowitz and
Kotowitz conclude that a competitive invention industry calls for short-lived
patents and a concentrated invention industry for long-lived patents.
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Inspired by the contentious discussion on intellectual property rights in the
Uruguay Round, Chin and Grossman (1990), Diwan and Rodrik (1991) and Dear-
dorff (1992) have developed models which analyse patent protection in north-
south trade relations. Many southern countries do not provide patent protection;
they either have no patent system or do not enforce it effectively. Their claim is
that southern welfare only decreases if patent protection is provided for northern
innovations that will be generated anyway. Northern countries, particularly those
representing northern firms, want protection against imitation in the south in
order to be able to recoup their R&D investments.
In the present chapter patent protection is defined within a model of hori-
zontal product differentiation similar to Klemperer's (1990) model. Both types of
welfare loss in his analysis, i.e., substitution to less preferred varieties and to not
buying, can potentially arise in our model. Unlike Berkowitz and Kotowitz (1982)
we do not use a small country assumption. Hence, the strategic interactions
between two countries which determine their patent breadths are taken fully into
account. For certain parameter configurations, for example, when demand in one
country is very weak, our model comes close to the setting studied by Berkowitz
and Kotowitz. Our model can also be used to investigate the optimal protection
levels for the north and the south. Unlike previous studies in that area, we do
not assume beforehand that only the north has potential innovators. This situa-
tion occurs in our model as a special case, more precisely when the innovation
density in the south is zero, as will become clear below.
7.2 The Core Model
In this section we focus on just one country as we develop the core of our model.
In passing, we comment briefly on the choice of patent breadth in a one-country
setting. By spending c on product development the entrepreneur can create an
entire spectrum of products. An individual product is described by its address w
in the product spectrum, which extends from -a to +a, where parameter o > 0.
If the product is developed, we assume that any firm is technically able to
produce any product in the spectrum at a marginal cost, which we set equal to 0
for convenience. Hence, in the absence of some form of property right, the
entrepreneur has no incentive to develop the spectrum: with no property right to
any portion of the product spectrum, the equilibrium price for all products in the
spectrum is 0. Similar to the analysis in chapter 4, we suppose such property
rights take the form of a monopoly right granted to the developer to produce
products in interval [-b/2, b/2], where 0 < b < a. Thus, subsequent to
development, the entrepreneur has the right to monopolisrically exploit a market
of length b.
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As in Hotelling's (1929) model, there is a continuum of consumers. Each
consumer has a most preferred product in each spectrum, which we denote by
w*. The demand side of the model is created by positing a continuum of con-
sumers with a uniform distribution of w* on [-a, a]. We set the density of this
distribution equal to 1. Denote the price of product with address w, or more
simply product w, by p(w) (for w in [-a, a]). Given prices, the consumer first
chooses which product to buy, and then chooses how much to buy of the
product chosen in stage one. Consumer w* buys the good w for which
p,,(w, w*) = p(w) + 11 w - w* | (7.1)
is smallest. The parameter t is analogous to the cost of transport in familiar
models of spatial competition; here, of course, it is a utility penalty associated
with consuming a product that differs from the consumer's most preferred
product. And the function Pd(w, w*) is analogous to a delivery price schedule.
If for two goods, w' and w*,
p(w') + t |w' - w*| = p(w*) + t|w* - w*| (7.2)
we assume that consumer w* prefers the good that is nearer to his most
preferred good, while if they are equidistant from w* the consumer randomly
picks one of them.
The demand function for the consumer's chosen product is the following
linear function of p^:
x(Pa) = (a - Pa)/F(n) (7.3)
Parameter a is the intercept of the inverse demand function and F(n) is its slope.
The slope of the inverse demand function, F(n), is an increasing function of n, the
number of developed spectra:
F(n) = Yn° 0 < 9 < l y > 0 '(7.4)
Notice that as the number of developed spectra increases, the consumer buys less
of his chosen product in each spectrum. The larger parameter 0, the more pro-
nounced this demand interdependence effect is. This inter-spectrum demand
effect assures that the marginal benefit of an additional product spectrum
decreases as the number of developed spectra increases.
Given patent breadth b, equilibrium prices are 0 in the two unprotected
intervals of the product spectrum, intervals [-a, -b/2] and [b/2, a], since any firm
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can produce these goods at 0 marginal cost. In the protected interval the monop-
olist maximizes profit by providing all conceivable varieties and by choosing
p(w) equal to a/2 if the consumer with w* = w prefers buying the monopolist's
good at this price rather than buying good w = b/2 (or good w = - b/2) at price
0. If, however, the monopolist is constrained by the possibility that the customer
with w* = w would prefer the nearest competitively priced good to the
monopolist's good at price a/2, to maximize profit the monopolist sets p(w)
equal to t|w - b/21 (or t|w + b/2|). Thus, equilibrium prices in the monop-
olist's protected segment are
p(w) = min [a/2, t|w - b/2| , t|w + b/2|] (7.5)
The first term is the unconstrained monopoly price, and the second (respectively,
third) is the highest price which will induce the consumer with address w* = w
to choose the monopolist's good w in preference to good b/2 (respectively, -b/2),
which is available at price 0). In this price equilibrium, each consumer buys her
most preferred good. The price equilibrium is illustrated in figure 7.1.a, for the
case in which tb > a, and in figure 7.1.b, for the case in which tb < a.
a/2
-b/2 0
(a)
b/2
Figure 7.1 Equilibrium price schedules
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At this point we have seven parameters: a, t, 0, b, y, o and c. The preference
parameters 0 and y in equation (7.4) are common to both countries throughout
the analysis, while, in the following sections of the chapter, the preference
parameters a and o and the policy variable b are country-specific. Experience
with the model suggests that very little is lost if we choose parameter t to be
infinite. In this case, the monopolist's profit-maximizing price is a/2 throughout
the protected portion of the spectrum, which permits a significant simplification
of the algebra in the balance of the analysis. Accordingly, we set t equal to
infinity. Given this simplification, the developer's gross profit from a country
with patent breadth b is just
7t(b) = (a*b)/(4F(n)) (7.6)
Consumers' surplus from the protected, monopoly portion of the spectrum is
(a*b)/(8F(n)), and from the unprotected, competitive portion of the spectrum it is
(a*(2o - b))/(2F(n)). Hence, the consumers' surplus from a product spectrum
breadth b is
4Kb) = (aV8F(n))(8o - 3b) (7.7)
Notice that total surplus (the sum of profit and consumers' surplus) and consum-
ers' surplus are decreasing functions of b, while profit is an increasing function
of b. Hence, if there was just one spectrum and one country, the optimal patent
breadth would satisfy 7i(b) = c; that is, patent breadth would be just broad
enough to allow the developer to recover his development costs. However, even
in a one-country setting, when there is more than one spectrum to be developed,
a difficult trade-off inevitably arises. Suppose the policy maker is considering
patent breadth b', and has identified all the spectra for which 7t(b') - c > 0. To
induce an additional entrepreneur to develop his valuable spectrum, the policy
maker will realize both that he must increase b and that any increase in b entails
a reduction in total surplus from each spectrum that would be developed given
b'. The cost-benefit optimal policy must balance these opposing effects. If it were
possible to design spectrum-specific patent policies, this unfortunate trade-off
would not arise.
Our focus in this chapter is on the externalities driven by patent breadth
policy in a multi-country context. In section 7.3, we model entrepreneurial
decisions given the opportunity to sell in different countries with (possibly)
different patent policies. Following that, in section 7.4 we examine the two-
country policy game in which countries choose patent policies.
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7.3 The Entry Game
Here we suppose there are two countries, 1 and 2, and look at the game in which
the number of spectra that entrepreneurs choose to develop in the two countries
is determined. The two parameters in equation (7.4), 8 and y, are assumed to be
common to the two countries, while the remaining parameters are country-
specific: a, and aj are intercepts of the inverse demand functions; o, and o^ are
spectrum length parameters. In the entry game of this section, patent breadths in
the two countries, bj and bj, are exogenous. In the following section we build on
the results of the entry game to determine equilibrium values of these policy
parameters.
We assume that the developer of any spectrum will receive local patent
protection in both countries. It is this assumption that drives the inter-country
externalities in our model. An immediate consequence of the assumption is that
any spectrum that is developed will be available in both countries. Hence, from
equation (7.6), the developer's aggregate gross profit or inducement to innovate,
which we denote by V(b,, bj; n,, nj), is given by the following expression
V(b,, b^; n,, n,) = (b,(a,)* + b,(ajV(4F(n, + M (7.8)
where rtj (i = 1, 2) is the number of spectra developed by citizens of country i.
To capture the notion of many development opportunities, we assume a
uniform distribution of development costs c in the two countries, and denote the
density of opportunities in country i by D, (i = 1, 2). In the equilibrium of the
entry game all spectra for which
V(b,, b,; n,, n j > c
will be developed. Given the uniform distribution of c in country i, the number
of spectra in country i that satisfy this inequality is just D;V(b,, bj; n,, n )^ (when
starting from 0). Hence, the equilibrium of the entry game is determined by the
following two conditions:
n, = V(b,, bj; n,, n j , i = 1,2 (7.9)
For simplicity we suppose that rij is a real number, not an integer. Solving these
entry equilibrium conditions, and letting N, denote the equilibrium value of n,,
we get
i\j = ^LMZJ^  ^/^L/J + L'ai / ^/.lu.a^
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where
Z = (b,(a,)* + b^(a^)/(4Y) (7.10.b)
From (7.10) we get a number of useful comparative static results:
(i) Nj increases with both policy parameters, b, and bj. Further, the rate at which
Nj increases as b^ (k = 1, 2) increases is proportional to (a^ )^ ; this reflects the facts
that developers who reside in country i have access to patent protection in both
countries, and that protection is more valuable as the individual consumers'
demand for the productis higher. Conversely, Nj increases with a^  (k = 1, 2) and
the rate of increase is proportional to b^. Finally, Nj is concave in b^ (k = 1, 2).
(ii) Naturally, N, increases as Dj increases. And Nj decreases as D^ (k not equal to
i) increases. This latter result is driven by inter-spectrum demand dependence; as
D,< increases, so does N ,^ but a larger N^ shifts individual demand down in both
countries, thereby decreasing Nj.
(iii) Given that b^ is less than 2CT^  (spectrum length), Nj is independent of CT^.
Given that the protected portion of the spectrum is smaller than the entire
spectrum, the size of the spectrum has no bearing on profitability and hence no
bearing on the number of developers that find it profitable to develop their
spectra.
The inducement to enter evaluated at equilibrium values for N, and Nj, which
we denote by V*(b,, bj), is
V(b,, bj) = (Z"« * *>)/(D, + D,)"'« * °>) (7.11)
This is the gross profit of each of the developed spectra in equilibrium. Of
course, net profit differs from spectrum to spectrum due to differences in
development costs. At one extreme, net profit is identical to V*(b,, bi), and at the
other it is 0.
We can readily compute aggregate development costs in equilibrium for
country i. They are equal to
Cj = (D,(Z)"" * ">)/(2(D, + D,)*"<' * °>) (7.12)
The total net profit accruing to developers in country i, Jtj(b,, bj), is then Nj*(b,,
bj) - Q, which reduces to
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»>) (7.13)
The total net profit for country i inherits the comparative static properties of N^
both Nj and 7C, are increasing in b>, a;, and Dj, decreasing in D^ (k not equal to i),
and independent of C7j. Interestingly, despite the inter-spectrum demand depend-
ence and the ever-increasing marginal cost of an additional developed spectrum,
7ij(b,, bj) is convex in b^ (k = 1, 2) (recall that 9 < 1). That is, aggregate profit of
country i increases at an increasing rate as patent breadth in either country
increases.
Finally, since all developed spectra are available in both countries, from (7.7)
we see that aggregate consumers' surplus for country i is
<h(b,, b*) = (N, + N,)((a,)7(8F(N, + N,)))(8CT, - 3b.) (7.14)
Using previous results this can be rewritten as
*(b,, b j = W(a,)'(Z(D, + D,))" " «'« * °> (7.15.a)
where
W = (8o, - 3b,)/8y (7.15.b)
The consumers' surplus comparative statics are also interesting:
(i) Consumers' surplus of country i is increasing in b^ (k not equal to i). An
increase in country k's patent breadth increases the number of developed spectra
available in country i, while having no direct effect on consumers' surplus per
spectrum in country i, thus increasing consumers' surplus in country i. (There is,
of course, an indirect effect on consumer surplus per spectrum driven by the
downward shift of the individual demand curve as the number of spectra
increases, but the increase in consumers' surplus resulting from the increase in
the number of developed spectra dominates this indirect effect.)
(ii) Provided that b^ is not too large, consumers' surplus in country i (i not equal
to k) initially increases as bj increases and subsequently decreases. Here there are
two offsetting effects: consumers' surplus in country i tends to increase as b,
increases because the increase in patent breadth results in an increase in the
number of developed spectra in country i; offsetting this effect is the fact that
surplus per available spectrum in country i decreases as b; increases. The second
effect eventually dominates the first, and if b^ is sufficiently large, it dominates
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from the outset.
(iii) Naturally, consumers' surplus in country i increases as a; increases. In addi-
tion, it increases as a^  (k not equal to i) increases. The causality runs through the
effect of a^  on N, (i = 1, 2): an increase in a^  results in an increase in the number
of spectra developed in both countries, thereby increasing consumers' surplus in
country i.
(iv) Understandably, consumers' surplus increases in country i increases as Oj, the
width of the product spectrum in country i, increases, and is independent of o\
(k not equal to i).
In the next section we build on these results as we analyze the policy game in
which patent breadths are determined.
7.4 The Policy Game
In this section we analyze the game in which patent breadths are chosen inde-
pendently and non-cooperatively by the two countries to maximize a weighted
sum of profit and consumers' surplus of the country's citizens. Letting X, and A,
denote the weights given to profit in the political objective functions in the two
countries, we get the following objective functions:
W,(b,, b j = Mi(b,, b,) + (1 - X,)(h(b,, b j i = 1, 2 (7.16)
For purposes of comparison we also need the total surplus functions for the two
countries:
eoj(b,, b,) = it,(b,, bj) + <t>,(b,, bj) i = 1, 2 • (7.17)
Of course, when equal weight is given to profit and consumers' surplus (when A,
is equal to 1/2), the objective of the policy maker is the maximization of total
welfare.
Prq/îf and Consumers' Surp/us Weighted £<jMa//y
We begin by looking at the case in which profit and consumers' surplus are
weighted equally in the political objective functions. The important qualitative
features of the equilibrium of this game are illustrated in figure 7.2. In this
equilibrium, country 1 chooses b, = 8.9 and country 2 chooses b2 = 5.2. Although
the parameter values on which this diagram is based are reported in the figure,
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Pareto-preferred
policy combinations
Figure 7.2 Asymmetric innovation densities (y = 10; 8 = 0.5; a, =
= A, = 0.5; D, = 1.5; Dj = 1.0)
= 10; a, = O2 = 30; X.,
we will not focus on them since, at this point, we are interested in the qualitative
properties of equilibrium.
One useful way to regard this equilibrium is to think of each country as
maximizing its own objective function, subject to the constraint that the other
chooses its equilibrium value of b. Focusing for concreteness on country 1, it is
then apparent that a level surface (or indifferent curve) of country l's objective
function is tangent to the constraint b^ = 5.2 at the equilibrium. Importantly, the
curvature of country l's level surface in the neighbourhood of the equilibrium,
and the set of policy combinations that are preferred by country 1 to the
equilibrium policy combination, are determined by the sign of the partial
derivative of W,(b,, bj) with respect to bz- The sign of this derivative is, of course,
positive since both profit and consumers' surplus for country 1 increases as bj
increases. For country 1 then, the set of preferred policy combinations lies above
l's level surface through the equilibrium. Now, beginning at the equilibrium
suppose we alter (increase or decrease) b, slightly: W,(b,, bj) necessarily
decreases since, given bj = 5.2, b, = 8.9 maximizes W,(b,, bj); then, to get back to
the original level surface, the positive sign of the partial derivative of W,(b,, bj)
Chapter 7 148
with respect to bj dictates that we must increase bj; hence, the level surface of
country l's objective function through the equilibrium is U-shaped in the
neighbourhood of the equilibrium. Similarly, the level surface of country 2's
objective function through the equilibrium is tangent to b, = 8.9 at the equili-
brium. The level surface through the equilibrium has the shape of a backwards
C, and preferred policy combinations lie to the right of the level surface. It is
then apparent that the equilibrium is not Pareto-optimal as regards the welfare of
the two countries and that there is too little patent protection in the equilibrium -
policy combinations in the cross-hatched, lens-shaped area of the figure Pareto-
dominate the equilibrium policy combination.
These results are generic in games in which there are positive externalities.
So there is a more general message in figure 7.2 regarding intellectual property
rights in an international setting. Interpret b, and bj as any two intellectual
property rights parameters in two countries. Given an interior equilibrium,
smooth objective functions and a positive cross-first partial derivative, the
qualitative features of figure 7.2 follow. Hence, any dimension of intellectual
property rights that confers a positive externality on the welfare of other
countries - length of patent, for example - will tend to be too weak in equili-
brium, if countries choose such policies non-cooperarively to maximize aggregate
welfare of their own citizens. As we argue below, this conclusion does not
necessarily follow if profit is weighted more heavily than consumers' surplus in
the political objective function.
The comparative statics of the policy equilibrium are also of some interest.
Our approach in figures 7.3 through 7.6 is to use the equilibrium of what we call
the baseline model as a point against which to compare the equilibria that
emerge as we change various parameters of the model. Although we used nume-
rical techniques to generate results, they are readily understood. In figure 7.3 we
have drawn the best-response functions for the baseline model, the solid lines in
the figure that generate the equilibrium EQ. We have also drawn the best-
response functions that arise when we increase spectrum width in country 1, the
dashed line for country 1 and again the solid line for country 2 that generate the
equilibrium at E,. An increase in spectrum width in country 1 leads to an
increase in the equilibrium value of b, and a decrease in the equilibrium value of
The first thing to notice about figure 7.3 is that the best-response functions
are downward sloping. This reflects the fact that an increase in one country's
policy parameter not only increases welfare in the other country, but also
decreases the rate at which the other country's welfare changes as it increases its
own policy parameter. It is this second effect that results in downward-sloping
best-response functions, and it is readily understood. Suppose we are initially on
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country l's best-response functions, and consider a discrete increase in bj,
holding b, fixed. As we emphasized in the preceding section, this increase in bj
results in an increase in the number of spectra developed in both countries and,
of course, an increase in the number of spectra available to consumers in each
country. In consequence, the demand for goods in each spectrum in country 1
shifts down (reflecting the inter-spectrum demand effect discussed above),
reducing the consumers' surplus of the marginal spectrum. That is, as b,
increases, the consumers' surplus associated with an additional developed
spectrum decreases. Interestingly, despite this inter-spectrum demand effect and
the fact that the marginal development cost of additional spectra is ever
increasing, as bj increases, the partial derivative of Jtj(b,, bi) with respect to b,
also increases, reflecting the strong positive externality that one country's patent
policy has on profitability of spectra developed in the other country. However,
the effect on consumers' surplus dominates the effect on profit with the net result
that the marginal social value of an additional spectrum in country 1 diminishes
as we increase bj. Then, since the marginal social value was equal to 0 in the
initial position on country l's best response, country l's best response to this
exogenous increase in bj is to decrease b,. That is, country l's best-response
function is downward sloping.
2,2'
Figure 7.3 Asymmetric spectrum width (y = 10; 9 = 0.5; a, = aj = 10; ; X, = X, = 0.5; D, =
D2 = 1.0; o, = Oj = 30 (solid lines: baseline model); o, = 40; Oj = 30 (dashed lines:
asymmetric spectrum width)
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From figure 7.3 we see that the increase in a, shifts country l's best-response
function to the right, while having no effect on country 2's best-response func-
tion. The key to understanding these effects is that while a, clearly increases
consumers' surplus per spectrum in country 1, it has no effect on the inducement
to entry (or gross profit) and therefore none on the number of developed spectra.
The increase in consumers' surplus per spectrum in country 1 translates into an
increase in the marginal social value of an additional spectrum in that country,
and hence into a rightward shift in that country's best-response function since b;
is the country's only control on development. Further, since all the externalities
from one country to another are channelled through the number of developed
spectra and since a, has no effect on the number of developed spectra, country
2's objective function and therefore its best-response function are independent of
a,.
Figure 7.4 Asymmetric demand intercept (a, = 15; a2 = 10)
In figure 7.4 the solid lines are the best-response functions for the baseline
model and the dashed lines the best-response functions that arise when the inter-
cept of the inverse demand function in country 1, a,, increases. As we saw in the
previous section, this increase in a, results in an increase in both N, and N2
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(given b, and bz). In country 2 this results in a decrease in the social value of an
additional spectrum, and country 2's best-response function shifts downward. In
country 1, the increase in a, increases the social value of an additional spectrum
and the best-response function shifts rightward. Both shifts work to produce an
asymmetric equilibrium. In the case illustrated the asymmetry is extreme - bj is
equal to zero.
As illustrated in figure 7.5, an increase in innovation density in country 1, D,,
has a similar effect on the equilibrium. Country 2's best-response function shifts
downward and l's shifts rightward producing an asymmetric equilibrium in
which b, increases and bi decreases.
It is then apparent that, except when both countries are identical, the
equilibrium of the policy game is asymmetric. Further, if the equilibrium is suffi-
ciently asymmetric there will be no symmetric policy combination that Pareto-
dominates the initial equilibrium. This suggests that it will be difficult and
perhaps unwise to attempt to create uniform policies with respect to intellectual
property rights across very different countries.
Figure 7.5 Asymmetric innovation densities (D, = 1.5; Dj = 1.0)
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Prq/ïfs We/gftta/ More Heaui/y 77ian Consumers' Swrp/ws
One crude way to introduce the possibility that strongly focused interests receive
more weight than diffuse interests in the political objective function is to suppose
that countries choose policies to maximize a weighted sum of profit and consu-
mers' surplus. In the current context it seems sensible to suppose that profit
receives the larger weight; that is, that X, (i = 1, 2) exceeds 1/2. In this subsection
we explore some implications of profit-biased weights in the political objective
functions.
Notice first that 7t;(b,, bj) and <t>i(b,, bj) are independent of both profit weights
(A., and A^ ). Hence, changes in profit weights have no direct impact on the
endogenous variables that are determined in the entry game analyzed in section
7.3. The real effects of changes in the weight given to profit in the political
objective functions work entirely through their impact on equilibrium policy
parameters.
Given b^ (k not equal to i), on country i's best-response function bj is such
that the partial derivative of 7Cj(b,, bj) with respect to b,, weighted by X,, is equal
to the partial derivative of <t>j(b,, bj), weighted by (1 - ^) . Necessarily, then, on i's
best-response function profit is increasing in bj and consumers' surplus is
decreasing in b<. An increase in X, then necessitates that bj be increased to
maintain the equality. That is, an increase in A, shifts country i's best-response
function up and to the right, and has no effect on the best-response function of
country k.
Relative to the baseline model, the effect of a simultaneous and symmetric
increase in the political weight given to profit in both countries is illustrated in
figure 7.6. As the weight given to profit increases, both best response func tions
shift up and to the right producing a new equilibrium in which both patent
breadths are larger. Interestingly, this may result in a higher level of total surplus
in both countries. That is, a bias toward profit in the political objective function
can work to offset the free-rider problem that is inherent in this model. Of
course, if the bias toward profit is too large, the result will be an equilibrium that
lies above and to the right of the locus of Pareto-optimal policy combinations.
The other side of this story is not so encouraging. If patent breadth is
cooperatively chosen in an international forum, and if profit receives a larger
weight than consumers' surplus in that forum, then the policy equilibrium will
inevitably involve property rights that are too strong relative to the social
optimum.
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Pareto-optimal
policy combination
7.0 9.2 15.0
Figure 7.6 Profit weighted more heavily (X, = A, = 2/3)
This story would seem to apply more generally to many facets of intellectual
property rights in an international setting. Strengthening intellectual property
rights in one country often involves positive externalities on firms and consumers
in other countries. Then, if each country chooses its intellectual property rights
policy to maximize total welfare of its own citizens, the positive externalities
imply that property rights will be too weak in equilibrium. However, to the
extent that profit is weighted more heavily than consumers' surplus in the politi-
cal objective function, the tendency for too weak property rights is offset. Indeed,
if the weight given to profit is sufficiently large, property rights will be too
strong in equilibrium.
7.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has developed an address model of product differentiation (à la
Hotelling 1929) in which the normative and positive aspects of the patent breadth
policies for two countries can be studied. We have established the following
results. First, when countries place equal weight on profit and consumers'
surplus of their own citizens, relative to the social optimum, patent breadths are
too narrow. This result reflects the existence of a positive externality flowing
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from each country's patent breadth to the profit and consumers' surplus enjoyed
by citizens of the other country. Second, to the extent that profit is weighted
more heavily than consumers' surplus in political objective functions, the
tendency for property rights to be too weak in equilibrium is offset. Third, except
in very special circumstances, equilibrium patent breadths are not identical in the
two countries, and in all cases there is a continuum of optimal mixes of patent
breadth, only one of which is symmetric. Further, if equilibrium breadths are
sufficiently asymmetric, there is no symmetric patent policy that Pareto-domi-
nates the original equilibrium.
Especially this last result is an important one as it applies to recent devel-
opments in international patent policy. The first is the on-going harmonisation of
national patent systems in Europe, as described in chapter 4. In the perspective of
our results, this trend towards symmetric protection, starting from divergent
breadths, is not necessarily to be applauded. The above analysis shows that a
uniform European patent does not Pareto-improve the European welfare if
national patents vary much. This conclusion is driven by the positive externalities
that arise in non-cooperative policy games played by independent countries. In
addition to the welfare loss due to harmonisation, another welfare loss may occur
if the European Community acts as a forum for producers. Relative to the social
optimum, too strong patent protection may emerge if profits are weighted more
heavily than consumers' surplus in the total surplus functions.
For a different environment, however, chapter 4 has presented an opposite
result. Given that European competition policy prevents price discrimination,
chapter 4 showed that European welfare increases when patent breadth is
uniform. The force driving the result was the unequal evolution of consumer
surplus and profits in patent breadth. Different patent breadths in order to
provide sufficient incentive to innovate are too costly in terms of welfare. By
harmonisation of patent protection, the European Community can easily keep
profits to the innovator the same while reducing the overall Community static
welfare loss.
Another application of the model presented in this chapter concerns the
discussion on intellectual property rights in the Uruguay Round, as briefly
outlined in section 7.1. The two countries in our model can be interpreted as the
northern and the southern region in the world. The north generates many
innovations whereas the south generates only few. In terms of our model, one
could say that the north has a high and the south has a low innovation density.
The model predicts that asymmetric innovation densities lead to extensive patent
protection in the innovation-intensive region and narrow protection in the
weaker region. This situation can indeed be observed in the world (the north
provides strong, the south weak protection) and has caused the contentious
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discussion in the GATT Round between north and south. The proposal of
northern countries, however, to extend their standards of protection to the south
does not Pareto-improve the global welfare if innovation densities are too
different (as they seem to be). Moreover, if the strong industry lobby has the
effect of weighting profits more heavily than consumers' surplus, the standard of
protection will be too high, relative to the global optimum. In addition to the
analysis presented here, the next chapter will concentrate completely on this
north-south issue of intellectual property protection.

8 Strengthening WorldwideIntellectual Property
Protection
At a special ministerial session in September 1986 in Punta del Este, Uruguay, the
GATT countries agreed to put the issue of Trade Related Intellectual Property
Rights on the agenda for the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
Particularly the US, supported by the EC and Japan, have made great effort to
achieve this. Two earlier attempts of the US to improve international protection,
as regulated by the Paris Industrial Property Convention (1883), failed. Both
attempts - the formulation of the UNCTAD's Code of Conduct for the Transfer of
Technology (1980) and the Revision Conference of the Paris Convention (1982),
inspired by UNCTAD criticism on the international patent system - eventually
missed the required unanimity because the demands of the Group of 77 (devel-
oping countries) were not accepted (Cornish 1989, Kunz-Hallstein 1989 and
Ullrich 1989). These attempts were undertaken via the World Intellectual Proper-
ty Organization, which performs the administrative tasks of the Paris Conven-
tion. Since more support for the proposal to extend global patent protection can
be expected in the GATT, where northern countries have more influence, much
political pressure was used to get the issue on the Uruguay agenda.'
The economic arguments underlying the pressure of the US, the EC and
Japan, and the resistance of the developing countries are reasonably clear. In
most discussions two parties are distinguished: the northern and the southern
countries. The north advocates extension of its strong standards of intellectual
property protection to the rest of the world. The main argument is that if
northern exports are not protected against imitation in the south, northern firms
forego profits and, consequently, the incentive to invest in R&D weakens. Accor-
ding to the north, the absence of protection would also harm the southern
1. Besides, in accordance with the rules of the Paris Convention, unanimity is not
required if an amendment in the form of an agreement, as could be the result of the
Uruguay Round, is to be accepted; the adoption of a special agreement only requires the
consensus of a limited number of states (Kunz-Hallstein 1989).
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countries because welfare is reduced if northern firms do not export and face
weaker innovation incentives. The south is often mentioned as the other party
but in fact contains (at least) two groups: the developing countries and the
Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs). The aims of these southern subgroups
are identical, but for different reasons. The developing countries make the point
that strong intellectual property protection only benefits northern firms - if these
firms export to them at all - because larger profits can be expected with stronger
protection. These profits flow back to the northern home countries, and the only
result is that more southern consumer surplus is lost. Furthermore, most innova-
tions are developed primarily for the northern market and are not necessarily
appropriate for developing countries, which have their specific wants and needs.
In addition, the NICs are not eager to institute effective intellectual property
rights because they have comparative advantages in their low labour costs and
good imitation capabilities. Profit opportunities for NIC firms only exist if the
original northern innovations are only weakly protected.
Several studies on the international economics of intellectual property, both
theoretical and empirical, have appeared recently. Feinberg and Rousslang (1990)
estimate the economic effects of foreign patent infringement on US firms. Their
analysis is based on a study of the US International Trade Commission on
foreign infringement of US intellectual property. They show that, due to foreign
intellectual property infringements, US firms have foregone profits of about 1%
of their total 1986 sales. Most theoretical models on the topic use a technology-
gap theory where trade between north and south occurs because of comparative
advantage of the north in R&D and technology-intensive products.* Chin and
Grossman (1990) study the argument of improved R&D incentives for northern
firms if the south strengthens its patent protection. Their model is a duopoly
with a northern firm, which alone can reduce costs through R&D, and a southern
firm, which can imitate perfectly. If the south protects the process innovation, the
northern firm has a cost advantage in the global competition with the southern
firm. Both firms compete on equal terms if the south does not provide protection
for the process innovation. The interests of northern and southern governments
generally conflict. The north always wants extension of protection whereas the
south does not, unless it is a significant demander on the world market and,
consequently, gains sufficiently from the process innovation. The optimal global
protection can go either way. For instance, much global protection is optimal if
R&D productivity is high. Deardorff (1991) constructs a model which points at
the decreasingly positive effects on innovation incentive as patent protection is
2. See Krugman (1979a) for a typical technology-gap model and Soete (1981) and Soete
and Cimoli (1992) for empirical evidence on technology-driven trade.
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extended to a larger portion of the world. In a two-country model, the innovating
country benefits from larger patent protection but the technology-importing
country often looses more. A richer model, applicable to both product and
process innovations and allowing for more freedom of choice in the level of
protection, is developed by Diwan and Rodrik (1991). Their main argument
concerns the appropriateness of technical development for the south. If the south
provides protection, it not only affects the intensity but also the direction of
R&D, that is toward technologies which are better suited for the south. This may
partially offset the tendency for free-riding behaviour of the south. Helpman
(1993), finally, studies international intellectual property rights in a dynamic
general equilibrium model. One of his conclusions is that the south seldom
benefits from tighter protection while for the north it mainly depends on terms-
of-trade effects.
This chapter presents a model which incorporates two aspects of optimal
global patent protection not dealt with before: (i) transport costs occurring in inter-
national trade; and (ii) imper/ecf imftoh'on capability in the south. First consider
the issue of transport costs. There is a rich tradition in empirical international
economics, including most prominently Linneman (1966) and Learner and Stern
(1970), which studies the role of distance in trade. The results generally show that
trade flows between two countries decrease as these countries are further apart.
The distance between two countries should be interpreted broadly; it not only
includes physical distance, measurable in miles, but can also include
metaphorical distance, such as differences in culture. Consequently, Armington
(1969) makes the observation that distance brings about that each country
produces a unique good and that goods in international trade are thus differen-
tiated by country of origin. Embedded in this empirical distance tradition,
Ferrantino (1993) presents an empirical analysis of intellectual property rights. In
brief, he finds that for US exporters in 1982, distance from trading partners plays
an important role. Furthermore, he finds evidence, be it weak, that exports to
countries with weak intellectual property protection are lower (the extent of
protection is measured by membership of the Paris or Berne Convention on intel-
lectual property and patent durations). In this chapter, a theoretical model is
advanced where distance, either physically or metaphorically interpreted, is
included and plays an important role.
The second difference between the model presented here and the previous
ones is the assumption on imitation in the south. All previous models assume
that the southern capability of imitating northern goods is perfect. A study of
David (1991) sheds a different light on the topic. His main argument is that the
assumption that the south can imitate easily and perfectly is often not justified.
Southern imitation capability might be poor indeed. It can therefore be in the
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interest of the south to provide intellectual property protection and induce
northern firms to export their new products to them. This argument rests on the
historical origin of patent systems. The very first patents in early Venice and
England were granted to foreign masters in order to make them teach domestic
apprentices their arts and skills (see chapter 2). Without these exclusive rights,
such skilful masters would never come and teach. Building further on David's
argument, this essay studies scenarios in which southern imitation is imperfect.
To be more concrete, this chapter develops a simple locational model of
intellectual property rights in which the world is represented as a line from north
to south and each country is a point on the line. Like the previous models
presented, the image is borrowed from the product differentiation literature in
Industrial Organization, starting with Hotelling (1929).' The 'north' is defined as
countries that provide protection and the 'south' as countries that do not provide
protection. Innovations only occur in the north, but they can be imitated, though
imperfectly, in the south. The value of an innovation diminishes with distance
from the innovator, either because international transport costs are incurred in
exporting the product, or because the technology becomes less suitable for more
distant countries. The analysis aims at determining the optimal point dividing
north and south. The model is appropriate to study various intellectual property
rights such as trademarks, patents and copyright, but only insofar as these rights
can be exploited abroad by exporting products. The model does not cover
technology that can be exploited abroad only through licensing or foreign direct
investment because such technology is not likely to be imitated in the south. The
focus of exposition in this chapter is on patents, rather than on other forms of
intellectual property.
The basic model, presented in section 8.1, examines the static welfare effects
of strengthening worldwide patent protection and reveals, from this static point
of view, the interests of the northern and southern regions and of the complete
world. Endogenous innovation enters the analysis in section 8.2. The effects of
patent protection on innovation incentives of northern firms are included. Section
8.3 presents some extensions of the basic model. Finally, section 8.4 concludes
and points at directions for future research.
3. The first application of location models in a theoretical international trade context is
Lôsch (1954); later on, Lancaster (1980) was the first using Hotelling-type, or address
models, in international trade whereas Krugman (1979b) started the Chamberlinian, non-
address paradigm of product differentiation in this context.
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8.1 Global Patent Protection with Exogenous Innovation
Consider a linear world, similar to Hotelling's (1929) linear city, which extends
from 0 to 1/ Northern countries are located at the 'left-hand side' in this world
with the most northern country at 0. Moving to the 'right' means moving south-
ward where the southernmost country is located at 1. Countries are uniformly
distributed along this world with density 1 and their location is given by w e [0,
1]. Suppose there is a firm in the northernmost country w = 0 (in section 8.3,
other resident countries will be considered) which is a monopolist in the
invention market of a worldwide industry and has generated a product innova-
tion. This firm wants to export its new product to the rest of the world and in
order to protect its exports it seeks patent protection in as many countries as
possible. Not every country, however, provides effective patent protection.
Roughly representing the situation in the real world, suppose that the countries
which do provide patent protection are located in the northern region [0, b) and
the countries which do not are located in the south [b, 1], where b e [0,1] is the
border country without an effective patent system.' In order to simplify nota-
tions and verbal descriptions, let the north and the south be synonymous with
the regions where effective patent protection is provided and not provided,
respectively. The north and the south are treated here as two homogeneous
coalitions in which individual countries are not concerned with their national
interest but only with the interest of their coalition. I will address this coalition
assumption later. The length and scope of protection (breadth and height) within
the north are furthermore assumed to be exogenous and uniform.'
The consumer surplus generated by the new product in each individual
4. One way of imagining the transformation of the world as a globe into one as a line is
the following: collect all countries which are located at the same degree of latitude at one
degree of longitude. A location on the line then represents all countries at the same
degree of latitude. In the line presentation, distances west- and eastward, between
countries at the same degree of latitude, are lost.
5. I am aware that this picture violates the fact that some southern countries such as
New Zealand, Australia and South Africa do provide effective protection.
6. An interesting problem, which will not be studied here, would be how the scope of
protection that the north wants for the whole world affects the southern decision on
patent protection. If the scope of protection is narrow and a patentholder consequently
has weak monopoly power (Gilbert and Shapiro 1990 and Klemperer 1990), the south
may be more inclined to provide effective protection and license the innovation at better
terms. In the case of broad protection, on the contrary, the south may be more inclined
to illegal borrowing.
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country on the line is given by:
U = ( v - p - t d if the country imports (8.1)
10 otherwise
where v is the gross surplus which the innovation provides (the quality), p is the
'free-on-board' price of the innovation, t is the cost per unit distance of
transporting the product over the world (t > 0), and d is the distance from the
exporting country to the importing country w (in this case d e [0,1]). A country
consumes one unit of the new product if its consumer surplus is non-negative,
and no unit otherwise/ Distance in this model can be interpreted literally in
miles or kilometres; td is then the total cost of carrying the new product by cargo
ship, truck, train or plane, from the innovating firm in country w = 0 to the
importing country w = d. As previously mentioned, there is also an alternative,
metaphorical interpretation of the transport costs, which is quite common in the
product differentiation literature. A location on the line can be thought of as
representing a country's most preferred variety of the new product. Each country
has its own preferred variety of the new product, for example because of
country-specific parameters such as infrastructure, national consumption pattern,
education level and natural environment. The transport cost is then anaJogous to
a surplus penalty caused by importing a less preferred variety. According to this
interpretation, the new product is most appropriate for the country from where it
originates, maybe because the inventor is more familiar with the local circum-
stances and demand characteristics (compare Diwan and Rodrik 1991 for the
point of appropriate technologies). Countries on the line are ordered according to
the distance of their preferred variety from the produced innovation. Although
this ordering principle differs from the geographical principle, there certainly is a
plausible correspondence. Fellow northern countries face relatively small surplus
losses, and moving southward these national losses grow larger as the product
becomes less and less appropriate. This reflects the fact that the difference
between northern and southern countries is larger than the differences within the
north or the south.
The countries which do not provide effective patent protection are assumed
to imitate the new product costlessly. Despite the absence of patents, which can
hinder imitation, southern countries are not able to imitate perfectly; their imita-
7. The assumption that the demand per country is unitary and inelastic of course
foregoes the notion of distance within a country and a national demand function.
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tions generate less gross surplus, namely pv, with 0 < p < 1.* The whole region
[b, 1] is filled up with these imperfect imitations pv (see figure 8.1). By
assumption, the innovator cannot make any profits in the unprotected region [b,
1]. Imitation prevents this. What are the innovator's profits in the patent-
protected region of the world [0, b)? Working backward, I will first determine the
demand function for the patentholder which is based on the national consumer
surplus function (8.1), and then derive the optimal price and (gross) profits.
Together with an innovation cost function, these optimal gross profits will be
used in the next section to determine the optimal innovation level. This section
studies the optimal patent protection for exogenously given innovations. The
implications of international patent policy for the static global welfare can be
isolated this way.
Surplus
v-pv
North South
Figure 8.1 Northern and southern welfare
8. The imitation parameter p may be a function of the national knowledge base which
can be dependent on the average level of education or the regional R&D expenditures.
See Verspagen (1991) on the determinants of international spill-overs and national
learning capabilities. Taylor (1993), on the other hand, develops a model where the ease
of imitation is determined by the original innovator, who can masque his innovation as
to make imitation more difficult. Finally, the lower surplus of Southern imitations can be
the result of a lower percdoerf quality. All three interpretations can be behind the
imperfect imitation capability here.
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The innovator is assumed to be perfectly able to price discriminate over
countries. This assumption is not decisive for the eventual conclusions; the
results are very similar in the case of uniform pricing. The marginal cost of
production is set equal to 0 for convenience. The patentholder maximizes his
profits by choosing a price which totally absorbs the consumer surplus in the
northern region:
p» = v - tw (8.2)
The profit of the patentholder is depicted in figure 8.1 by the dotted area. Each
country w e [0, b) is prepared to pay the value of the innovation v minus the
transport costs tw that must be incurred to import the innovation. Since the
northern consumer surplus flows entirely to the patentholder, his profits make
up the total social welfare in the north (W^).
For further analysis, a distinction has to be made between large and small
innovations. Large innovations (i.e., large relative to the unit transport cost and
the global patent protection) provide positive net surplus in the whole northern
region, whereas small innovations stop providing positive net surplus before the
border of protection b is reached. First consider innovations with high v. Large
innovations serve the complete northern region and the border of protection
becomes restrictive for their demand. Country b is then the most southward
located northern country that imports (by assumption the innovator cannot serve
the south). Northern welfare (equal to the innovator's profit) is given by: W ,^ =
o / *" (v - tw)dw = bv - b*t/2. As a benchmark, maximum welfare in the north is
bv and would exist if all northern countries extracted the full surplus v from the
innovation. Welfare losses, however, are inevitable because fellow northern
countries face transport costs associated with their imports. These welfare costs
are equal to bH/2. Now consider the case of small innovations. If an innovation
v is small, the country that is indifferent to importing or not importing is given
by w' = v/ t . The countries north of w' will thus not consume the product.
Northern welfare is then given by W^ = „ / "' (v - tw)dw = v*/2t.
The welfare in the southern region (Wg) without patent protection is totally
made up of consumer surplus as depicted by the shaded area in figure 8.1. Each
southern country can imitate and will thus incur no transport cost. Yet welfare
losses will occur because surplus is lost while imitating the original innovation.
For both large and small innovations, southern welfare is Wj = (1 - b)pv.
Based on the welfare functions for north and south, it is possible to deter-
mine the optimal level of global patent protection. Before examining the optimal
global level, however, I will first study the interests of the northern and southern
regions separately. As mentioned above, north and south are treated as coali-
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rions, where individual countries do not pursuit national interests. In the simple
scenario studied here, with only one innovator resident in the most northern
country, one could object that fellow northern countries ignore their national
interests as their consumers' surpluses flow away to the patentholder and for
some of them imitation would yield increased national welfare. Two arguments
can be advanced as a defence. First, the assumption of homogeneous coalitions is
inspired by the practice of the GATT negotiations, where indeed two blocks can
be found. The northern block represents the interests of innovators in general
because, unlike the simple scenario studied here, innovators are likely to be
resident in all these countries. Second, even in this simple scenario, there is a
possible justification for the existence of a homogeneous northern coalition.
Suppose that the patentholder compensates all countries that provide protection.
In the extreme case that the innovator pays an amount equal to his total profit to
all northern countries, the goal of profit maximization remains unchanged and is
common to all northern countries. This also holds for intermediate cases.
What is the optimal level of global protection from the northern point of
view? The northern welfare, given by W^ = bv - tb*/2, is maximized for the
patent coverage:
V = min (v/t, 1) (8.3)
Northern welfare increases in b as long as the marginal country enjoys poten-
tially non-negative surplus. For large innovations, this implies a worldwide
protection of 1. If the innovation is small, the country that is indifferent to
importing or not importing is given by w' = v/t. Increasing patent coverage then
only diminishes northern welfare, because an increasing number of countries will
refrain from buying the innovation. According to expression (8.3), the optimal
northern protection level can increase in v and decrease in t. The country that is
indifferent to importing or not importing is located more southward if the
innovation provides more surplus. The alternative of not importing is also more
attractive if the transport costs are larger.
The welfare in the southern region without patent protection is totally made
up of consumer surplus. Southern welfare always decreases in world patent
coverage (rfWg/rfb < 0 for b € [0, 1]) because the region shrinks without getting
better innovations in return. The negative effect of extending global protection
intensifies as p and v become larger. So the optimum from the southern perspec-
tive is to provide no protection at all (assuming that the innovator still generates
his innovation so that imitation continues to be possible).
How do these optimal levels of the north and the south, which can be
extreme opposites (none vs. total protection), combine in one optimal global level
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of protection? The unweighed sum of the northern and southern welfare is taken
as the global objective function. The optimal extent of protection that maximizes
the objective function is:
b ^ = min (v(l - p)/t, 1) (8.4)
Notice that this optimal global protection is smaller than or equal to the optimal
one from the northern point of view (given by 8.3), and always larger than the
optimal southern level. An interesting property of the optimal global level is that
it decreases in the imitation capability of the south. The reason for this is that the
south loses more when it provides patent protection if its imitation capability is
high.
8.2 Endogenous Innovation
So far, the analysis has revealed the interests of the north and south from a static
perspective, i.e., for given innovations. This section will take into account the
effects of protection on the R&D incentive of the innovator. The innovation v is
chosen endogenously by the innovator. His choice of R&D expenditures is a
function of the global patent protection provided. On the basis of the gross
profits (net of R&D costs) which can be gained with a certain innovation, the
inventor has to choose an innovation level. Suppose that by increasing R&D
expenditures a higher gross surplus is being generated by the product innova-
tion, and suppose that this is decreasingly so. A simple deterministic innovation
cost function which catches this idea of exhausting innovation opportunities is:
c(v) = <xv* a > 0 (8.5)
where c stands for the R&D expenditures and 0 < v < v*, where v* is the upper
limit of v (the final improvement possible). For small innovations - the ones that
do not serve all countries - the net profit function is 7t(v; p*) = vV(2t) - ocv*. If the
innovation costs are relatively high (a > l/(2t)), then the innovation will not be
developed at all. If the innovation costs are relatively low (a < l/(2t)), which I
will focus on from now on, the innovator always gains with investing more
R&D. The upper limit v* will occur when the innovation opportunities are com-
pletely exhausted before the border of patent protection is reached (v* < tb). The
market will then not be completely served and the global patent protection
provided does not affect the innovation incentive. For these innovations, the
optimal global protection is identical to the one that maximizes static welfare bç*
= min (v*(l - p)/t, 1), as given by (8.4). However, if the upper limit on surplus is
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relatively high (v* > tb), we enter the regime where the most southward
importing country is located at the border b. For this regime, the net profit
function (gross profit minus R&D cost) is 7r(v; p*) = bv - tb* - ocv*. The optimal
innovation level which maximizes this net profit function is:
v* = b/(2a) (8.6)
This expression indicates that a higher unit innovation cost a makes the optimal
level of innovation lower. Furthermore, the optimal innovation is positively
related to the level of protection. So the claim of the northern countries in the
Uruguay Round that strengthening world protection improves the R&D incentive
of northern firms is indeed captured by the model. Again, the welfare in the
north is given by the profits of the discriminating monopolist: W^ = bv* - tbV2 -
<xv**. The extent of patent coverage b has opposing effects on northern welfare.
The positive welfare effects are, first, that increasing coverage improves the
induced innovation (v* increases in b) and, second, but this is due to the
terminology used, that the size of the northern region increases. There are also
negative effects on northern welfare. First, similar to the static analysis, an
increase of b causes larger transport costs. Second, since the induced innovation
is larger, the R&D costs are relatively higher. The gain in welfare always turns
out to be large enough to compensate for the extra transport and R&D costs. To
see this, substitute the optimal innovation level (8.5) in the expression for welfare
which is then reduced to: W ,^ = b*(l - 2at)/(4oc). Since the current analysis is
based on relatively low innovation cost (a < l/(2t)), northern welfare always
increases (quadratically) in b. Therefore, the optimal protection from the northern
point of view is the corner solution b,/(v*) = 1.
Again the welfare in the southern region [b, 1] is totally made up of
consumer surplus. For the optimal development level v*, the southern welfare is:
Wg = (1 - b)pv* = (1 - b)(pb/2a) (8.7)
Contrary to the previous section, the south faces a trade-off now. More patent
protection enhances the R&D incentive, which improves the product innovation
and, consequently, the southern imitations on the one hand, but causes welfare
loss due to the decreased size of the southern region on the other. From the
southern point of view the optimal patent coverage is:
V(V) = 1/2 (8.8)
'Equatorial' protection is now in the best interest of the south. Compared to the
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case of exogenous innovation discussed in the previous section, it is now in the
interest of the south to provide some protection in order to induce sufficient in-
novation incentive.
The global welfare is again the unweighed sum of northern and southern
welfare, Wç = bv* - tbV2 + (1 - b)pv* - av**, and is maximized for:
bc*(v*) = 1 if p < 1 - 2cct (8.9)
p/(2p + 2<xt -1) if p > 1 - 2at
Solution (8.9) has some important properties for international patent policy. If the
imitation capability in the south is poor (p < 1 - 2oct), a benevolent global social
planner provides worldwide patent protection of 1. Apart from imitation
capability p, the size of the regime of complete coverage also depends on the unit
innovation transport cost t and the innovation cost a. This regime enlarges if the
unit transport cost decreases, relative to the innovation cost (1 - 2oct is larger
then). Thus, innovations that cause relatively low transport costs, i.e., whose
value decreases slowly when moving southward (for example, technologies that
are appropriate for all countries), should be given worldwide protection. A
regime of non-worldwide protection emerges if the south is better able to imitate
(p > 1 - 2at). From the optimal protection level onwards, an extra southern
country that provides protection adds insufficiently to the innovation incentive in
order to make up for the difference in net surplus between the original
innovation and the imitation: in this regime 2at - 1 < 0, the optimal global
protection is always larger than 1/2. Table 8.1 presents some numerical
examples. The table shows that the globally optimal levels of patent coverage are
higher if p is lower. It furthermore shows that, irrespective of p, the optimal
levels are lower if the transport cost, relative to the innovation cost, is higher.
This can be the case for a high absolute transport cost but also for a low absolute
innovation cost.
Table 8.1
Optimal global patent coverage
Transport cost t
l/(10a)
l/(4a)
l/(3a)
l/(2.1a)
bc*; p = 0.8
1
0.727
0.632
0.515
bc*; p = 0.6
1
0.857
0.692
0.521
bc*; p = 0.4
1
1
0.857
0.532
b c ' < l
p > 0.82
p > 0.50
p>0.33
p > 0.06
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The simple model developed in this section has thus demonstrated that the
aim of northern countries in the Uruguay Round to extend patent protection
globally does not necessarily need to be welfare improving from the global point
of view. There are two reasons why the optimal level of protection is not world-
wide protection. First, if southern capability to imitate northern innovations is
high, the welfare emerging from southern imitations is higher than the welfare
emerging from stronger innovation incentives. Second, if the unit transport cost is
relatively high (in other words, if the innovation is only appropriate for the
innovator's direct neighbourhood), worldwide protection would provide too
strong an incentive to the innovator and overcompensate him. Although these
conclusions are intuitively clear, one should keep in mind that they are based on
a simple model which focuses only on imperfect imitation and transport costs. Of
course, more serious policy conclusions should be based on more realistic
models. But the result that worldwide protection does not need to be optimal, as
northern countries generally claim, should not be ignored in the Uruguay Round
negotiations.
8.3 Some Extensions of the Basic Model
To relax some of the simplifying assumptions this section will study four exten-
sions of the basic model. The first extension fa) examines locations of the
innovator other than those in the basic model where the innovator was resident
in the northernmost country. The second extension (W studies the effect of an
uneven international income distribution. The third extension (c.) determines the
impact of the assumption of the south being completely filled with imitations and
looks at what happens if there is only one imitator (for example, a NIC). The
final extension (d) analyzes the 'exhaustion doctrine', which is often practised in
international jurisdiction.
fa) Innovator .Resident in .Anof/ier northern Country
Up to this point, the innovator has been a resident of the northernmost country
w = 0. Suppose now that the innovator is a resident of a country w* G [0, b).
What is the effect of the innovator's location? Suppose that the complete northern
region is served (a < l/(2t), v* > max (t(b - w*), tw*)). The profit of the
patentholder is then given by 7t = g / "*" (v - t(w* - w)dw + „./*" (v - t(w - w*)dw
= bv - t(b* - 2bw* + 2w**)/2. The optimal innovation based on this gross profit
function and the R&D cost function (8.4) is independent of the innovator's
location: v* = b/(2a). Relative to the basic analysis in section 8.2, the profit of the
innovator and, therefore, the northern welfare has increased. The reason is that a
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more central location of the innovator causes fewer transport costs.' The optimal
levels of protection from both regional perspectives remain unchanged: b , / = 1
for the north and bj* = 1/2 for the south. The increased welfare in the north,
however, does show up in the optimal level of protection from the global point
of view:
b ^ = 1 if p < 1 - 2at(l - w*) (8.10)
(p + 2aw»t)/(2p + 2at - 1) if p > 1 - 2at(l - w*)
The optimal level is larger if the innovator is located more southward. The
reason is that the marginal effect on the innovation incentive of an extra southern
country providing patent protection is larger if the innovator is located more
southward. The qualitative results of the basic model remain unchanged: non-
worldwide protection is optimal if the imitation capability is good and the unit
transport cost t is large, relative to the innovation cost a.
CW D/jÇfcrences m MirionaZ
Extension (a) might indicate that firms located in the centre of the northern
region are more innovative since they can gain more from an innovation. The
notion that there are differences in national income over the world and that
southern countries are often poorer might offset this tendency. The national
consumer surplus function as given by (8.1) can be extended such that differ-
ences in national incomes between countries are incorporated. Consider the
following national consumer surplus function:
U = | mv - p - td if the country imports (8.11)
10 otherwise
where m is a country-specific parameter which indicates the degree to which the
country appreciates the innovation (m e [y, z], z > y). This innovation preference
intensity parameter m can be interpreted as the marginal rate of substitution
between national income and importing the innovation. Consider, for example,
(see Tirole 1989, p.97) the separable utility function U = u(I - p) + v, where I is
national income. Let I be much larger than p. A first-order Taylor expansion of
this utility function is: U = - u'(I)p + v. Define m = l/u'(I). If u is concave,
wealthier countries have a low u'(I) and therefore a higher m.
9. The best location for the innovator, from the Northern point of view, would be the
centre of the Northern region w* = b/2. The total Northern transport costs t(b* - 2bw* +
2w"*)/2 are minimized then.
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It is commonly known that national incomes are not uniformly distributed
over the world, northern countries are generally richer and southern countries
poorer. In order to give (extreme) credit to this fact, let the northernmost country
w = 0 be the richest (m = z) and moving southward countries become poorer
with the poorest country (m = y) being the southernmost one at w = 1. In other
words, let m = z - (z - y)w. Figure 8.2 illustrates the income differences for z = 1
and y = 0 and shows that the potential national surpluses decrease while moving
southward. Again, the innovator is located in the northernmost country and
chooses country-specific discriminating prices.'"
The profit-maximizing price charged to country w is:
p*(w) = mv - p - t w = - y)w)v - tw (8.12)
Surplus
North South
Figure 8.2 Differences in national income
10. Notice that profitable arbitrage can occur here. Consider two countries with different
income, m, and irij, with m, > nr^ . Country n^ can resell the new product to the richer
country m, (which appreciates the innovation more than country n^ itself) and make
profits of v(m, - nr^ ). The practice of arbitrage between countries, however, is excluded
from the analysis here.
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Let the northern region be served completely. The patent coverage is then re-
strictive and the profits of the patentholder are given by: jr. = „ / "* ((z - (z - y)w)v
- tw)dw = zvb - (vb*(z - y))/2 - tbV2. Based on these gross profits and the R&D
cost function, the optimal innovation level is:
v* = (2zb - (z - y)bV(4a) (8.13)
Expression (8.13) has some interesting properties. The optimal innovation level v*
is larger if the richest country z is richer and smaller if the difference between the
richest and the poorest (z - y) is larger. In fact, (z - y) represents the skewness of
global income distribution (since the world line stays of length 1). The levelling
of incomes thus has a positive effect on the innovation v being chosen.
In order to prevent that the expressions for the optimal levels of protection
become untransparantly complex, I set the income parameter y equal to 0 and z
equal to 1. Table 8.2 presents the optimal coverage for various constellations of
the unit transport cost t and the southern imitation capability p. Contrary to the
previous results for large innovations, table 8.2 (second column) shows optimal
levels of protection from the northern perspective which are smaller than 1. The
exact optimal level for the north is b^,* = (3 - V(16at + l)) /2 and is always smaller
than 1. The result is thus general for the incomes chosen here. The reason is that
all countries are poorer (except for w = 0) than in the basic analysis. Because the
surplus of a marginal northern country is always lower than before, the positive
effects of extending patent protection are weakened. Another point is that the
optimal northern protection levels are lower if the transport cost is relatively
higher. Country-specific innovations now thus deserve also less protection from
the northern perspective. In the basic model this became only visible in the
globally optimal level.
The welfare in the south, now given by Wj = i, / ' (pmv*)dw, is maximized
for bj* = 1 - V2/2 (= 0.293). This optimal southern level is lower as compared to
the basic analysis of the previous section (where it was 1/2). The reason is that
northward expansion is welfare-improving for a longer period of time as richer
countries join the region and extract more surplus from imitation. Table 8.2
reveals some interesting aspects of the optimal level of protection from a global
perspective. As before, the optimal global levels are lower if the unit transport
cost is higher, relative to the innovation cost. However, as opposed to previous
results we also see that the optimal level of protection can decrease if the
southern imitation capability is worse. This is the case for high transport costs (t
= l/(3oc) and t = l/(2.1cc)). Relatively high transport costs make the wasteful
transport loss large to the extent that, even inferior, imitations are the best alter-
native.
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Table 8.2
Optimal coverages with national income differences (z = 1, y = 0)
Transport cost t be»; p = 0.8 be»; p = 0.6 b^ ; p = 0.4
0.694
0.382
0.242
0.032
0.293
0.293
0.293
0.293
0.477
0.322
0.278
0.227
0.527
0.329
0.275
0.215
0.586
0.339
0.270
0.198
(c,) Owe /mifafor m f/ie souf/j
The poorest developing countries can hardly be expected to imitate, even imper-
fectly. Instead of imitators in all southern countries, suppose now that there is
only one imitator in the south, resident in country b. This country could be
thought of as being a NIC. Extension (ç) then reflects (be it extremely) the fact
that the imitation capability of NICs are generally higher than that of other
southern countries. Assume that the imitator, like the innovator, can perfectly set
discriminating prices. The effect of one imitator on global welfare is negative
because transport costs now also occur in the south where they were absent
before. The optimal coverage from a global welfare perspective is now b^* = (p +
2at)/(2p + 4at - 1) and is always larger than in the optimal level in the basic
analysis bg* = p/(2p + 2at - 1). This is due to the consideration that the southern
transport loss should be kept small.
(d.) 77ie £x/iausf/'on DocfnVie and Parai/eZ Imports yrom f/ie souf/t
The basic analysis in the previous section has assumed that the patent rights in
the north make the patentholder an absolute monopolist in that region. In real
case law, however, it has become apparent that patent rights can be exhausted
under certain circumstances. For instance, in the case of lower-priced parallel
imports. Consider, in figure 8.3, the country which is located just a little north of
the border of protection b and faces a considerable (delivery) price differential
between the original northern product and the southern imitation, as illustrated
by Ap. A court in this country may easily interpret the price differential as being
a signal of abuse of monopoly power and hold the patentholder's rights to be
exhausted. The main argument for this ex/wMsf/on docfrme is that it promotes the
free trade of new products and sets (indirect) limits to the monopoly price of a
patentholder. The patentholder always has to take into account, when choosing
his price, that foreign competitors can be permitted to enter. Judging from inter-
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Surplus
Ap
v -pv
North w ' b South
Figure 8.3 The exhaustion doctrine
national case law, the exhaustion doctrine is widespread. In the US and the EC,
for example, it is common practice (Cornish 1989).
In terms of the basic model, the exhaustion doctrine implies that patents only
provide protection against imitations or duplications which are made within the
patent-granting country, but not against cheaper imitations made abroad. The
patentholder actually faces import competition from the south now and must
compete in the region [0, b) with the closest imitation from country b. In the
northern region two firms are now competing: the innovator and the imitator
from b. The imitator has an advantage in the southern part of the north because
countries located there face higher transport costs when buying from the original
innovator. The advantage of the original innovator is that his product provides
more surplus. Again assume that the imitation industry in the south is competi-
tive (imitators are present in each country) and that the imitator in b charges the
competitive price of p = 0. The country which is indifferent to buying from the
original innovator at the (perfectly discriminating) price p* = v - tw, or from the
imitator in b is given by w' = (v(l - p) + tb)/(2t) (see figure 8.3). No country to
the south of w' buys the original innovation because the surplus from the imita-
tion is larger. Countries to the north of w' all buy the original innovation at price
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p* = v - tw." The gross profits of the patentholder are given by: n = ,, / "' (v -
tw)rfw = (v(l - p) + bt)(3v + pv - bt))/(8t). Based on these gross profits and the
innovation production function, the optimal innovation level is: v* = bt(l + p)/(p*
+ 2p + 8oct - 3). The welfare in the north now includes the profits of the patent-
holder, illustrated by the dotted area in figure 8.3, and the consumer surplus in
the countries south of w' that buy an imitation at a competitive price from
country b, illustrated by the shaded area. The welfare in the southern region does
not change compared to the basic scenario.
Table 8.3
Optimal patent coverage with and without the exhaustion doctrine (p = 0.8)
Transport cost t
l/(10cc)
l/(8cc)
l/(4a)
l/(3o)
l/(2.1a)
Exhaustion
Doctrine
0.120
0.502
0.806
0.746
0.626
No Exhaustion
Doctrine
1
0.941
0.727
0.632
0.515
Table 8.3 compares the globally optimal coverages under the exhaustion
doctrine with the ones from the basic analysis. A surprising result emerges for
relatively low transport cost (t = l/(10a) and t = l/(8a))." Under the exhaustion
doctrine, the optimal global patent coverage is smaller than in the basic case. The
effects of strengthening protection are somewhat different compared to the basic
case. The positive effect of a larger b on the profit and innovation level is
11. Notice that, theoretically, the full discriminating price p* is not correct since countries
North of w' may no longer have a reservation price of 0 (the alternative of not buying).
Their reservation price is the net surplus of the imitation from the South (pv - t(b - w).
The true discriminating price for country w is then: p = min (v - rw, v - tw - (pv - t(b -
w))). Although theoretically incorrect, in order to simplify calculations I do not take into
account these new reservation prices. The effect is that the profits of the innovator are
overestimated and that, consequently, the North gets too much weight in the global
welfare function. This might lead to optimal coverages which are too high. Qualitatively,
however, the results are very similar.
12. I checked whether for t = l/(10oc) and b = 0.120 the net surplus of the indifferent
country w' is still positive. This is indeed the case.
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weakened because part of the increasing demand now goes to the imitator. The
negative effect, however, of a larger b on the transport losses is also weakened.
For relatively low transport costs (or high innovation cost), even without much
protection, the negative effect is relatively stronger. For higher costs, the results
of the basic analysis are confirmed and the optimal levels decrease in t.
8.4 Conclusions
A simple address model of global patent protection is developed which mainly
shows that the proposal of the US, the EC and Japan, during the Uruguay
Round, to extend protection worldwide, does not need to be beneficial for the
global welfare. Strengthening worldwide protection is likely to be beneficial if the
imitation capability in the south is poor. The south can then better provide patent
protection, thereby improving the northern innovation incentive, and import the
original innovation rather than producing a poor imitation itself. If, however, the
imitation capability in the south is better, extending protection might worsen
global welfare. In the latter case, an imitation provides more surplus than the
original innovation which involves transport costs. The ievel of optimal global
protection in general decreases for higher transport costs (relative to innovation
costs). Thus, innovations that are only locally appropriate should not be given
worldwide protection. Several extensions of the basic model have been examined
but in general do not change the main message very much.
It should be stressed that the above conclusions follow from a simple model
with simplifying specifications. The transport cost function, the R&D cost
function and the distributions of consumers and producers could be modelled
more generally. Particularly the incorporation of non-unitary and elastic national
demand curves may lead to richer conclusions. Besides these refinements, some
other applications of the model also stay open to future research. Licensing and
foreign direct investment, for example, make the transport costs decrease and,
consequently, the welfare costs of extending global protection will be lower.
Another application concerns the trade-off between extending patent protection
to more countries and improving the protection within countries. This trade-off is
very similar to the one dealt with in Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and Klemperer
(1990) on the optimal mix of patent length and breadth (see chapter 2). In some
cases it might be more efficient to provide infinitely long protection in one
country and no protection in others, while in other cases shorter lived rights in
the whole world might be optimal.
Summary, Conclusions
and Directions for
Future Research
Although this book does not contain one but several studies, this concluding
chapter will try to give a comprehensive overview of the results obtained in the
separate essays. The order of presentation as outlined in the Introduction (chap-
ter 1) is maintained: Starting at the industry level, I will work my way up to the
country and world level.
First, I want to emphasize again the practical importance of the economics of
patent protection. In addition to the numerous cases of patent infringement
described in the legal literature (which indicate that protection is imperfect), the
empirical observation which supports the relevance of all studies in this book is
the fact that most patentable inventions are indeed patented (fact (a) in the
Introduction). Competition in industries where invention takes place is thus often
affected by the presence of patent protection. Patents create asymmetries in the
competition between a patentholder, who enjoys some extra market power, and
his competitors, who face restrictions in their strategy spaces. As opposed to the
economics of patent protection studied in this book, another branch of Industrial
Organization deals with the economics of patent design. This branch examines
how patents affect the pre-patent stage of technological competition: What kinds
of incentive to carry out research and development do patents provide to private
firms? Empirical studies (for example, Taylor and Silberston 1973, Mansfield
1986), however, have demonstrated that the impact of patents as innovation
incentives is low for most industries and high for only few industries. At the
same time, these studies have shown that in all industries most of the patentable
inventions were actually patented. Thus, for most industries the practical rele-
vance of the economics of patent protect/on seems to be higher than that of the
economics of patent desigw.
Within the protection literature, the distinction of several dimensions of
protection turns out to be very useful. So far, the legal duration of patents has
received considerable attention. Other dimensions of patent protection, however,
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which say something about the practice of inventing around, seem to be far more
important than duration and have therefore been examined in this book.
Summary
The introducing chapter explains that the motivation behind this book is the lack
of attention in economics for the evident and close link with patent law and legal
practice. This chapter furthermore summarizes some facts about patent protection
which have inspired all the analyses carried out in this book. Following the
Introduction, chapter 2 presents a survey of the current literature on patents. The
survey differs from existing surveys on the topic in the sense that it only reviews
the subgroup of theoretical models that have appeared in Industrial Organiza-
tion. Chapter 2 thus not only yields an overview of the field and the state of the
art, but also detects some important niches in the patent research spectrum.
Based on these findings, the next chapters focus on new dimensions of patent
protection.
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 all examine dimensions - one could label them as 'exclu-
sivity' dimensions - that determine the extent of patent protection and the
opportunities for inventing around. Chapter 3 studies the /leig/ii of patent protec-
tion, a dimension not studied before. The stringency of novelty requirements that
patent offices and courts use in their judgement about infringement disputes and
patentability of inventions defines the height of protection provided to a patent-
holder. The effect of patent height is studied in a duopoly where firms compete
in product improvements. As the relation between a large and a small improve-
ment is comparable with the relation between high and low quality, a model of
vertical product differentiation is used to describe the competition in improve-
ments. The patent owner exercizes monopoly power in the portion of the vertical
product spectrum that is protected by the patent. The requirement of minimal
steps of improvements, determined by the height, limits the strategy space of
competitors who want to invent around a patent; competitors are only allowed to
locate in the non-protected region of the spectrum. In this vertical differentiation
model with asymmetric strategy spaces, it is shown that low patents do not affect
the natural market equilibrium without patents. A patentholder can lose with
medium patent heights but becomes a pure monopolist if patents provide high
protection. The non-patentholder can gain with medium heights but is increas-
ingly worse off with higher patents.
Chapter 4 deals with the dimension of patent breadf/i. Whereas height
indicates the degree of protection against improvements, patent breadth gives the
degree of protection against imitations. Imitations can be considered as horizontal
differentiations of the patented product (i.e., some consumers prefer the
imitation, others the original patented product), while, as mentioned previously,
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improvements are vertical differentiations (i.e., at equal prices, all consumers
prefer the improvement to the original product). Thus, whereas patent height
defines the strength of protection against competition in vertical differentiations,
breadth defines the degree of protection against competition through horizontal
differentiations. Since competition through imitations is basically different from
competition through improvements, the distinction between height and breadth
is a useful one.
The focus in chapter 4 is not completely on patent breadth. A patent breadth
model is used as a foundation of the demand functions faced by a patentholder.
The central object of study is the practice of price discrimination. More precisely,
the analysis concentrates on the effect of third-degree price discrimination on
dynamic efficiency. The ratio of static welfare loss to profits, which indicates how
efficiently an innovation incentive in the form of a minimum profit level can be
provided, is taken as a measure of dynamic efficiency. Whereas uniform pricing
with linear demand curves improves static efficiency (a well-known result in the
discrimination literature), price discrimination is equally efficient to uniform
pricing when evaluated from a dynamic point of view. Moreover, if an explicit
model of patent breadth underlies the demand curves of the monopolist, it is
shown that dynamic efficiency improves with price discrimination. This result is
an important exception to the rule of thumb often practised in competition policy
(inspired by the theoretical literature), that price discrimination is welfare-inferior
to uniform pricing. A direct application of this result is the European competition
and patent policy. While national patent breadths may differ substantially, full
exploitation in the form of price discrimination is forbidden by competition
policy. From the perspective of providing innovation incentives to private firms,
the current harmonisation of national patent systems, through the European
patent system and the future Community patent system, is welfare improving.
The dimensions of breadth and height are integrated in chapter 5. Starting
with the original utility function that Hotelling (1929) used to model horizontal
differentiation, I add a preference intensity parameter to catch vertical differentia-
tion. The only other study that combines horizontal and vertical differentiation
that I know of is Neven and Thisse (1990), although they use quadratic transport
costs instead of the linear transport costs used by Hotelling. The new model in
chapter 5 has been developed to allow for an integrated analysis of patent
breadth and patent height. As in chapter 3, I examine a duopoly with a patent-
holder and a competitor and I focus on one product innovation. Building further
on a basic innovation, subsequent innovations can take the form of improve-
ments or imitations of this basic innovation (or a combination of both). The basic
innovation is patented. For simplicity, further patents are excluded from analysis.
Being the owner of the sole patent, the patentholder is completely free to choose
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the improvement level that maximizes his profit. The competitor, however, can
be restricted in his choice of an improvement. Although there is a natural
tendency to create distance between improvements and thus relax price competi-
tion, the marginally increasing R&D costs offset this tendency from a certain
point. The freely chosen improvement of the competitor may be sufficiently novel
not to infringe the patent. If this is the case, the patent does not affect the market
equilibrium. If, however, the height of the patent is restrictive, the competitor
must choose a larger than optimal improvement which causes his profit to
decrease. The other forms of inventing around, imitations, are taken exogenously.
By an ordering assumption on the horizontal product spectrum, the patentholder
cannot choose another variety of the basic innovation (the spectrum runs from 0
to 1 and, by definition, the patentholder's variety is located at 0, and moving
toward 1 imitations are increasingly different from the variety at 0). The
competitor cannot choose his variety either; he is assumed to have an imitation at
the border of what is marginally allowed (determined by patent breadth), closest
to the patentholder. Given the restrictions caused by patent breadth and height,
the optimal inventing-around strategy for the competitor can either be an improve-
ment strategy ('above' the patent) or an imztafiow strategy ('aside' the patent). The
dimensions of breadth and height can actually give direction to these inventing-
around strategies. For some parameter constellations, I find that higher patent
protection induces imitation strategies and broader protection improvement
strategies.
In the theoretical model of chapter 5, the optimal circumventing strategy
depends on demand and cost parameters as well as on the patent office stan-
dards of breadth and height. In the practice of most industries, two broad
categories of innovation strategies can be distinguished which are very similar to
the above improvement and imitation strategies. Freeman (1982) distinguishes
between pioneering and imitative innovation strategies. Pioneering strategies,
similar to improvement strategies, rely more on basic research. Since basic
research explores more novel and unknown technical paths, the inventions
emerging from it meet the novelty requirements of the patent office more easily.
Indeed, one can find that firms that pursue pioneering strategies often use
patents as primary means of protecting the fruits of their basic research (see
Freeman 1982). Imitative, or defensive innovation strategies, on the contrary, rely
more on applied research and experimental development. Modifications of
current (perhaps patented) products in order to create horizontal distance is the
main goal of the R&D carried out by defensive firms. These modifications pass
the patent office less easily since the requirements of an inventive step and non-
obviousness are often not met.
Chapter 6 presents an empirical analysis of these two innovation strategies.
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The success ratio of a firm, defined as the proportion of all applications filed that
pass the patent office and are granted a patent, is the variable to be explained.
The basic hypothesis underlying this empirical analysis is that the success ratio of
firms with pioneering innovation strategies is higher than that of firms with
defensive strategies. Two data sets are used to test this hypothesis. First, a set
published by the European Patent Office which contains all applications filed in
the period 1978-1993 (August), and the procedural status of these applications.
From this set the success ratio of an individual firm can be obtained. The second
set contains information about one industry: the data-processing industry. It
covers the 100 largest firms worldwide (by 1990 revenues) for the period 1986-
1990. Although this set contains very detailed information, direct figures on the
amount of R&D spent on basic research or on applied research and development
are not available. Therefore, I construct instrumental variables which indicate to
what degree firms carry out basic research. Especially two variables are impor-
tant in explaining the interfirm success ratios. The first is diversification. Since
more diversified firms can spread the risks better and apply the results to a
broader extent, diversification is an indication of the degree of basic research a
firm is expected to conduct. The second variable is the propensity to patent,
defined as the patents to R&D expenditures ratio. Since basic research generally
leads to more patents (relatively per unit of R&D expenditure), the propensity to
patent is positively related to the success ratio. In the estimations carried out,
both these variables are in general highly significant in explaining the success
ratios. The basic hypothesis is thus largely confirmed.
In addition to the results on success ratios, the study reveals a remarkable
practice of the European Patent Office: Japanese and US applicants have to wait
longer for their files to be processed than European applicants. Finally, I find that
countries which have more stringent national novelty requirements (represented
by a lower proportion of applications passing the national patent office) generally
perform better in the European Patent Office. More applications originating from
these countries pass the office. National patent offices may thus act as screening
institutes for the European Patent Office.
After examining patent dimensions at the industry level in the first chapters,
the final two chapters deal with the international patent policy setting. Chapter 7
presents a two-country model of patent breadth. Drawing on Hotelling's model
of spatial competition, an address model is developed which makes it possible to
study normative and positive aspects of the choice of patent breadth in an
international setting (i.e., for two countries). The following results are established.
First, when both countries place equal weight on profit and consumers' surplus
of their own citizens, relative to the social optimum, patent breadths are too
narrow. This result reflects the existence of a positive externality flowing from
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each country's patent breadth to the profit and consumers' surplus enjoyed by
citizens of the other country. Second, to the extent that profit is weighted more
heavily than consumers' surplus in political objective functions, the tendency for
property rights to be too weak in equilibrium is offset. Finally, except in very
special circumstances, equilibrium patent breadths are not identical in the two
countries, and in all cases there is a continuum of optimal mixes of patent
breadth, only one of which is symmetric. Further, if equilibrium breadths are
sufficiently asymmetric, there is no symmetric patent policy that Pareto-domi-
nates the original equilibrium. Like the main result of chapter 4, this last result
directly applies to the current situation in Europe. Compared to chapter 4,
however, the conclusion is completely different. Chapter 7 shows that the
tendency in Europe towards unification is not necessarily (and only in excep-
tional cases) a Pareto improvement compared to the presence of different
national patent systems.
Chapter 8 deals with the aim for unification at an even higher, global level.
Through the past GATT Uruguay Round, northern countries have attempted to
extend their strong standards of protection to southern, mainly underdeveloped,
countries. Ever since the Paris Industrial Property Convention (1883), and more
recently, the Washington Patent Cooperation Treaty (1970), there has been a
movement toward uniform global protection. The GATT Round was used by
northern countries to accelerate this process. Chapter 8 develops a simple
locational model to study the question of optimal worldwide intellectual property
protection. The world is represented as a line from north to south and each
country is a point on the line. The image has been borrowed from the product
differentiation literature discussed above. The north is defined as the group of
countries that provide protection and the south as the group of countries that do
not provide protection. Innovations only occur in the north, but they can be
imitated (though imperfectly) in the south. The value of an innovation diminishes
as the distance from the innovator becomes larger, either because international
transport costs are incurred in exporting the product, or because the technology
becomes less suitable for more distant countries. The analysis aims at
determining the optimal point dividing north and south. Two aspects that are
ignored in previous studies are central to this model: transport costs in
international trade and imperfect imitation. It turns out that if the imitation
capability in the south is poor, the globally optimal extent of intellectual property
protection is worldwide protection. However, if southern imitations are better, it
is optimal to have a southern region without effective intellectual property rights.
The optimal world coverage also depends on the transport costs. If the transport
costs to import a new product are high relative to the innovation cost to generate
the new product, worldwide protection is, again, not optimal. These conclusions
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are fairly robust and in general do not change for the various extensions of the
basic model discussed.
Ouera// COHCZMSI'OWS
In addition to the conclusions emerging from the separate essays, some more
general conclusions can be drawn from this book. The first deals with the
research questions raised. The patent system has proven to be a powerful institu-
tion that has survived for centuries. This might be due to the simple idea behind
it: in return for carrying out research and disclosing the fruits of research,
provide temporary market power to the researcher. Although empirical evidence
suggests that the patent system does not induce private firms to carry out R&D
as strongly as often thought, it is a fact that a large number of firms do actually
use the patent system. Yet, in spite of the considerable attention throughout the
years, the economic theory has only recently recognized some obvious problems
related to patents. The most outstanding example being the ever present practice
of inventing around patents. Although this book contains some efforts in this
direction, a lot of new questions remain to be raised and known questions need
to be re-examined. Only after more research has been conducted do conclusions
about the overall performance and desirability of the patent system seem valid.
The second general conclusion relates to the methodology used. The differen-
tiation models applied in this book are not only good tools for the analysis of the
economics of patent protection, but also for the economics of technical change in
general. As Comanor (1967) already observed, much industrial R&D is spent in
order to create differentiation. Through differentiation a firm can increase its
market power and, consequently, its profit. Remarkably, the link between the
economics of product differentiation and the economics of technical change is not
better exploited. Certainly, there are fields that have recognized the relation. The
new growth theory, for example, has implemented a micro basis which originates
from (the non-address branch) of the product differentiation literature (see
Grossman and Helpman 1991). Nevertheless, there remains much more to be
exploited, particularly at the firm and industry level.
Future Research
On the basis of the studies performed in this book, several directions for future
research can be given. I will only indicate three directions which, in my view,
seem particularly promising and should be carried out first. First of all, the stage
of R&D before patenting should be studied. Given the results in this book, patent
races should not have a winner-takes-all but a losers-take-some structure. There
are some examples of such models (for example, Mortensen 1982 and Stewart
1983), but more effort should be put in the development of models which incor-
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porate a multiple-prize structure in the pre-patent stage on the one hand, and an
imperfect protection structure which allows from inventing around in the post-
patent stage on the other. The second direction concerns the dynamics of models
of patent protection. Rather than the one basic innovation and one or two subse-
quent innovations studied here, future models should include more innovations
in time. The dimension of patent height, for example, is richer than becomes clear
in this book; the full effects of height are better visible if there is more than one
patent in the market. The final direction is empirical research on the new patent
dimensions. Chapter 6 has analysed one particular aspect, the proportion of
patents that pass the patent office. A recent study by Lerner (1994) investigates
the importance of the breadth of patent protection for the value of new firms in
biotechnology. Given the availability of some highly detailed data-bases on pat-
ents, there are opportunities to examine other dimensions as well.
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Samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
Dit proefschrift gaat over de beperking van octrooibescherming. Een octrooi' is
een tijdelijk en sterk exclusief eigendomsrecht op een uitvinding. Niet allé
uitvindingen kunnen geoctrooieerd worden; er moet voldaan zijn aan bepaalde
voorwaarden om voor octrooibescherming in aanmerking te komen. Zo moet een
uitvinding ten eerste voldoende nieuw zijn ten opzichte van bestaande produkten
of processen, ten tweede niet voor de hand Hggen voor experts in een bepaald
technisch gebied, en tenslotte industrieel toepasbaar zijn. Voldoet een uitvinding
aan deze (en nog een aantal andere) eisen en komt daarmee de octrooiaanvraag
door de beoordelingsprocedure van het octrooibureau heen, dan wordt een
octrooi verleend en is de uitvinding beschermd.
Wat houdt deze octrooibescherming precies in? Het thema van dit boek is de
beperking van octrooibescherming. De bescherming die een octrooi biedt is niet,
zoals vaak werd gedacht in de economische wetenschap, volledig maar er zijn
diverse grenzen. In dit boek worden verschillende grenzen van octrooibescher-
ming vastgesteld en bestudeerd. Ieder hoofdstuk gaat in op een bepaalde grens.
Allé analyses beperken zich tot nieuwe of verbeterde produkten; procès innova-
ties worden buiten beschouwing gelaten.
Stel dat een bedrijf een nieuw produkt heeft voortgebracht met behulp van
omvangrijke investeringen in Onderzoek en Ontwikkeling (O&O). Stel verder dat
dit bedrijf een octrooi krijgt op deze produkt innovatie. De meeste octrooien zijn
tegenwoordig trouwens in handen van bedrijven, en niet van individuele uitvin-
ders. Moderne ondernemingen hebben namelijk vaak O&O afdelingen waar
voortdurend naar nieuwe, of verbeteringen van bestaande, produkten wordt
gezocht. Dit intentionele zoeken naar innovaties waarmee kosten gepaard gaan,
vormt het belangrijkste economische argument voor het instellen van octrooien.
Octrooien stimuleren investeringen in O&O doordat ze bedrijven beter in staat
1. Octrooi is Nederlands voor het Engelse 'patent'.
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stellen om deze investeringen terug te verdienen. Als nieuwe produkten ook
gegenereerd zouden worden zonder investeringen in O&O, dan zou er geen
economisch motief zijn voor het instellen van octrooien. Bedrijven dienen
gestimuleerd te worden in onderzoek omdat de sociale opbrengsten (dat is, voor
de gemeenschap als geheel) van de innovaties die eruit voortkomen vaak veel
groter zijn dan de private opbrengsten voor een bedrijf alleen. Zonder octrooien
zouden bedrijven dus te weinig in innovaties investeren.
Wat betekent octrooibescherming voor een bedrijf? Hoofdstuk 3 bekijkt de
dreiging die uitgaat van concurrenten die met verbeteringen van een geoctrooi-
eerd produkt komen. Stel dat de octrooihouder één concurrent heeft. Bij
introductie van het nieuwe produkt op de markt leert deze concurrent het
nieuwe produkt kennen. Echter, vanwege het octrooi is het deze concurrent niet
toegestaan om exact hetzelfde produkt ook op de markt te brengen. Wat de
concurrent wel kan doen is proberen 'om het octrooi heen uit te vinden'. Hij kan
bijvoorbeeld zijn O&O afdeling opdracht geven om naar verbeteringen van het
produkt te zoeken. In geval van een nieuw geneesmiddel bijvoorbeeld kan
worden gezocht naar nieuwe samenstellingen die minder negatieve bijwerkingen
veroorzaken. Als de verbetering voldoende groot is ten opzichte van het
bestaande octrooi, wordt aan de nieuwheidseisen van het octrooibureau voldaan.
Het is de concurrent dan toegestaan om met zijn verbetring de markt te betreden.
Het hangt dus van de strengheid van beoordelen van het octrooibureau af hoe
groot de dreiging van verbeteringen voor de octrooihouder is. Hoofdstuk 3
introduceert hiervoor de 'hoogte' van octrooibescherming, gegeven door de
strengheid van beoordelen. Hoe hoger de bescherming voor de octrooihouder -
dus hoe strenger de beoordeling in het octrooibureau -, hoe moeilijker het is voor
een concurrent om een voldoende verbetering te genereren en tot de markt toe te
treden. De effecten van octrooihoogte op de concurrentie in een markt kunnen in
drie categorieën ingedeeld worden. In de eerste catégorie van lage octrooi-
bescherming hebben octrooien geen invloed op de natuurlijke marktuitkomst
(zonder octrooien). De reden hiervoor is dat een concurrent met zijn verbetering
een natuurlijke afstand houdt van het geoctrooieerde produkt met als doel de
prijsconcurrentie minder sterk te maken. In de middencategorie kan een octrooi
meer winst opleveren voor de octrooihouder en minder voor de concurrent,
omdat deze een grotere verbetering moet genereren dan optimaal voor hem is. In
deze catégorie kan het hebben van een octrooi echter ook een handicap zijn,
omdat het verplicht een minder winstgevende positie te kiezen. De laatste
catégorie, tenslotte, van hoge octrooibescherming, is altijd voordelig voor de
octrooihouder omdat het octrooi hem dan een absolute monopoliepositie
verschaft.
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt bekeken welke restricties een octrooihouder kan onder-
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vinden door regels van mededingingsbeleid. Er bestaat een bijna natuurlijk
conflict tussen octrooi- en mededingingsbeleid; octrooibeleid verschaft monopo-
lieposities (om innovaties te stimuleren), terwijl mededingingsbeleid vaak mono-
polieposities bestrijdt (om de sociale kosten die worden veroorzaakt door mono-
polies te beperken). Het hoofdstuk spitst zich toe op de 'breedte' van octrooi-
bescherming en de praktijk van prijsdiscriminatie.
Ik zal eerst op de octrooibreedte ingaan. Zoals eerder gezegd is octrooihoogte
een indicatie van de bescherming tegen uerbeferiwgen van een geoctrooieerd
produkt. Octrooibreedte daarentegen geeft de mate van bescherming aan tegen
zmi'fflh'es van het nieuwe produkt. Wat is het verschil tussen hoogte en breedte, en
daarmee samenhangend, tussen verbeteringen en imitaties? Ten eerste is er een
technisch verschil. Hoogte geeft het minimum aantal nieuwe elementen aan dat
een verbetering moet bevatten om door het octrooibureau heen te geraken.
Breedte geeft het aantal elementen van het geoctrooieerde produkt aan dat een
gelijkaardig produkt (een imitatie) maximaal mag bevatten om geen inbreuk te
plegen op het octrooi. Dus hoogte is een indicatie van de vereiste nieuwheid en
breedte van de toegestane gelijkheid. Een tweede verschil betreft de kosten van
verbeteringen en imitaties. Verbeteringen vereisen over het algemeen meer
investeringen in O&O, omdat nieuwe elementen moeten worden voortgebracht,
dan imitaties, waarin bestaande elementen worden nagemaakt. Een derde
verschil tenslotte heeft te maken met de perceptie van consumenten. Tegen
gelijke prijzen zal een consument bijvoorbeeld een verbeterd geneesmiddel met
minder bijwerkingen prefereren boven het oudere geneesmiddel. In het geval van
imitaties zullen sommige consumenten het originele middel prefereren terwijl
andere consumenten geïmiteerde, gelijkaardige varianten prefereren.
Omdat octrooibreedte de bescherming tegen gelijkaardige substiruten aan-
geeft, is het in essentie een maat van monopoliemacht van de octrooihouder. Als
nu de breedte die een octrooihouder wordt verschaft verschilt tussen twee landen
dan zou, cetens panbus, de monopoliemacht en dus de optimale prijs per land
verschillen. Echter, vaak wordt het vanuit mededingingsbeleid verboden om
verschillende prijzen voor hetzelfde produkt te vragen. In Europa bijvoorbeeld is
prijsdiscriminatie niet toegestaan. De reden hiervoor is dat, onder bepaalde
voorwaarden, de welvaart bij prijsdiscriminatie lager is dan bij uniforme prijzen.
De winst echter van een bedrijf dat prijsdiscriminatie toepast, is over het
algemeen hoger dan van een bedrijf dat uniforme prijzen hanteert. Hoofdstuk 4
gaat in op de vraag hoe een potentiële innovator het best, vanuit sociaal oogpunt,
een bepaalde minimum winst, nodig om hem tot O&O aan te zetten, kan worden
voorzien. Zoals gezegd levert prijsdiscriminatie meer winst op maar minder
welvaart, terwijl uniforme prijzen minder winst maar meer welvaart opleveren.
De vraag is dus wat de meeste welvaart per eented u>inst oplevert. In een model
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